EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, July 14, 1930.

No. 1082

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS. AUG 8 - 1930 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUG 5 1930 ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR DIGEST

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AUG 6 1930

DEPARTMENT OF STATE JUL 31 1930 DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU 767.91/39

FILED AUG 12 1930

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report disturbances along the Turco-Persian frontier considerably more serious than the usual raids occasioned by nomadic tribes as they drift back and forth across the border in search of pasture for their cattle. It appears that incursions into Turkey of bands from Persia, alleged to have been armed and equipped there, have coincided with an uprising led by certain Kurdish chieftains in the interest of a reactionary movement.

An intensive campaign of the Government to clean up this disturbed area began on July 5 when two army corps were sent against the so-called brigands who are

operating

operating principally in the vicinity of the two mountains, Ağri-Dağ (Ararat) and Suphan-Dağ. A third corps was sent from Istanbul and Brusa, bringing the Turkish expeditionary force up to a total of approximately 15,000 men.

The fighting appears to be taking place in three vilayets: Van, (the northern part) Bitlis and Bayazit as well as extending into Persian territory near Maku. The Turks are employing airplanes. The Kurds are armed with machine guns. The latest official communiqué states that the frontier is rapidly being freed from banditry and that the Kurdish trouble-makers have either been exterminated or driven back to Persia from where they came.

Such are the reported facts in a situation fraught with rumors and potential complications for Turkey. It is too early to learn the true story of events, if indeed this ever will be known. The following points, however, should be kept in mind:

1. The extensive publicity now given in the press to recent events along the northeastern frontier, especially when contrasted with the previous complete lack of news tends to bring into exaggerated emphasis a situation which has never in recent years been altogether quiescent. News coming from Persia via Europe forced the Government to issue statements which are now most detailed and of course optimistic.

2. The Turco-Persian frontier has always been a source of trouble between the two Governments. An exchange of notes signed April 9, 1929, attempted to

settle

settle the problem by delimiting the frontier. However, certain points in dispute, notably the disposition of three series of villages: Maku, Kotur and Bulak Başi, were left to a border commission. This commission has been frequently interrupted in its labors.

3. While the Turkish press has been accusing the Persians of arming and inciting Kurdish bands to raid Turkish territory, it seems more likely that Persia is unable to keep her own frontier in order. The Persian Government is said to have armed certain tribes to keep down the others and in this fashion has created a guerrilla force which she is often unable to control. I am reliably informed that the Persian frontier force has been increased to 2,000 men and that Persia is making attempts to cooperate with the Turkish troops.

Relations between the two countries are cordial enough. Turkey is keeping her Ambassador Şevket Bey, in Teheran to complete the settlement of the frontier question and to confer over border difficulties. Tevfik Rüştü Bey did state to the British Ambassador that he was seriously considering sending notes to the Secretary of State and to Mr. Litvinoff calling their attention to Persia's obligations as a signatory to the Kellogg Pact. However, the characteristic impulsiveness of the Foreign Minister does not seem to have led to such steps, particularly since Turkey now appears master of the situation within her borders.

4. There is no doubt that politically the present disturbances are of potential danger to Turkey, although any insurrection coming from a reactionary movement based on tribal, religious and social grounds appears so far to

have

have been suppressed. Selahettin, the son of Sheik Sait, Kurdish leader of the 1925 revolt, was arrested some time ago for stirring up sedition in the Eastern provinces. He had become President of his father's secret society, "The Friends of Kurdistan", and was said to have been backed by the British authorities at Baghdad. His trial and that of his associates has been postponed until July 18 to await other prisoners captured in the present operations.

Selahettin's secret organization and the Hubyan Society (another Kurdish secret body) as well as the discontented elements left over from the 1925 rebellion may not be unrelated to the present disturbances. Although these are taking place in the north of the eastern provinces while the insurrection of 1925 occurred on Turkey's southern border, the reactionary leaders can of course easily shift the scene of their operations. The southern border is reported as orderly.

5. It is difficult to ascertain the rôle of the Soviets in Turkey's eastern frontier question. During the past year they are reported as having driven out various Mohammedan elements from their villages near the Turkish border. These elements are received favorably in Turkey. Conversely, conditions around Maku (Persian frontier) are said to have been aggravated by recent Soviet incursions into Persia in pursuit of fugitives from Russia. These incursions have laid waste the country and have forced the tribes to keep on the move, often into Turkish territory.

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While the Government has apparently not considered the situation serious enough to make an official statement under the signature of one of its leaders, there is no doubt that it is doing everything within its power to avoid a recurrence of the 1925 insurrection. So far it appears to have been successful.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Joseph C. Grew

Joseph C. Grew

Copy sent to American Legation Teheran.

Copy sent E. I. C., Paris.

4 Carbon Copies

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2 copies detached

for Note.

KW

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Teheran, Persia,
July 15, 1930.

No. 121.

AUG 8 30

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 7 1930
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Confidential

FOR DISTR

INDEX BUREAU
N 767.91/40

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

With reference to the penultimate paragraph of my despatch No. 111 of June 31, 1930, regarding the disturbances on the Perso-Turkish border, I have the honor to report that, according to Reuter's news despatch from London, the Turkish Government has complained to the Persian Government with regard to the activities of bands of Kurds who have entered Turkey from Persia, pillaging the country

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and inciting the inhabitants to rebel. The report continues that strong forces of Turkish troops with aeroplanes have inflicted severe losses on the raiders; that remnants of one band are holding out on the heights of Mount Ararat, and that troops are watching both sides of the Turco-Persian frontier. Asked whether the reports concerning these disturbances were true, the Turkish Ambassador said that they were nearly accurate and gave the following details.

He said that for some time the Turkish officials have been having difficulty with Kurdish raids into Turkish territory. Several Turkish towns were pillaged and in one case an officer and four gendarmes were killed. Caravans had been robbed and the situation was getting out of the control of the Turkish frontier guards.

The situation was complicated by the fact that the Persians had no proper frontier guards and had turned the protection of the frontier over to the various Kurdish chiefs. Though these chiefs constantly insisted that they had nothing to do with the raids into Turkish territory and denied that any of their men had taken part in these raids, the Turkish officials were convinced that these chiefs had at least indirectly aided in these raids by allowing their men to participate in them or by harboring Turkish Kurds fleeing across the border from the Turkish authorities who had carefully abstained from crossing the frontier. He

even

even feared that such Persian military as were near the frontier were none too assiduous in trying to check this practice, and might even be sharing in the spoils.

In this relation the Ambassador said that his Government had always had difficulty with the Persian frontier and, though there was a Turco-Persian protocol creating a mixed commission to settle border questions, it was impossible to get anything accomplished dealing with the Persians. He had made numerous protests to the Persian Government, which almost always agreed to all his Government's suggestions to remedy the unsatisfactory situation, but, as usual, the Persian Government did nothing about it. Turkey has similar arrangements with all its other neighbors, Bulgaria, Russia, Iraq, Syria and Greece, but there was never any difficulty even with the latter country for whom an almost national hatred existed in Turkey. He said that he believed in the sincerity of the friendship of Persia for Turkey, but the Persian habit of laisser-faire was even stronger.

Since the local frontier guards had been unable to cope with the situation a large number of Turkish troops were sent to the frontier and had succeeded practically in surrounding two principal bands of presumably Turkish Kurds, one of 1,500 between Great and Little Ararat, and another separate one of 500 in Zeilan Valley west of these mountains and north

of

of Lake Van. The Ambassador said that at all costs his Government intended to capture or crush these bands. The prisoners would be transferred in small groups to various parts of the interior of Turkey, far from the frontier, where they would be given land and some financial help to establish farms and villages. The Ambassador believed that if this were successful it would break the spirit of the other border Kurds to the south who would stop their raiding of Turkish territory.

The Turkish Ambassador had been granted home leave by his Government and was about to return to Turkey in June when the situation became aggravated and he was compelled to alter his plans.

The Ambassador does not look well and, in addition to the natural fatigue of a long residence in Persia and tedious dealing with the Persian Government, he has lately been suffering from absesses in his teeth. Even this seems to have had no effect on his habitual patience and courtesy.

With reference to the possibility of a Kurdish state between Turkey and Persia, extending north from the Iraq frontier to the Soviet border, the Ambassador said that the British desired this but that he regarded it as no more than a very remote possibility. The British hoped to control such a state and thus extend their influence to the Caucasus. This would place them in an advantageous position

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in case of hostilities with the U. S. S. R. The Kurds, he said, though great fighters, are a nomad people composed of a number of tribes whose relations with one another are not always the best. The Ambassador said that both the British and the Persians had "spoiled" the Kurds, the former in the hope of future favors, and the latter because they had not enough stamina to keep them under control. He implied that Turkey had no intention of "spoiling" these tribesmen.

The Persian press reproduced a number of articles published by Turkish newspapers accusing Persia of responsibility for the situation by its slackness in dealing with the Kurds, and even implying that the Kurds had received assistance from the Persian Government. These imputations were met with vigorous denials in the Persian newspapers which were accompanied by the most cordial expressions of friendship for Turkey. Moscow was blamed as the source of these "false rumors". The IRAN said that Soviet agents were endeavoring to represent Persia as a bad neighbor in order to justify the recent violation of Persian territory by Russian troops and the Soviet wished to injure the cordial relations between the Oriental peoples.

It is understood that the Persian Government has sent troops to the border, who will at least make a show of assisting the Turkish authorities by attempting to close the Persian border to Kurdish

refugees

refugees and Persian Kurds who might assist the fellows on the other side of the line.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Charles C. Hart.

Copy to American Embassy, Istanbul.

4 Carbon Copies
Received KH C
KW

3 copies detached
for notes
KW

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

INDEX BUREAU
767.91/41

SEE 867.401/12 FOR Memorandum

FROM State Department, Near (Ferrin) DATED July 14, 1930.
TO Eastern Division NAME

1—1127 ...

REGARDING:

the history of the Kurdish tribes of Persia, Turkey, and Iraq, their troublesome nature, various rebellions, etc., leading up to a consideration of the present unsettled conditions along the Perso-Turkish frontier affecting the relations between Persia and Turkey.

mb/

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Istanbul, July 26, 1930.

AM RECD

No. 1101

AUG 13 30

FOR DIS...

Assistant Secretary of State
AUG 19 1930
MR. CASTLE

INDEX BUREAU
N
767.91/42

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 1930
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

767.91/39

In continuation of my despatch No. 1082 of July 14, 1930, reporting disturbances on the Turco-Persian frontier, I have the honor to state that recent press despatches and an official communiqué indicate that the Turkish forces have now been able to localize the uprising to the vicinity of Agri-Dag (Mt. Ararat). To accomplish this an encircling movement was directed against the so-called "bandits" who were forced to retreat into Persia. In the Zeylan and Erdiç regions the hostile forces were defeated only after severe fighting and a considerable loss of life on both sides. Three thousand Kurds are reported to have been killed. The serious character of the action was not minimized by the Foreign Minister himself when he informed

me

AUG 20 1930

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me that three Turkish airplanes had been shot down.

Salih Pasha who was brought from the Eighth Corps area to lead the Government's forces has now moved his headquarters to Bayazit and has opened the second phase of his campaign, which has as objective the complete subjugation of the Kurds who inhabit the rugged slopes of Agri-Dag. It is unlikely that the Turks will attempt to seize this mountain stronghold by storm being content to wait for the first snows in August to drive the Kurds down from their positions. The present campaign is therefore by no means finished.

Meanwhile another uprising is reported to have broken out along Turkey's Iraq border. The Greek Military Attaché, Colonel Palidis, states that some five thousand Turkish troops have been despatched to the Iraq border (in addition to the fifteen thousand on the Persian border) to meet the invaders who are said to be made up of Kurdish, Assyrian and Armenian elements. Reports of this uprising are only now beginning to appear in the press. Colonel Palidis states further that a general mobilization order calling out four classes of reservists has been applied to the 6th, 8th and 9th Army corps.

767.90J

Although the Greek Attaché's estimate of the situation as comparable to the 1925 revolt may not be justified, the above facts together with his recall to Athens to report personally on events show the importance placed thereon by his Government.

The following proclamation of Ibrahim Tali Bey, Inspector General of the Eastern Provinces, does indeed

flavor

flavor of the 1925 rebellion in its appeal to the citizenry:

> "Compatriots, I have learned that some foreigners in cooperation with certain fugitives are at work in order to lead you into the mistake of creating disturbances. Two of these instigators have been arrested and will receive the punishment they deserve.
>
> "Compatriots, the strength of the Government is far greater than you appreciate. You remember that three or four years ago none of those who had offended the law could be saved, and that those who had induced you to commit offenses immediately fled across the frontier in order to place themselves under the protection of a foreign power.
>
> "Honest compatriots, attend to your tasks, reap an abundant harvest, try to increase the number of your cattle, and do not let yourselves be beguiled by these diabolical instigators who are trying to betray you, because you will not be able in the end to escape the severity of the law."

The exact background of these uprisings is difficult to prove, although it is undoubtedly to be found in the various ramifications of Turkey's complicated Kurdish problem. The Government's campaign to break up the feudal elements in the eastern provinces, including the tribal organization of the Kurds, has not only created discontented elements in Turkey but has furnished a field for foreign intrigue. It is unlikely that the discontent prevalent in the eastern provinces would have manifested itself in uprisings without the intervention of foreign elements adjacent to Turkey's frontiers.

In the case of the present uprising these elements appear to be as follows:

> (1) Kurdish tribes along the frontiers of Persia, Iraq and Russia which recognize no boundary in their nomadic existence and which are always fomenting discontent among their fellow tribesmen in Turkey.
>
> (2) Kurdish brigands who plunder in Turkish territory and then flee into Persia.
>
> (3) Reactionaries from Syria and Iraq consisting largely of former Turkish Army officers of Kurdish and Turkish origin who oppose the national regime. The Hubyan Society is one of the most active Kurdish organizations and maintains headquarters at Aleppo.

(4) Former

(4) Former Turkish minorities - principally Armenians and Assyrians - who are now working from Aleppo. The press makes mention that, besides former Turkish Army officers, Armenians have been identified among enemy casualties.

There is increasing evidence that the part played by the armed Kurdish bands coming from Persia is relatively insignificant as compared with other elements in causing the present uprising. There is at least some reason to believe that the present troubles are part of a preconceived plan of the enemies of Turkish nationalism. Their propaganda has found a fertile field in the north-east corner of Turkey which has suffered from economic depression and where the population through past disturbances and transportations, as well as by crop failures, has lost virtually all its means of subsistence with the result that it is only too willing to take to brigandage. This propaganda appears to have permeated the Army itself. I am reliably informed that one regiment near the Caucasian border mutinied in the present campaign against the Kurds. The Turks further admit being obliged to resort to severe repressive measures and to the "pacification" of some 200 villages, which usually means their complete annihilation including men, women and children.

The Government realizes the danger of a Turkey weakened by internal disorder and has announced that it will clean up the disturbed areas once and for all. The number of troops now operating is privately estimated at 15,000 in the north and 5,000 in the south. The large official purchases of motor trucks destined for Anatolia which have been made within the past week in this market indicates

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the thoroughness with which the Government is carrying on operations. These operations necessarily entail large expenditures which may tend to upset the Government's budget.

I am inclined to believe that the Turks cannot afford to carry on a costly campaign against the Kurds once the danger of an insurrection is removed. I also believe that the complete subjugation and cleaning-up of the so called ""infested areas" will not be accomplished by any single military campaign. It is more likely that once comparative order has been restored, the conciliatory policy of Ibrahim Tali Bey, Inspector General of the Eastern Provinces, will continue.

Coincident with events on the Persian border comes the announcement that Shevket Bey, Turkish Ambassador to Persia, has resigned and that Husrev Bey has been chosen as his successor. Political motives are said to have resulted in Shevket Bey's resignation.

701.6791

Although the press attack against Persia has subsided, the Government continues to regard her as the culprit in not taking sufficient steps to control her frontier. The Foreign Minister informs me that he is preparing a note to Persia summarizing events and that he will insist that if the Persian Government cannot suppress the Kurdish bands the Turkish Government be allowed to take such steps as might be necessary, even to military operations on Persian territory. The Minister thought that it would require about a year to complete the necessary understanding with Persia. This will no doubt include the work of the frontier commission. In this respect the Persian Chargé d'Affaires

at

at Ankara stated to a member of my staff that the Turkish Government, in attempting to cover up internal difficulties by making Persia the scape-goat, is desirous of securing a rectification of the boundary giving her certain strategic points in Persia rather than a mere delimitation based on the 1913 agreement. These points consisting of three series of villages have long been occupied by Turkish forces. There is no doubt that some working arrangement for cooperation between the two Governments in controlling outlawry and brigandage along the border will help solve Turkey's difficulties, although it should not be forgotten that the Kurdish tribes in Persia enjoy autonomy and that the Persians have little to lose from chaotic border conditions. In fact the Foreign Minister indicated to me that such conditions might well meet with the approval of Teheran in the belief that the Kurdish bands would sometime prove useful against Turkey.

767.9115

While the Persians are openly accused by the press, there is a less heralded but nevertheless strong under-current of opinion both in Turkish and diplomatic circles that Great Britain may have a finger in the pie in furnishing arms and munitions or at least in not taking sufficiently energetic measures to prevent the tribes of the Mosul region from fomenting constant trouble along the frontier. The recent report that an uprising has broken out there and that Colonel Lawrence had appeared at Rowanduz, Irak, within thirty miles of the Persian-Turkish border is cited in connection with the suspicion of British connivance.

The

The Soviets are apparently playing a passive role in these events. Their border patrols are reported as extremely vigilant and as having offered the Turks their cooperation.

An interesting sidelight is the report from Ankara that Kurds in the United States have been providing their countrymen in Turkey and in the Hubyan society in Syria with funds for the past two years. It appears that this was reported by the Turkish Ambassador in Washington sometime ago. In this connection, the POLITIKA, a local Turkish
1/ newspaper, reproduces the enclosed heading of the Assyrian-American Courier which it describes as a propaganda organ published in America for distribution to "Assyrian-Kurds". It is furthermore my recollection that communications addressed to the Department from a Kurdish organization in the United States emanated from the same source as pro-Armenian propaganda.

Note 811.044/18

It would seem to be possible therefore that minority organizations in the United States (Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians) may be drawn together in unity of action against the common foe, Turkey. I should appreciate receiving any pertinent information the Department may receive regarding such a movement.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Joseph C. Grew.

4 Carbon Copies
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1. Enclosure:
Heading of the Assyrian American Courier.

Copy sent to American Legation Teheran.

1 Copy detached for Note

ENCLOSURE No. 1.

ASSYRIAN AMERICAN COURIER

(FORMERLY PERSIAN AMERICAN COURIER.)

JOEL E. WERDA, Editor and Publisher

CHURCH STREET HARTFORD CONN

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VOL VIII No. 39

DECEMBER 1 1923

Asuri Kürtlere dağıtılmak üzere Amerikada çıkarılan propaganda gazetesi

POLITIKA - July 23, 1930

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 16 1930
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

VAHAN CARDASHIAN
COUNSELOR AT LAW
1 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK
TELEPHONE ASHLAND 2126

August 13, 1930.

Index Bureau
RECEIVED
AUG 14 1930
Dept. of State

Personal.

12 August 1930

Dear Mr. Murray: August 26, 1930.

Senator King has frequently spoken of you in high terms, and suggested that you may perhaps welcome such information upon the Turkish situation as may reach me privately.

I have a report, dated June 27, from Ihsan Noury, Kurdish Commander at Ararat. He says: Between June 11 and 25, they brought down three Turkish planes; the aerial attacks were harmless; the Turks attacked, almost continuously, in small units, most of which were destroyed; battles are taking place in the regions of Van, Ikdir, Zeilan and Sassoon; Turkish losses exceed 12,000; the Turkish field army, about 70,000; his communication with Persia unimpaired, and unlikely to be impaired (the frontier is 150 miles long); Turkish troops are ill-fed; many are deserting. The general situation satisfactory and encouraging.

Another report, about three weeks' old, from The Hoyboon, Aleppo office. The Kurds massacred most Tartars at Bayazid and most Turks around Van. The Turks dumped all the male Kurds of the valley of Abaka into the Lake Van, and drove off the women and children. The Turks are deporting (this is equivalent to massacre) all the Kurds from the Provinces of Erzerum, Harput, north Van and north Bitlis and north-west Diarbekir, and have destroyed all those, about 50,000, around Ararat.

Mr. Vratzian, Premier of the ousted Armenian Government (1921) and Chairman of the Central Bureau of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, which assists in the direction of the Kurdish movement, and who is now here on a short visit, tells me, this year's Kurdish venture has limited purposes, namely, to try the Kurd's staying power; to cut him loose from the Turk, and to train him in fighting modern arms.

He expects, as even Kurdish leaders, the Turks will massacre the Kurds in the exposed points, at a cost to themselves of a minimum of 50,000 casualties and over

Hon. Wallace Murray,
Near Eastern Division,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

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100,000,000 Turkish pounds. He now feels that the Turks proved to be much weaker than he had believed, and that the prestige of Kemal is well-nigh gone, which should play an important role in determining the attitude of the Kurds who remained passive. It is of course still possible for Turkey to win over the Kurds, by offering them autonomy, but the prestige of Kemal and the Kurds' temper would argue against it. Also, by concentrating great forces, Kemal may reduce the movement, but that would only be a spur to the Kurds' fighting spirit.

The chief of operations at Ararat is an Armenian, who is assisted by several Armenian officers and technicians. The Kurds of Persia, Iraq and Syria have already established armed contact with those of Turkey. They are now in possession of parcels of Turkish soil about Ararat, through Persia; in Hekkiari, through Iraq, and in El-Djezireh, south of Diarbekir, through Syria.

The events to-date have served to emphasize the fiscal and economic crisis in Turkey, and will probably result in a general break-up and in a realignment of forces.

Two things, however, now appear certain: Turkey, as a means of securing loans, must surrender her financial and juridical sovereignty, and she must retire from the regions east of the Euphrates River, that is, the Armenian plateau and Kurdistan. The first step may involve political complications with Russia; the second may not be taken in the near future, but it shall be, ultimately.

Very sincerely yours,

William Christman

August 13, 1930.

767.91/43

Dear Mr. Cartashian:

Mr. Murray is now away from Washington on his annual vacation, but as soon as he returns I shall bring to his attention your letter of August 12, 1930, together with its enclosure.

Sincerely yours,

Paul H. Alling

Mr. Vahan Cartashian,
1 Madison Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

NE PHA:HN

CR
Aug. 13, 1930.

No. 251

August 13, 1930.

To the American Ambassador,
Istanbul.

The Secretary of [illegible] one confidential information [illegible] Ambassador a copy of a letter dated August 12, 1930, from Mr. Vahan Cardashian, with regard to the Kurdish disturbances in eastern Turkey.

767.91/43

Enclosure:

Copy of letter dated
August 12, 1930.

NE PHA:HN

CR
Aug. 13.1930.

A true copy of the [illegible] orig-

August 26, 1930

Dear Mr. Cardashian:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 12, 1930 which was delivered to me yesterday on my return from a month's leave of absence.

Sincerely yours,

Wallace Murray

Vahan Cardashian, Esquire,
1 Madison Avenue,
New York City.

767.91/45
NR WSM/LVD

A true copy of the signed original.

CR
Aug. 26 1930.PM

767.91/45

THE CASE OF KURDISTAN AGAINST TURKEY

FLAG OF KURDISTAN

FW. 767.91/43.

BY AUTHORITY OF

HOYBOON

SUPREME COUNCIL OF THE KURDISH GOVERNMENT

THE CASE OF KURDISTAN AGAINST TURKEY

THE SAME TURK

By Herbert Adams Gibbons, Ph.D., Litt.D.

Correspondent New York Herald in Turkey, Egypt, Balkan States, France, 1908-18; Spencer Trask Lecturer, Princeton University, 1919; Author: The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire; The New Map of Europe; The New Map of Asia; The New Map of Africa, and other books.

One of the most common mistakes of those who have championed more warmly than wisely the successive Nationalist régimes in Turkey is their assumption that Armenians and Greeks, by failing to cooperate with the new spirit of Young Turk liberalism, were responsible for their own misfortunes and for the disruption of the Ottoman Empire. Emphasis has been placed upon the disloyalty of Christian subject races, who are said to have entered into intrigues with outside Christian Powers to destroy Moslem Turkey. Because of this disloyalty they had to be suppressed. Prince Sureya Bedr Khan's splendid exposé of the wrongs and sufferings inflicted upon the Kurds, whose official representative he is, demonstrates that the Turks have been equally implacable in their attitude towards a subject race of coreligionists.

The Kurds are Orthodox Sunnite Moslems, who worked loyally with the Turkish Government, both before and after the Revolution of 1908 and all during the World War. Their reward, as these poignant pages reveal, has been the same as that meted out to the Christian Armenians and Greeks. The motives of Turkish inhumanity to the Kurds have been the same; the methods of persecution, massacre, deportation, have been the same; the result bids fair to be the same—unless the cry of distress of the Kurds is heard by those Powers that guaranteed under the treaties of the Paris Settlement the rights of racial minorities in former enemy countries.

A study of the course of events in Turkey from the Revolution of 1908 to the outbreak of the World War leads to the conclusion that the Young Turks never had any other thought than to keep under the domination of the Turkish element all the other elements of the population of the Ottoman Empire. Their hostility was not directed against Armenians and Greeks alone: discrimination was not exercised against Christians alone. In fact, the first opposition to the "Turkifying" process inaugurated after the downfall of Abd-ul-Hamid came from Moslem Arabs and Albanians. The Arab revolt in the Hauran and the two Albanian revolts in the mountain regions of what was still at that time Turkey-in-Europe exhausted the Turkish Army and contributed greatly to the startling weakness of the Turks in the disastrous First Balkan War of 1912-1913. These revolts were more serious than the war with Turkey. They were provoked by the determination of the Young Turks to impose their will upon non-Turkish elements. Although numerically less than half the population of the Empire, the Young Turks had decided that three out of four in the Constantinople Parliament must be of their own race. That was their idea of a constitutional régime!

Prince Sureya's story of what has been happening in Kurdistan since 1925 proves that the Turk does not change his political conceptions—and his methods of realizing them. The Kurds were given liberal promises, then tricked into doing work for the Turks that paved the way for their own martyrdom and enslavement. When they woke up to this, they found that the Angora Government knew only the one traditional Turkish method of dealing with them. They were to be assimilated, and, if they refused assimilation, exterminated by massacre and deportation. To prevent undergoing the fate of the Armenians, they sprang to arms. The revolution started sooner than was intended, and the Kurds were at a disadvantage. But they managed to hold their own, in a good part of their territory, defeating successive Turkish armies sent against them, as the Albanians and Arabs had done. History has been repeating itself. More than half the Kurdish nation has been killed or exiled; but the war goes on into its fourth winter.

The outside world knows little, or nothing, of this last tragedy in the bloody history of Turkey—a tragedy that

is still being enacted. Kurdistan is far away, and it is an interior country, out of touch with the rest of the world. Rarely does news from Kurdistan get into the papers. Angora calls this *national* movement "an abortive rebellion." Mustafa Kemal, after using the Kurds, now vilifies them when he finds that they will not surrender the traditions of a proud race running back for a thousand years before the Turks came to Asia Minor. Emir Sureya has succeeded in getting to the United States, and now he tells us in measured language, and with the competence of a scholar, things we ought to know about the past history of Kurdistan, about the character of his people, and their present sufferings.

Prince Sureya Bedr Khan is the grandson of Prince Bedr Khan of El Djezireh, the last semi-independent Kurdish ruler. He comes to us with a mandate from the Hoyboon, the Kurdish National Council, to state the case of Kurdistan to the American people and Government. How well he is able to do this, the reader of the following pages will judge.

It is good for us to know about the Kurds and their heroic struggle to save their heritage of centuries. They say they will fight on; and I am sure that they will. Their history is a pretty good guarantee of that. It is good for us to know that the Angora Government acts towards faithful coreligionists in the same way that it has acted towards Armenians and Greeks. This statement of the case of Kurdistan against the Turks gives us a little different light upon the Armenian persecutions and the ruthless suppression of Hellenism.

The author makes clear the distinction between Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism; and he warns us that Pan-Turanianism, a racial movement and not a religious reawakening, is a new menace to world peace after having already caused much of the world's misery and woe during the last two decades. And he shows how close are the relations between Angora and Moscow.

Not the least interesting part of this story of Kurdistan is the Emir's explanation of the delay in making the Treaty of Sèvres and of the responsibility and fatal consequences of that delay. The intervention of President Wilson at the Peace Conference was actuated by the highest of motives, but for many centuries the world has known that "hell is paved with good intentions." Because of the intrigues of

France and Italy, Kemal Pasha successfully evaded the obligation of observing the treaty to which Turkish plenipotentiaries had put their signature; and because there was supposed to be much oil in Mosul, according to this prince of Kurdistan, Angora was able to negotiate a new Treaty at Lausanne, after having finished the destruction of the Armenians and Greeks. And now the Kurds are left to bear the brunt of the colossal failure to make a durable settlement of the Near Eastern Question at Paris.

We feel that those who read the case of Kurdistan against Turkey will have a better understanding of the situation in the Near East than they have even had before. It should arouse not only sympathy and interest, but the determination on our part to remedy, in so far as it is possible for us to do so, the mistakes in Near Eastern diplomacy—fatal mistakes—of the past decade, in which our own Government has had a share.

As a good Moslem Emir Sureya Bedr Khan cannot be accused of being prejudiced against the Turks because they are Mohammedans. As a good Kurd he is not open to suspicion of having been disloyal to Turkey and its rulers during the trying years of five wars. In fact, we believe that the Emir has no more prejudice against the Turks than we have. He has cooperated with them. He is of that part of the world; he knows the basic good qualities of all Near Eastern peoples.

We have alwayqs sympathized with National movements throughout the East. The right of self-determination is one that must be holy in American eyes; it was preached to us during the World War and for that ideal our young men gave their lives on the battlefields of France. We have believed that the Turks should exercise that right. The Kurds stood with the Turks to win that right. But when the Turks attempted to defend the right for themselves, and at the same time deny it to others who had been their loyal helpers, then the Kurds parted company with the Turks.

A *rapprochement* among peoples of the Near East can come only from recognition *by all* of the right to live and let live *for all.* This is the theme of Emir Sureya Bedr Khan's plea.

Princeton, N. J., December 15, 1928.

THE CASE OF KURDISTAN AGAINST TURKEY

BY PRINCE SUREYA BEDR KHAN[1]

Much of the organized propaganda for Turkey—Old and New—as distinguished from amateurish prattle, reflects necessarily the varying interests of the propagandists. The Italian press but yesterday condemned vociferously Kemal's pretensions and ridiculed his innovations; today, with the signing of a treaty which promises Italy certain economic advantages in Turkey, it professes with equal zeal admiration for the courage and far-sightedness of Kemal. The American missionary also, a short time ago only, could see no hope for the Turk who, in ten years, had annihilated over ninety-five per cent of the gains attained by the missionary in a hundred years. But today the same missionary meekly and with apparent sincerity, even at the price of a complete denial and abandonment of his primary purpose, accepts employment under Turkish direction, and has become the Turk's most zealous apologist and advocate before the world. We may not altogether agree with the wisdom and morality of these violent and artificial changes of attitude, but we can at least understand the motives of the actors.[2]

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[1] Emir (Prince) Sureya Bedr Khan is the elder grandson of Prince Bedr Khan of *Azizan,* last ruler of the semi-independent Kurdish state of El-Djezireh, which was conquered by Turkey in 1847 (See, footnote, p. 28). He is the direct descendant of Halid Ibn Valid, Chief of the tribe of Beni Kuzeim, at whose hands Mahomet, the Prophet, suffered his only defeat, and of Abd-ul-Aziz, the grandson of Halid, who conquered El-Djezireh in the 7th century, and was appointed by Omar, third Khalif, hereditary Prince-ruler of the conquered territory. Since, in unbroken succession, the forbears of Bedr Khan, down to his grandfather, ruled El-Djezireh.—Ed.

[2] In pre-war Turkey, the American missionaries maintained or supervised 1,049 schools, with an attendance of about 50,000—since reduced to 11 schools, with an attendance of about 2,500. Formerly, these schools were in truth *American mission* institutions; they enjoyed complete administrative and scholastic autonomy, and the teaching of religion formed, of necessity, the basis of their existence. Under the Kemalist regime, how-

That sort of propaganda, however, can neither help the Turk nor alter the essential facts.

From a far-flung empire, with an area of over 1,600,000 square miles and an estimated population of 45,000,000 in 1842, Turkey has shrunk to a mere shadow of her former self—320,000 square miles in area, with an estimated population of 5,500,000. More than one-half of this Turkey is in a state of complete desolation, deserted, in heaps of ruins, a veritable No Man's Land. The overwhelming majority of her people, of whom perhaps 3,500,000 are Turks, are steeped in deep ignorance, subject to hopeless, abject poverty, waiting fatastically for something to happen that may perhaps improve their unbearable lot—or end it. They care not whether they are made to wear a fez or a hat, nor whether Kemal adopts the Latin alphabet or the Swiss Code. Their only concern is that those racial elements which hitherto furnished them bread and loot are no longer there, and they themselves lack the initiative, intelligence and the means to keep body and soul together.

Taxes are nearly three times higher today than before the War; the cost of living about two and a half times greater, but the scale of wages, which hovered at around starvation point even before the War, is either at a standstill, or in spots perhaps fifty per cent higher. In the Province of Iconium, the agricultural centre of Turkey, nearly 300.000 peasants are in the grip of famine, and in the region of Harpoot, where a workman, if he should be fortunate enough to find work, can earn no more than 25 cents a day, sugar is 50 cents a pound, and bread 20 cents. These are typical in-

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ever, they have become actually *Turkified* and *secularized*. The curriculum and the appointment of teaching staff are regulated, as those of Turkish schools, by the Turkish Government, and the teaching of religion is forbidden in them. This policy of opportunism has stamped the work of the missionary as a purely commercial venture. They no longer command the respect of those whom they have betrayed nor even the confidence of those whom they are striving to "enlighten."

There is more than a passing resemblance in the situation to the custom of the Dutch traders in Japan, for some centuries preceding the opening of Japan by Perry, of tramplng upon the cross, in order to gain admittance to the country.—Ed.

stances of the general misery of the people throughout Turkey.[1]

The "budget" of the Government is fixed arbitrarily at $95,000,000; but the revenue, in reality, is barely two-thirds of that, and over one-half of the revenue used for the army. Bribe taking, commonly known as Bakshish,—an almost legalized institution in pre-war Turkey,—is today practised even more methodically and systematically than ever before. The Turkish official must eat.

In an effort to distract attention from this tragic condition of things, much noise is made by a few hundred gallicized Turks, and especially interested foreigners, about the so-called reforms which exist chiefly on paper, and isolated attempts at reconstruction.

A few miles of military railways have been constructed; a number of new buildings have been put up at Angora and Constantinople; some tractors, motors and other machinery have been imported; but these haphazard gestures only compel the conclusion that Kemalist Turkey possesses neither the brains nor the resources to realize the aims and ambitions of its spokesmen.[2]

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[1] A state of famine now obtains in the regions of Iconium, Sivas, Cesarea, Nigde and Eregli, and the failure of crops is now threatening the whole of Turkey with famine. The Government has appointed a special committee to study the situation, and to provide, if possible, food concoctions of cheap and debased matter.—Ed.

[2] Both the fiscal and economic position of Turkey are hopeless, and is rapidly approaching collapse.

The productive capacity has been reduced, as shown by all available data, to hardly 25 per cent of the pre-war capacity.

The revenues of the Government, in spite of oppressive taxes, cover only about 60 per cent of its expenditures, which still remain at the pre-war level, although Palestine, Syria, Arabia and Mesopotamia have been detached.

The Government has suspended interest and administrative services on the public debt, and has seized the sources of revenue allotted to the Administration of the Foreign Debt. (An agreement has been recently effected.) In 1881, Turkey defaulted on her foreign obligations, amounting to about $1,000,000,000. By an agreement with her creditors, this debt was reduced to $573,036,170, and its administration was entrusted to a Committee of the Bondholders, known as The Administration of Public Debt, to which was assigned certain sources of revenue.

Indeed, Turkey has never redeemed any part of her public debt—foreign or domestic,—and has repudiated most of the latter, and has never paid interest on the remainder.

The balance of trade has always been against Turkey, and, according to a Turkish writer on finance, her public wealth, estimated by him at $250,000,000, will be exhausted within 8 years, at the present rate of adverse trade balance.

The budgetary deficits of the Government from 1909 to 1924 amounted to $1,615,500,000, which were partly met by loans—foreign and domestic—and requisitions, and largely by formal repudiation or a mere confession of inability to pay.

The domestic debt is created, not by loans as is customary in civilized countries,

The pretensions as to Kemal's military and diplomatic successes and capacities are equally misleading. True, Kemal conquered a Greek army which refused to fight, and, also, through the active help of the Bolsheviki and of the Tartars, he overcame the Armenian Republic of Erivan. But, in the autumn of 1922, he dared not cross the line defined at the Dardanelles by General Harrington, who commanded a force of only 20,000 men. The policy of tolerance which the Allies pursued at Lausanne, and are still pursuing, was dictated solely by certain provisions of the treaty of alliance between Angora and Moscow. One of these provisions is that, under certain conditions, the Bolsheviki will lend military help to Turkey. Kemal knows too well that it would be quite a risky thing for him to be rescued by the Reds, yet a drowning man clutches at a straw. The Allies fully realize the possible consequences of pressing Kemal too hard because, if the Reds should once enter Turkey, it might be

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but by inflating the currency, that is, by printing fiat money. Requisition means arbitrary seizure of property.

If the present Government attempts to balance its budget, even eliminating the charges due to the public debt, it must either reduce the size of the Army by about one-half, or curtail its civil branch by nearly two-thirds. In either case, internal dissolution, factional strife or foreign aggression would certainly follow. To borrow in Europe, Turkey must recognize her public debt and accept the control of foreign creditors over her finances.

During the past three years, the adverse balance of trade has been met by the sale of "abandoned property," (the property of expelled Christians) by funds belonging to these Christians and seized from the Banks; by sale of State property—of the Sultanate and Pious Foundations (Evkaf), and, also, by credits, inspired by the hope of concessions to exploit the resources of the country.

The following figures show the fiscal and economic position at present:

Medium of Exchange—Paper Currency	
Paper currency issued since 1915—Face Value	$628,000,000
Present market value	70,000,000
Gold in Reserve or Collateral	None
PUBLIC DEBT	
Foreign Debt, Turkey's share, exclusive of allocations to succession States	$586,000,000
Domestic Debt. Depreciated to	205,958,877
	$791,958,877

	Revenue	*Expenditure*
1913	$125,000,000	$150,000,000
1923	50,000,000	85,000,000
1924	80,000,000	150,000,000
	Exports	*Imports*
1912	$108,000,000	$198,000,000
1923	51,000,000	87,000,000
	U. S. Exports to Turkey	*U. S. Imports from Turkey*
1923	$3,500,000	$13,008,000
1926	2,927,980	16,834,463

quite difficult to dislodge them. That is the sum total of Kemal's alleged military power. It is also the secret of his arrogance.

The inevitable process of economic and physical disintegration is now taking place in Turkey. An examination of the Kurdish problem will shed much light upon the background and ultimate issue of this process.

Turks' Policy Toward Non-Turks

The Turks' policy toward the non-Turks—Greek, Armenian, Kurd, Serb, Arab and others—from the beginning to cause and a common purpose. At certain periods and under this day, has a common background, a common moving compulsion the Turk has altered the form of his rule, his methods and professions, but the underlying cause of his policy and his purpose have remained, and remain, unchanged.

That policy is fixed and directed by a realization of his own physical (numerical) inadequacy, his economic sterility and inability to survive. In consequence, by the natural urge of self-preservation he has sought to make up and supplement his native defects in these respects by the *pacific or forced assimilation* of other races and by *loot*. Deprived of these two artificial sources of life, the Turks as a ruling race would long since have died out from inanition.

Heredity, training, religious fanaticism, intrigue, provocation, and what not have been and may again be offered in explanation of the Turk's outbursts of savagery. In reality, the root of all these abnormal manifestations has been and is the desire of the Turk to strengthen and sustain his race—by the abnormal means of forced accretions.

Most races seek and have sought to live and to grow through normal processes—with due regard to the rights of others. In this respect, the Turk is perhaps the only exception in the annals of history; he has so far maintained his ranks and has recruited his racial ranks by drawing upon others, quite regardless of their rights. Considerations of morality aside, the status of the Turk in the civilized world is both extraordinary and anomalous. Even the Turkish chauvinist now realizes that the life of the parasite can last no longer than that of his victim, and he is today faced for the first time, with the grim, cruel law that his life is strictly

limited to his own capacity and ability to reproduce and produce.

Since this is the crux of the Turk's problem, of which the Kurdish problem and the Armenian problem are only by-products, the subject deserves further elucidation.

Rise and Decadence of the Turk

The course of Turkish history, down to the rise of the Young Turks, has been marked by *three* main stages. It has now entered the fourth, and perhaps the last, stage.

A review of the physical and political development of the Turk will show that his great adventure—a mere prowling jaunt in the beginning—gradually grew into an organized industry, under such euphonious titles as Sultanate, Empire and Republic, from the earliest times always motivated by the necessity and the purpose to enslave or to annihilate, to loot or to absorb. It will also reveal the fundamental cause of his unending troubles with the non-Turks on one hand, and the hopelessness of his latest attempt at survival on his own account on the other.

A Mongolian, his habitat in Central Asia, the Turkish race comprised many millions of predatory tribes, under the leadership of irreconcilable chieftains. One of these tribes, as early as the third century, had established a great State, reaching from Manchuria to India. In the eighth century, this State fell under the rule of the Arabs.[1] The Turks then embraced Islam and, through pacific assimilation, increased

[1] The Turks first came in contact with the Arabs in the 7th century. At the memorable battle of Nehavend (642), Khalif Omar's Army of 30,000 men, under command of Noman, destroyed Yezdegird's Persian Army of 150,000 under Firuzan, and then the whole of Persia fell under the Arabs. Yezdegird, however, fled to Merve, and sought the help of the Turks and of the Emperor of China. The Turks responded and, for several years, fought the Arabs in the regions of Merve, but, finally, retired across the Oxus. In 1055, Sultan Toghrul, the Seljuk Turk, entered Bagdad, and was welcomed by Khalif Caim as "Emperor of the East and of the West." Toghrul married Caim's daughter, and became the temporal ruler of the dominions of the Khalif. . . . In 572, Khusrou, the Persian, in revenge of his defeat by the Roman Marcian at Sargathon, raided Apamea, Syria, taking 292,000 captives, and sent thousands of Christian girls as slaves to the Khan of the Turks. But, in 626, Emperor Heraclius had these same Turks as allies against the Persian Sahr-baraz, and, in consideration, offered the hand of his daughter, Epiphanea, to the Turkish Zhebu Khan. International morality was not then upon a higher level than it is today.—Ed.

their numbers and power, and placed men of their own race on the Arabian throne.

Later, the Seljuks, another Turkish tribe, entered this Arab state, now under the overlordship of their kin, absorbed it to the extent of exploiting its resources for their own purposes, and, in the middle of the eleventh century, had extended their rule over Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria, to the very edge of the lands which bear today their racial title —Turkey.

This is the first stage of Turkish history. During this period—nearly 700 years,—as down to our own day, the Turk increased his numbers by *pacific or,* at need, *forced assimilation,* always depending for his own economic wants upon *loot* and the *labor* of those who fell under his power.

Turkish Tide at Vienna—and Back

We enter the second stage of Turkish history. The Turk was now in military control of Persia, Mesopotamia and Syria. Gathering under his banner motley legions of adventurers, mercenaries and renegades from many lands and climes, and with the virility and desperate courage of the brigand, reinforced by religious zeal and lust for booty, the Turk set out to gain the mastery of Asia Minor.

The whole of Asia Minor, from Ararat to the Dardannelles and from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, soon became his field of operations. At the extreme end, there was the little Armenian Kingdom of Ani, which was soon to succumb to Byzantine treachery and Mongol assaults (1046), to be replaced (1080) as the home of the Armenians by the Cilician[1] Kingdom along the Mediterranean, which survived till 1375. All through the rugged mountain chain, from Ararat to the Amanus, on the western edge of Syria, was held by the Kurds, under numerous chieftains, whose sole concern was the protection of their tents and homes. Beyond this thin Kurdish curtain, which screened off the Seljuk Turks from their objective, lay Asia Minor, populous and stored with dazzling riches, governed by pleasure-loving, effete politicians, in the name of Byzantium.[2]

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[1] *Cilicia* or *Seleukia,* from the family name of the House of Seleukos, Satraps of Alexander of Macedon (331-323 B. C.) in Near and Middle East; established the Seleukid dynasty; ruled in Syria, Persia, and at Bactria; the former merged, the latter obliterated by Turanians in first century A. D.—Ed.

[2] During the Eastern Empire (959), Asia Minor (240,000 Sq. M.) had a population of 32,000,000—since reduced to about 3,000,000.—Ed.

Between 1048 and 1071, while the armies of Byzantium were struggling in the northwest against the Slavs, the Seljuk Turks, methodically and persistently, worked their way into Asia Minor. They murdered whole populations; enslaved and carried away unnumbered girls and children; and looted and lay waste as far as their dominion reached. The Mongol Turk who, during the first stage of his westerly progress, had assimilated the Semitic Arab, now began to assimilate the Aryan Greek.

In 1071, Alp-Aslan, the Seljuk, inflicted a crushing defeat on Emperor Diogenes of Byzantine at Manazguert, in the region of Van, and then pushed his way almost to the very edge of the Sea of Marmora. It was in 1288 that the Ottoman Turks, under their leader, Ertogrul, numbering 444 tents, who had entered the domains of the Seljuks in 1257, were granted a tract of land at Sugut, midway between Angora and Brusa, and subsequently, fell heir to the estate of Apl-Aslan, the Seljuk Turk.

The passing of power from the Seljuks into the hands of the Osmanli Turks was accomplished without serious friction. Apart from the racial and religious kinship and common schooling, the Osmanlis found themselves under the same necessity to pursue toward the non-Turks the policy of their predecessors.

The Turk murdered to overcome opposition, to terrorize and to weaken his subjects; he forced multitudes to embrace Islam; he filled his harem with the girls and women of almost all the races which fell under him.

Orkhan, the second Sultan (1326-1359), by law, decreed that Christian families should deliver to the State, as a special tax, male children between the ages of 7 and 10. In 1453, when Mahomet captured Constantinople, he massacred or enslaved the whole population. Suleyman, in 1526, in one of his fifteen invasions of Hungary, massacred 200,000, and enslaved 100,000. Serb, Arab, Greek, Kurd, Armenian, Albanian, Circassian, from the beginning of the Turk's rule to this day, have been compelled to furnish their quotas of flesh and goods toward the preservation and sustenance of the Turk. It is extremely doubtful if ten out of a hundred of present day Turks, now numbering about 3,500,000, can trace their ancestry back to the invading Turkish race.

It is likewise remarkable that the overwhelming majority

of Turkish leaders, generals and statesmen, and all the Sultans, following the tenth Sultan, have been and are either renegades or of mixed parentage. Mahomet's Admiral, who captured Constantinople, was a renegade Bulgarian. Talaat, Turkey's war-time Grand Vizier, was a Bulgarian Pomak, and his two immediate predecessors—Shevket and Prince Halim—were Arabs. Mustapha Kemal is the grandson of a renegade Croat from Nish. Ismet, his Premier, is a Kurd from Rafan, and so is also Fevzi, his former Premier and now Chief of Staff, a Kurd from Tarjan; Reouf, another of Kemal's Premiers, now an exile, is a Circassian. Indeed, renegades, the endless internecine strife of conquered races and the jealousies *interse* of the great nations are what have made possible the success of the Turk and the preservation of his power to this day. Kemal's success, albeit temporary, is due to the conflicting interests of the Principal Allies of Western Europe and to the support of the Reds.[1]

How, then, it may be asked, can we account for the survival of millions of non-Turks, if the Turk was bent upon murder, forced assimilation and loot as essential guarantees of self-preservation? The answer is that the Turk's policy toward the non-Turks was limited by both his power and his opportunity as well as by considerations of self-interest.

When Mahomet captured Constantinople he massacred and enslaved the whole population; but he allowed the Greek and Armenian to conduct the business of the nation and engage in productive pursuits for the wants of the State. Greeks, at some places, notably in Crete, were never completely subjugated. In the mountains of Sassoon and Zeitun, even down to our own day, the Armenian maintained him-

[1] The Turks of Turkey are basically of the most primitive and backward branch of the Mongolian race. Upon that stock is grafted a hodge-podge of renegades, slaves, captives and forced converts, drawn from all the races bordering upon the Mediterranean and Black Seas. There is also a large element provided by black slaves from the Soudan and Central Africa. The piratical monopoly of these seas which was held by the Turks for so many centuries, down even to the middle of the 19th century, was a magnet which drew the lawless and criminal from all parts of the world. Of this blending of the primitive, the savage, the stupidly brutal and atavistic products is composed the Turk of to-day. The retention by him of his primordial traits is explained by the Mendelian Law, which, as applied to anthropology, is stated by Madison Grant in the following terms: ". . . The result of the mixture of two races, in the long run, gives us a race reverting to the more ancient, generalized and lower type." —Ed.

self in a state of rebellion. The Serb fought the invader in the Black Mountains; the Albanian mountaineer never bowed to him. The Kurd, up to a century ago, never allowed his Zapties and tax gatherers within the precincts of Kurdistan, and even today he holds fringes of his soil against the pretensions of Kemal.

The main and the specific point which I desire to stress is this: From the beginning of his career to this day, the Turk increased and replenished his numbers *by drawing upon other races,* and he maintained his State and himself by robbery and brigandage. He never built, and never produced. Limited to his own capacities and resources, he must, naturally and inevitably, succumb.

From Vienna to the World War

The almost uninterrupted westerly advance of the Turkish tide was beaten back at the gates of Vienna in 1683, and in 1774 Turkey suffered even a greater defeat at the hands of Russia, and was compelled to accept the first humiliating Treaty (at Kutchuk-Kainardji), which granted Russia the right to be interested in the lot of the Orthodox subjects of the Sultan. The Turk was now on the defensive.

In this third stage of Turkish history, the problem that faced the Turk, insofar as it concerned his treatment of the non-Turk and his own problem of self-preservation, took on a new and more serious character.

The Turk was in a hopeless minority, in a sea of hostile races, in an alien world. He was now faced by two aggressive, powerful foreign States—Russia and Austria, and, later, by England and France as well. The subject races in Turkey no longer submitted meekly to the cruelty and exactions of the Government. Not only were they now conscious of their own ability to protest and resist, and of the inherent weaknesses of the ruling Turks, but they could now look to the Great Powers for help and protection.

On the other hand, if the Turk granted his subjects their just demands for equality and freedom, they would gradually assert economic and political independence; but, if he did not, he would then drive them to rebellion, and court the intervention of the Powers.

The Turk, therefore, resorted to a policy of deception and bribery—a policy which is still today the very foundation and life of Kemalist Turkey. Between 1774 and 1913, the

Turk agreed, in twenty-one international documents, to inaugurate reform measures in this or that section of his realm, and he changed the form of his government nine times. He bought off nations with gold and concessions, and by playing upon their conflicting political and economic interests.

Tactics of duplicity, however, only retarded the inevitable course of events. One race after another broke loose from Turkish grip. From the high tide of his power to this day, races numbering nearly 80,000,000, in Europe, in Asia and in Africa, have thrown off his yoke.

With the accession of Abd-ul-Hamid to power in 1877, the Turk found himself in the necessity of adopting a different national and international policy for his own preservation. Hamid believed, even as Mahomet, conqueror of Constantinople, that the non-Turk was the mainstay of the Turkish State; he also believed the chief danger to his throne lay in the ever-recurring interferences of the Powers. The foundation of his internal policy was to make lavish promises of reforms, which he would not and could not fulfill, and he sought to ward off the aggression of the Powers by an appeal to the sentiment and influence of Islam, as Califf. This new policy of Pan-Islamism served the purpose of England in holding Russia in leash; but it had no influence whatever upon the subject races in Turkey. Rebellions became the order of the day—in Albania, in Arabia, in Macedonia, in Cilician Armenia—and the futility of half-measures to satisfy the subject races and the impossibility of holding together much longer this heterogeneous mass known as Turkey, became clear to the ruler and subject alike.

Young Turks in Power

The Young Turks, now known as Kemalists, attained power in 1908, with the avowed purpose of preventing, if possible, the then threatened dismemberment of Turkey. We need not here discuss the value, much less the earnestness, of any of their professions of fraternity, equality, etc. We then knew the hidden aims and convictions, which were to shape their policy toward the non-Turks, and which they have since tried to put into execution.

According to the Young Turks, Pan-Islamism was an

asset of questionable value: even the Moslem Arab, Kurd and Albanian frowned upon it, and cherished separatist ambitions. The subject races would not be satisfied with reform measures, and, furthermore, such reform measures would be more to the advantage of the non-Turk than that of the Turk. *Elimination of the non-Turk was the only sure guarantee of removing at once the cause of internal disorders and rebellion as well as of foreign interferences.* But the elimination of the non-Turk would also destroy the racial elements upon which the Turk had heretofore drawn to increase and replenish his ranks and, for his economic existence. It was, therefore, necessary for them to join hands with the Turco-Tartars (Turanians) beyond Turkey—in Persia, in the Trans-Caucasus and beyond the Caspian. So, for Hamid's Pan-Islamism, they substituted *Pan-Turanism.*[1]

Young-Turk-Kemalist Policy Toward Non-Turks

The Young Turks entered the world war with the purpose of putting this policy into execution.[2]

In 1914, there were four principal racial elements in

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[2] Turkish political parties are small personal cliques. They are not parties in our sense. That of Kemal, launched in 1919, and which is known as the Popular Party, is composed of a number of officers and officials who were formerly associated with him in the Committee of Union and Progress, commonly called "Young Turks."—Ed.

[1] In 1914, a society was organized in Constantinople, styled as the Turk Ojak Society (meaning, Turkish Hearth), of which Enver Pasha, the then Minister of War, became President. The Turks belong to the Turanian (Mongoloid) branch of the human family. The purpose of the Society was to establish a link between the Turks of Anatolia and those of the Caucasus and the Transcaspian, and, ultimately, to found a Turkish State, stretching from Thrace to Central Asia.

The Turanians number about 22,000,000. The *Turks* of Turkey and Southern Caucasus, 4,000,000; *Tartars, Kumuks* and *Noghai* of Northern Persia, eastern Trans-Caucasus, northwestern coast of the Caspian and of the Ural-Volga regions, 4,000,000; *Bashkirs* of Astrachan and Ufa, 1,500,000; *Turkomans* of the eastern coast of the Caspian, Aral sea, Khiva and northwestern Persia, 1,200,000; *Uzbeks* and *Sarts* of Khiva, Bokhara, Tashkend, Pamir and of northern frontier of India and western China, 3,500,000; *Kirghizes* of northeastern Turkestan, 5,000,000, and *Kashgarlaks* and *Taranchys* of western China, 1,500,000.

All these races trace their origin to the Turanian stock; speak allied dialects and profess Mohammedanism.

The dream of a Turanian empire is a fixed policy of the Kemalists,



PRINCE EMIN BEDR KHAN

Founder of Kurdish Progressive League in 1908, first patriotic organization, and of Kurdish Social League (1918), a cultural and philanthropic organization.

Turkey: Arabs, Greeks, Armenians and Kurds. Expediency and opportunity determined the time and form of action with regard to each of these races.

While the Greek was looked upon as an element of disturbance and as nursing separatist ambitions, even as the Armenian and Kurd, the latter two races had one additional drawback of separating the Turk from his Turanian kin in Persia, in the Trans-Caucasus and beyond the Caspian.

The Young Turks destroyed, during the war, about a quarter of a million Greeks; about 200,000 Lebanese; executed scores of Arab leaders, and deported nearly 700,000 Kurds, of whom all but one-half perished. But the full force of their vengeance fell upon the Armenian. They murdered nearly one-half or a million of the Armenians in Turkey, and enslaved over a hundred thousand girls and children.

With the defeat of the Central Powers, the Arabic portions of Turkey—Mesopotamia, Arabia and Syria—broke loose from her rule. Then Mustapha Kemal took up the task of carrying into completion the plan of his former associates in the matter of ridding Turkey of the non-Turks.

Taking advantage of the dilatory policy of the Allied and Associated Nations in liquidating the Turkish problem, and with the active help and connivance of certain Powers, particularly, of Bolshevist Russia, Kemal set up a military dictatorship.

Kemal destroyed, between 1919 and 1923, nearly 750,000 Greeks. Of the pre-war Greek population in Turkey, estimated at a minimum of 2,500,000, about 1,380,000 found refuge in Greece and there are now no more than 100,000 Greeks remaining in Constantinople. He destroyed or expelled all but 100,000 of the surviving Armenians, and he undertook a fierce war of extermination upon the Kurdish people, culminating in the Kurdish revolution of 1925, and the subsequent declaration by Kurdistan of her independence and the state of war which has ensued between Turkey and Kurdistan.

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and is to them a question of life and death. Kemalist agitators, emissaries, spies, officers and scholars are now feverishly at work, particularly among the Tartars of Persia, Armenia and of Russian Trans-Caucasus. The Turanians of these regions are being furnished with arms and munitions by the Kemalists for the day when Turkish "crusaders" will "rescue" their brethren from alien yoke. The consummation of the scheme, however, requires not only the extinction of the Armenian and Kurd, but also the submission of Persia, Russia and Great Britain.—Ed.

I will now address myself to the task of presenting the Kurd and his case.

The Kurd—Race and Tongue

The Kurd, or Gordyene, the aborigine of his present-day habitat from time immemorial, is now recognized, like the Portuguese, Spaniard, South Italian and many Persians, as a member of the Mediterranean branch of the Caucasian or Aryan family.

About 1,000 B.C., northern Aryan groups penetrated as shepherd colonies through the Caucasus range into the State of the Medes, bringing along with them their Ayran tongue and their Zoroasterian faith. They called themselves and their tongue, Parsee or Pharsi. In the 6th Century, B.C., they had imposed their racial title and tongue upon most of the Medes, and, in 538 B.C., under the leadersrhip of Cyrus, they organized the Parseeian or Persian Empire. During the reign of Darius (485 B.C.), most Medes had become merged with the invading Persians.

The pressure of the conquering Persians upon the Medes for centuries drew the Kurd and Mede into closer sympathy and contact, and the subsequent fusion of the Persian and of most Medes resulted also in the merging of many Medes with Kurdish tribes, and in the ultimate disappearance of the Mede as a separate racial entity.

The Parthian, also, like the Mede, was largely absorbed by the Persian, and partly by the Kurd. With time, the blood of the Persian invader became almost completely assimilated with allied strain of the Mede and of the Parthian. The racial kinship between the Kurd and the Persian of today is thus traced to the Mede and the Parthian, merged in the Persian and the Kurd.

The tongue of the Persians, Old Persian, is closely related to Zendic, an Iranian language, and to the Sanscrit of Hindustan. The Old Persian ceased to be a living tongue about 4th century B.C., but from it are derived the Modern Persian, Pehlevi or the Parthian, the Medic and the present-day Kurdish dialects.[1]

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[1] Much of the literature about the pre-history of the Persian, Armenian and Kurd is founded on wrong guess and Biblical mythology. A great deal of this misconception must be attributed to an arbitrary association and confusion of geographical designations with race and language. A distinguished Professor of history, in a recent volume, speaks of the defeat of Mardonius the Persian by Pausanius the Spartan at Platoea, in 479

Early History

The Greeks perhaps gave the Kurd his racial name. Herodotus refers to the Kurds as a warlike people, the descendants of *Carduques,* who hindered the retreat of Xenephon's ten thousand (401-400 B. C.).

The Kurds called themselves GUTUS, which signifies warrior. In the Assyrian cuneiform inscriptions, there are references to them as GARDANS, KARCTANS, or CARDACS and

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B. C., as "the first great assault of Asiatics upon Europe." And yet, both Mardonius and Pausanius were Aryans and spoke allied tongues. We are still limited to unconnected fragments of evidence, or of negative or presumptive evidence, of a remote and misty age, out of which we must weave the record. Much of what we think we now know must be, to be sure, revised, if not in the base, in many particulars at least, in the light of subsequent research and discovery.

"In the Later Stoge Age, presumably in the great plain of eastern central Europe, between the Vistula and the Volga, the Indo-Europeans dwelt as one people. . . . Before the dawn of history they began to break up into distinct groups. . . ." (Bender).

We now know that the regions, designated as Persia, Upper Armenia and Kurdistan, were inhabited, for over 6000 B. C., by the Medes (Persia) and by numerous clans, most of which gradually became coalesced into a confederation of States, and embraced the lands from Ararat, in the east, to the Amanus mountains in the west. The latter were the Sumerians, or the Ur-ar-du or Ar-ar-du of later Armenians, centered around Lake Van, and the Accads, or the Cutus of later Kurds or Gordyenes, who occupied Northern Mesopotamia, around Mosul, south of Urardu. The Hittites held the strip west of Urardu and Accadia. They were all Alpine Aryans, except the Hittites, who were Anaryans, and spoke allied Aryan tongues, which became greatly denatured, without, however, losing their basic identity, by subsequent invasions and fusions.

The Aryans, since known as the Cimmerians, who entered southern Caucasus about 1,000 B. C., broke up, under Cyrus, the Median Empire in 538 B. C., and, in 226 A. D., under Ardashir, they destroyed the Parthian Empire, which was founded, in 250 B. C., in the northeast of Media and Urarda, by invaders from the Transcaspian. Thus, most Medes and Parthians became merged with the Persian invader and adopted his tongue. The Parthian, notwithstanding some arbitrary assumption to the contrary, would seem to be an Aryan. In the period of his appearance on the scene, groups of Scythians and Teutonic Alans entered the Caucasus, but we have no record of Turanian invasion of the Cis-Caspian prior to the extinction of the Seleukid Bactrian State in the first century A. D. Also, his tongue and the record of his social intercourse with his Ayran neighbors would place him in the Aryan family. King Tirdates of Armenia, who established (298) Christianity as the religion of the State, and St. Gregory, who became the first Primate of Armenia, and several of their immediate successors, were of Parthian stock. Their available likenesses and tradition suggest no trace of non-Aryan ancestry.

The habitat of the Kurds, or Gutus, Cudus or Accads, was north of Mesopotamia or south of Urardu, and touched Media in the east and the

they are classed together with such important contemporary races as the Hittites, the Elamites and the Asdekians of Babylonia.

The tribe has always been, as now, the unit of the Kurdish race. Scores of tribes, much like the clans of the Scots, have managed, with varying fortunes, to maintain semi-independence or local autonomy, under Cyrus and Xerxes,

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Hittite country in the west. They were racially and linguistically related to their neighbors. The break-up of the Hittite State (1200-800 B. C.) by the Phrygians and Assyrians, resulted in the fusion of many Hittites in the Kurds, in the mountainous regions of northwestern Syria, of which we have living proofs. In the 3rd century B. C., all these lands fell under the Parthians, who imposed their tongue, *Pehlevi,* which they had adopted from the Persians, upon most Kurds. But those Kurds, who were brought into close contact with the Persian invader, adopted a dialect akin to the Sanskrit of Hindustan, and others, further west, developed a speech allied to Armenian. Hence the three principal Kurdish dialects of *Kirmanji, Baban* and *Zaza.* The sanskrit was introduced into India by Aryan invaders, under Sacae, about 1200 B. C., and was rendered into written form, in a book of poems, The Vedas, about 300 B. C. The word "Sanskrit" is a compound of *Sacae* and *Kir or kr-el,* meaning, written in (the tongue of) Sacae.

Almost simultaneously with the invasion of eastern Asia Minor by the Cimmerians, about the 10th century B. C., an Aryan group from south-eastern Europe, the kin of the Phrygians and Achaeans, progenitors of the Hellenes, who conquered Greece and the Ægian coast of Asia Minor, crossed the Hellespont (Herodotus, Plonius, De Morgan) ; reached Cappadocia, at the foot of Mount Argus, in the 8th century, absorbed the land of the *Had-s,* centered in Cesarea (since *Hai* or High, racial title of Armenians in their own tongue), which was founded by the Phrygians in the 12th century B. C., at the expense of the Hittites; and, in the 7th century, pushed their rule easterly towards the uplands. Here they conquered (580 B. C.) the Confederation of the seven States of Urardu or Sumeria, and became merged and blended with their people. The titles of at least 40 Houses of Nobility of Urardu were retained, by succession, down to the Christian period, by Armenian princely families. Emperor Theophilus, of Byzantium, of which 10 Emperors, 2 Queens and 2 co-regent Sovereigns (between 582 and 1056) were of Armenian race, took, for his consort, (829) Theodora Marinus, "a scion of the great Romanized Armenian House of the *Mamikonians*"—(Foord)—a lineal descendant of an Urardu family of that name.

In the 6th century Persian cuneiform inscriptions of the Achaeanians, this land is described as Ar-mina, hence Armenia. Tigranes I. of Armenia entered into an alliance with Cyrus, 535-525 B. C. *Ar* and *mina* are two Sumerian words, meaning, Ar-yan Land. *Ar-ar,* in adopted Armenian, means *work, create; vod* or *od,* foot; *du,* given. Hence Ar-ar-od (Ararat), meaning, Foot-rest of Creator; *Ur-ar-du,* given by Creator. *Ar-mina* may be a compound, the latter word being the title (Minni) of one of the States of the Urardu Confederation, or it may be the racial title of invading Thracians, who had the city of *"Armenium"* in Thrace, and, later, in the course of their easterly progress, named a mountain in Bithynia

the Macedonians, the Parthians, the Arabs, and the Turks.

At times, their power grew into mighty states, and they imposed their rule upon neighboring races. Before the dawn of Islam, in the 6th century, the Kurdish tribe of Gauran, under Goatanza, their chief, founded a great state, embracing the present Persian Tabriz, and beyond, with its capital at Kirmanshah.

"Orminius," and a town, in the region of Halys or Kizil River, *"Armenon,"* now *"Ak-Liman."* As to the Armenian tongue, Prof. Bender makes these observation: ". . . It has been thoroughly established by the German philologist, Heinrich Hubschmann, that Armenian is an Indo-European tongue, and thus belongs to the same family of languages to which English belongs. . . . A few Latin parallels will illustrate the Indo-European nature of Armenia. Compare Armenian *berem* "I bear" with Latin *fero; ail* "other" with *alius; araur* (aror) a "plow" with *aro* "I plow"; *akn* "eye" with *oculus; malem* "I crush" with *molo* "I grind"; *lam* "I weep" with *lamentum.* . . ." The Armenian race is, like Central French, South Germans, North Italians, German-Austrians, most Russians, Rumanians and Greeks, an Alpine member of the white race (Grant).

The component elements of the three races under discussion are: *Persian*—Mede, Cimmerian, many Parthians, Semites (Assyrians and Babylonians), some Greeks (from the Macedonian-Seleucian period, 4th century B. C.), random Armenians and Kurds. *Armenian*—Tracians and Phrygians, Urardus or Sumerians, random Medes, some Parthians, Cimmerians and Greeks, and Latins (during the Cilician Kingdom (1080-1375 A. D.) *Kurd*—Accads, some Cimmerians, Medes, Parthians and random Hittites.

The Georgians, the base of whose tongue is Urardu, are probably an offshoot of the Urardus, whom the invading Thracians drove in the direction of Choruk River; the Ossetes, who speak a tongue allied to Armenian, are the remnants of the Teutonic Alans, and the Lazes, of the Barkar slopes, whose physiognomy, tongue and traditions link them with the Urardus, and allied strains infiltered through northern invaders by sea.

> *"These Armenoid Alpines,"* (Sumerians, Medes and Accads) *says* ***Madison Grant,*** *"possibly invented and developed the Aryan language; introduced it along with bronze culture into Europe about 3000 B. C.; taught the Nordics both their language and their mental culture; they made very large contribution to the civilization of the world, and were the medium through which many advances in culture were introduced from Asia into Europe. . . . They brought the nomad hunters a knowledge of agriculture and of primitive pottery and of domestication of animals. . . ."*

Fragmentary evidence, however inconclusive, points to these views: In the Later Stone Age, the Aryan race moved both to the West and the East, and the focal point in the East was the foot of Ararat, as shown by similarity of implements hitherto discovered in the latter region and in Central and Western Europe; the current from the East to the West antedated, by at least 3,000 years, that from the West to the East, as shown by introduction of metal culture by Alpines into the West; following the extinction of Chinese civilization, about 7,000 years B. C., which

The sweep of Islam, however, in the 7th and 8th centuries,[1] gathered in its momentum not only the Kurd's political power, but also influenced profoundly and materially altered his faith and his moral code, ultimately to his association with the Turk, and his inevitable debasement and misfortunes in consequence.[2]

The rule of the Arab over conquered races was a mild, almost benevolent, despotism; the Arab, however, was at the same time the crusader of a new religion, and he forced the Kurd to abjure and abandon his ancestral pagan faith, and accept, instead, Mohamedanism. He also *compelled* the Kurd to give up his own alphabet, and to use, instead, Arabic characters.[3]

This violent and abnormal change in the cultural life of the race naturally produced a bewildering confusion of speech and dialects among the tribes, and in the end resulted in the decadence of Kurdish letters.

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probably reached Mesopotamia, the region of Ararat became the base of radiation of Alpine-Aryan civilization, and of the later Babylonian, Egyptian and Assyrian civilizations.

The story of the Garden of Eden, watered by certain Four Rivers, leading to the center of this Alpine country, is apparently an allegorical suggestion or a circumscribed presumptive opinion as to the birthplace of man and the fountain of civilization. Jeremiah's (LI, 27, 28) call on "the Kings of Ararat, Menni and Aschenez (of the Urardu Confederation) . . . and the Kings of Media" against Babylonia, and the subsequent alliance (538 B. C.) between the Persian-Median Cyrus and the Armenian Tigranes, resulting in the liberation of the Jews from 70 years' captivity, would shed further light upon the mental attitude of the authors of that story toward the civilizations which then flourished between Ararat and Northern Mesopotamia. The story about the Ark and the deluge also furnishes a rational corroborative suggestion in this connection. That story is conceivably a picturization of Noah's migration, in 40 days, across the desert to Ararat; his seven months' wanderings in the land of his future home before he could find a site for his caravan to "rest," and of a state of famine and pestilence which, for 150 days, had ravaged the country he had abandoned. The point, however, of immediate note in the story of the Ark is the suggestion that there then existed a commanding and comparatively advanced civilization in the region of Ararat. Unfortunately, much of the record of that stage of prehistory lies buried in the lands which are still under the power of the Turk.—Ed.

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[1] Mahomet, the Prophet, was born in Mecca in 571 A. D.; launched his mission in 611; died in 632. The Mahometan era begins in 622, which marks the flight (Hejira) of Mahomet from Mecca to Medina.—Ed.

[2] Khalif Omar, following his victory over Persia in 642, conquered the Kurds; reduced their land into a tributary dependency, ruled by Emirs.—Ed.

[3] Many Kurds, notably the Yezidis, have since clung to their ancestral Zoroasterian faith, and the Nestorians, who probably belong to the Kurdish race, are Christians.—*The Author.*

Kurd's Height of Power

But not even the might of the Khalifs of Bagdad, nor the kinship of faith which now existed between the Kurd and Arab, could long keep the Kurd in subjection.

Between 888 and 905, many Kurdish tribes rose in rebellion against the domination of their Arab rulers, asserting their independence. In the XIIth century, Salaheddin (Saladin), the Conqueror, established the vast empire of Eyoubi. He challenged Richard the Lion Hearted and destroyed Richard's armada. The power of the Kurd at that time extended as far as Khorassan in Persia, Egypt, and the western limits of Syria.

During the intermittent Tartar and Mongol invasions of the Near East in the 14th and 15th centuries, the Kurds

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[1]*Sunni,* in Arabic, signifies, conformist, and *Shiite,* schismatic or sectarian. Turks and Kurds are *Sunnites;* Persians, *Shiites.*

Prophet Mahomet's daughter, Fatima, married Imam Ali. They had two sons: Hassan and Hussein. Ali became the fifth Khalif in 656. Muavia, who was appointed Governor of Syria by Omar, Third Khalif, now assumed an insubordinate attitude, and was challenged by Ali to submit allegiance. Two years' warfare, internecine strife and negotiations resulted in Muavia's assumption of the dual title of Khalif-Sovereign over the Western dominions of the Khalifate. Subsequently, Ali was assassinated (661) in the mosque by an agent of Muavia, and was succeeded by his son, Hassan. He was forced (August 10, 661) to abdicate in favor of Muavia, who ruled for twenty years (661-680) as the undisputed Khaliff of all Islam. Later, at the instigation of Muavia, Hassan was poisoned by his wife, and his brother, Hussein, and his entire family were murdered at Kerbele in 680 by an armed band sent by Yezid, son of Muavia, then Governor of Syria. From that day on, the adherents of Hassan and Hussein broke loose from allegiance to Khalif Muavia, whom they denounced as usurper, and murderer of Ali and Hassan, the true Khalifs, and of Hussein—the only direct descendants of Mahomet the Prophet. They thus assumed the title *Shiite.* The antagonism, however, between the House of Ali and Muavia antedates even the birth of Mahomet. It was a tribal feud between the Hashimites, the family of Mahomet, and the Amayades, both descendants of the tribe of Coreish. Following the fall of Bagdad into the hands of Seljuk Turks in 1055, and the assumption by Toghrul, the Turk, of temporal power over the dominions of the Khalifate, the Arabs secretly sent the emblems of the Khalif (robes, turbans, flags and two strands from the Prophet's beard) to Egypt in 1060. Sultan Selim of Turkey, upon his conquest of Egypt in 1517, seized these relics, and, ever since and down to the abolition of the Khalifate by Kemal in 1923, Turkish Sultans claimed succession to the Prophet. According, however, to the admonition of Mahomet, succession must be determined by election. Many interpreters of the Koran hold that it may be legitimately claimed by a lineal descendant of the Prophet.—Ed.

enjoyed a period of welcome peace and quiet, while Turk and Persian were engaged in an ever growing sectarian quarrel, which was to determine also the political destiny of the Kurd.

It is perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of Kurdish history that Persian and Kurd, sprung from a common racial stock, professing a common faith, and enjoying a common social and cultural inheritance, could not bridge the chasm of a minor sectarian difference which divides them. The Persians are *Shiite* Moslems, and the Kurds, *Sunni* Moslems.[1] The antagonism and distrust, wholly purposeless and unnecessary, which this sectarian discord created and nursed between the two races, soon became the cause of their humiliation and of unending misfortunes.

Kurds and Turks Enter into Treaty

In 1514, the mighty Sultan Selim I of Turkey undertook his campaign for the subjugation of *Shiite* Persia, then under the rule of Shah Ismail. The road that led to Persia was held by semi-independent and powerful Kurdish tribes. The Kurds could hardly, therefore, remain neutral in this religious conflict; they had to choose between the *Sunni* Turk—their own sect—and the *Shiite* Persian. They threw in their lot with their cosectarians, the Turks.

The victorious Turkish Sultan, on his way back from his Persian expedition, was lavishly feted by Kurdish tribal chiefs. He gave assurances to them of his solicitude and respect for their independence. The Kurds, deeply impressed by the bravery and magnanimity of Selim, offered him a political and military alliance.

Thus, in 1514, there was concluded between Turkey and twenty-three Kurdish States a Treaty of Amity and Alliance, drafted by Jdris, a Kurd, and approved and signed by Selim, of which the following is the substance:

> I. "All existing, signatory Kurdish States will retain their full independence.
>
> II. Succession will pass from father to son, or shall be regulated according to the laws of the country, the Sultan recognizing the legitimate successor by Imperial firman.
>
> III. The Kurds shall participate in all wars by Turkey.
>
> IV. Turkey shall assist the Kurdish States against foreign aggression.
>
> V. The Kurds will contribute customary religious gifts (something like Peter's Pence) to the Purse of the Califf."

Turks Violate Treaty

For over one hundred and fifty years, following the Treaty of 1514 between Turkey and the Kurdish States, the Kurds faithfully fulfilled their obligation to Turkey. They took part in all the wars of Turkey—wars of offense and defense—and sacrificed tens of thousands of lives.

But, the Turks, as usual, failed to keep faith. Plunder and enslavement have always been the mainspring of Turkish actions, and intrigue and the scimitar the instruments of their rule.

No sooner was Sultan Suleyman beaten back at the gates of Vienna in 1683 than he set himself to a campaign of intrigue and treachery in the Kurdish States, designed to stir hate and disunion among them. Without apparently interfering with their independence, Suleyman arbitrarily designated a Governor General, who was to make his headquarters at Diarbekir, and was to be the intermediary between the Kurdish States and Constantinople.

Thereafter, the policy of "Divide and Conquer" was followed with its usual success. Gradually, but surely, the Turkish invader, equipped with an inexhaustible supply of pretexts, seized the Kurdish States, and made them into Provinces. By the middle of the nineteenth century, during the rule of Abd-ul-Medjid, the Turk had annexed to his dominion almost all of the Kurdish lands, allowing the tribal chiefs only a mere nominal autonomy.

In 1847, Prince Bedr Khan, ruler of Djezireh, the strongest remaining Kurdish State, was challenged by the Turkish Sultan to a test of authority. The Turkish armies, numbering over 100,000 men, suffered disastrous defeats at the hands of Bedr Khan; but, Bedr Khan succumbed to the treachery of his own cousin, and the last remaining seat of Kurdish independence fell to the Turks.

Since that time the Kurdish people, without a shepherd, and broken into many and irreconcilable factions, have been persecuted and bruised, and subjected to a thousand wrongs at the hands of the Turk.[1]

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[1] Extinction by the Turks of the Kurds' autonomy led to ever-increasing attempts at rebellion by the Kurds. In 1806, at Suleymanieh, Kurd Abdurrahman Pasha of Baban destroyed the Sultan's regiments, and pushed his advantage further, but, after two years' unequal struggle, succumbed. In 1812, his son, Ahmed Pasha Baban resumed the fight, and reached the very precincts of Bagdad. In 1820, the Zazas, and between

Before the World War, religion was the common denominator of the nationality and nationalism in Turkey. To the Turk, there were only Moslems and Infidels. The Turk called himself "Moslem," not "Turk." He was the ruling race, and any race which enjoyed, with the Turk, the common "patronymic" of Moslem was marked off from the rest of the people, and enjoyed certain exclusive privileges, and performed certain duties, which were neither granted to nor imposed upon the others.

The Turk carried arms. His main concern was to hold in check and exploit the conquered races, particularly, the non-Moslem. He reserved to himself the task of soldiering. The "infidel" was not allowed to carry arms, and he was exempted from military service in consideration of a nominal head tax.

The Kurd, however, shared the rights and duties of the Moslem Turk, and, also, many of his limitations and his weaknesses.

The constant and ever increasing exactions of military service depleted the Kurd's man power; made of the woman an animal of burden; hindered and smothered the productive

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1829 and 1839 the tribes of Ravenduz, Hakkiari, Tur-Abdine, Sinjar and of Diarbekir rose in rebellion against the Turks, to be subdued only at great cost to the Porte. Marshal von Moltke, who was the organizer of the Turkish Army, and who had witnessed many battles between Turks and Kurds, in some of his letters to his mother, speaks in admiring terms of the bravery of the Kurds, but he utters words of indignation and abhorence at the barbarities committed by Turkish officers and soldiers upon Kurdish women and children.

The most notable of Kurdish uprisings against Turkey in the pre-war period was led, in 1847, by Prince Bedr Khan of El-Djezireh, who had as his allies many powerful tribes. The Sultan dispatched against Bedr Kahn an army of 60,000 men, which was annihilated by the Kurdish allies. A second army of 100,000 men, under Topal Osman Pasha, was hurled back by Bedr Khan; but, when success seemed within sight, the Sultan sought refuge in intrigue. He bought off Bedr's nephew, who commanded the left wing of his uncle's forces, with disastrous results for Kurdish fortunes. Alexandre Zaba in his volume, *Recueil de Notices et Recits Kurdes,* says that ". . . the famous Prince Bedr Khan, who successfully fought Turkish armies in 1847, succumbed only to a ruse by Osman Pasha . . ."

In 1875, 1884 and 1889, attempts at rebellion were made by particular Kurdish tribes. While Turkish titles and gold succeeded in buying the allegiance of some tribes, others remained unreconciled to Turkish rule. The present Kurdish rebellion is a revival, on a larger scale than its predecessors, of the Kurds' determination to throw off the Turkish yoke.—Ed.

effort of the Kurd; demoralized and degraded his cultural life, and dragged him down to the low level of the Turk.[1]

Throughout this process of suppression and oppression, to which the Kurd was subjected in common even with the Turk, he, unlike the Christian, had neither the right nor the opportunity to complain of his lot, either to the Government, which was nominally at least his own, or to the world. His lot was in fact even more cruel than that of the Turk because the Turkish ruler used him as his agent against the Armenian,[2] and as the agent he had to bear the greater part of the indignation and the contumely aroused throughout the world by this savage course, perpetrated at the instigation of and for the benefit of the Turk. It was primarily the Kurd who was denounced before civilization as a marauder and murderer.

Following the Armenian massacres of 1894-96, under the

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[1] Neither Islam nor Turkish rule, however, altered the Kurdish social life. The Kurds, save possibly a few Turkified Kurds, adhere to monogamy. A woman goes about freely, and unveiled, except in the presence of a Turk; she enters into matrimony and enjoys freedom and authority within the home and engages in social intercourse much the same as the American girl and woman. Divorce is a rare thing, and is resorted to upon the gravest ground. *La Grande Encyclopedie* says: "The sense of home and family is highly developed among them. They are sincere, honest and hospitable. Their women are freer than in Turkey and in Persia; they go about unveiled. Polygamy is never practised, except by a few rich. The Kurds detest the Turks. They love music and dance."—*The Author.*

[1] In the pre-Christian period, the Armenians worshipped a trinity of deities,—*Aramazt* (Creator of All), *Anahid* (justice, wisdom, beauty, mercy), and *Vahakn* (power, strength). This theistic conception offered the religion of Christ a fertile field in Armenia. "Armenia was evangelized by Apostles fresh from the memory of our Lord, as early as 33 A.D., and as a nation adopted Christianity and founded a National Church in 301, and which has outridden the storms of centuries, and is vital today. Armenia was the first nation to adopt Christianity, with all that act involved in a pagan world." (From the Harbord Report, April 13, 1920.)

Founded by Apostles St. Thaddeus and St. Bartholomew, the Holy Apostolic Church of Armenia has since had, in unbroken succession, 137 Catholicos (Supreme Pontiff), at *Etch-Miadzine* ("Descended from-the-Only-Begotten"), the Great Monastery at the foot of Ararat. All the Armenians, excepting about 100,000, who are affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church and Protestant denominations, are adherents of the Mother Church.—Ed.

inspiration of Abd-ul-Hamid, a group of Kurdish leaders came at last to a realization of the disastrous effects of misguided religious fervor upon their people, as well as of the folly and the infamy of the Turk's Pan-Islamic policy. These Kurdish leaders felt that if the Kurds should continue much longer to serve as a pawn and an instrument in the hands of a mad and unscrupulous ruler, they would not only forfeit forever the right to appeal to the conscience of mankind, the civilized world, but that the Kurdish people, even as the Turks, would seal the doom of their existence.

A short time before the advent of the Young Turks in 1908, Kurdish leaders started a movement looking toward the disentanglement of Kurdish life from that of the Turk, and the restoration of the cultural and national ideals and independence of the Kurdish people.

Young Turks' Kurdish Policy

In 1907, the edifice of the Turkish State was tottering. A few gallicized Turks, who called themselves "Young Turks," and who had found refuge in Europe, appealed to Armenians, Kurds, Greeks and Macedonians, to make common cause in an effort to overthrow the Hamidian tyranny, and to set up a constitutional régime, founded upon the principles of equality, fraternity and liberty.

In the historic Congress of Paris in 1907, a pact was made between the Young Turks and the leaders of the oppressed nationalities in Turkey to realize the high aims professed by the Young Turks. The uprising of Salonika, in July, 1908, was the outcome of the common efforts of the representatives of these various racial groups which joined in the Pact of Paris. On July 24, 1908, Hamid was forced to proclaim a constitutional system of government, and the reins of power passed into the hands of the Young Turks.

But no sooner had the Young Turks attained power than they brazenly repudiated the pledges of the Pact of Paris. They now made it clear that while they did not believe in the efficacy of the Pan-Islamic policy of Hamid—although they were ready to exploit Islam world opinion in favor of Turkey—the foundation of their policy toward the non-Turks was the Ottomanization or Turkification of the Non-

Turks. *They would enforce that policy by assimilation, if possible; by elimination, if necessary.*

From 1908 to 1914, they pursued that policy. In the case of the Moslem Kurd, they tried the policy of assimilation; in the case of the Armenian, that of elimination. But the pace was too slow to satisfy them. They entered the World War primarily to fulfill the Turkification or the elimination of the Kurd, Armenian and Greek.

This policy was the first step toward Pan-Turanism. Once rid of racial problems within the bounds of Turkey, they planned to reach out beyond the frontiers of Turkey and join hands with the Turanians or Turks of Persian and Russian Azerbaidjan, as well as with those beyond the Caspian.

Kurds During the War

The story of the tragedy of the Armenian people during the War is well-known, and need not be rehearsed here, except that the deportation of nearly three-fourths of the two million Armenians who lived in Turkey in 1914, and the massacre and enslavement of nearly a million of them, were parts of a pre-conceived and calculated plan, designed to eliminate the Armenian as an inassimilable element in Turkish life and a stumbling-block in the path of the Turk toward the execution of his pan-Turanian adventure.

The failure of the Dardanelles expedition freed the Turk, for the first time, from the influence and restraint of European opinion. It also rendered available detachments of troops and irregulars, which were promptly employed to execute the plan of Armenian extermination, or to put down the Armenians' resistance at five or six localities.

Turks Deport 700,000 Kurds

Under these conditions, the Young Turks undertook the "assimilation" of the Moslem Kurd at first through pacific processes. They prevailed upon the accommodating Sultan-Khaliff Rechad V. to sign a decree, which provided for the deportation of the Kurdish people from their ancestral homes, and their settlement among the Turks in Western Anatolia, in proportion of 10 Kurds to 100 Turks. The two races professed a common faith, and the Kurds would now

be compelled to speak Turkish, and, according to the authors of this crime, the second Kurdish generation would become thoroughly Turkified.

Before proceeding to the mass "assimilation" thus planned, the Turks tried out the process first by deporting groups of Kurdish notables. They discovered, much to their surprise, that the Kurds were just as averse to becoming "assimilated" as the Armenians. Losing patience, they therefore decreed for the Kurds the fate of the Armenians.

The Register of the Director General of Emigration in Constantinople discloses the ghastly fact that in 1915 the Young Turks deported 700,000 Kurds from Kurdistan to Western Anatolia.

Girls, women and children of tender age were enslaved by the thousands; hunger, disease and privation exacted a terrible toll of the long caravans of these helpless human beings; heaps of corpses and of the dying filled many ditches and dotted the whole line of this colossal crime upon the life of the race. Not even one-half of these unfortunates reached their destination. No one knows how many of them survive today.

The extermination of the Kurd had now become a settled and avowed policy of the Turk.

Kurds Fight for Turks

At the outbreak of the War, most Kurds of military age were drafted into the Turkish army. In the absence of any means of communication with their home folks, they were kept in complete ignorance of the plans and acts of the Turkish Government in Kurdistan. Also, the Government was prosecuting a vigorous anti-Armenian and anti-Christian campaign among the Kurdish regular and irregular troops.

The real or artificial antipathy of the Armenian for the Kurd had long been deeply rooted and seduously cultivated in the Kurdish mind by Turkish propagandists. The Young Turks now told the Kurds that the Armenians had made common cause with the Allies; that, only a month or so before the entry of Turkey into the war, the Armenians of the Trans-Caucasus and of Turkey had entered into a writ-

ten agreement with Russia, whereby Russia would help them in the invasion and conquest of Turkish Armenia and of Kurdistan, and that quite naturally the Armenian would exact a terrible vengeance from the Kurd for past wrongs, etc.

This sort of propaganda was impressive and convincing. It won the Kurdish fighter to the side of the Moslem Turk. In thus playing into the hands of the Turks, the Kurds suffered terribly both physically and morally, and contributed greatly to the destruction of their own fortunes and homes, and to their present plight.

After the Armistice

During the last days of October, 1918, the ring-leaders of the Young Turk camarilla saw the handwriting on the wall, and they turned the Government over to a "pro-ally" group. Reouf Bey, who subsequently became Kemal's Premier, signed for Turkey the Armistice of Moudros with the Allies. The Articles of the Armistice provided expressly for terms of peace, including the expulsion of Turkey from non-Turkish regions, which the Allies, in conformity with their wartime pledges, proposed to impose upon Turkey.

Turkey lay prostrate.[1] The wartime Turkish army of 1,200,000 men had now shrunk to 50,000 men, with about 150,000 desertions. Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine had already been cut off from the Empire; the region east of the Euphrates had been practically denuded of its Turkish population as of its Armenian population; the Government had almost ceased to function in Asia Minor, and the central Government in Constantinople was soon to fall into the hands of the Allies (March, 1919).

Prompt and honest action by the Allies would have liquidated, once for all, the problem of the Turk, and would have ended the agony of those whom the Turk had oppressed for a thousand years. But, misguided and uninformed humanitarianism, or unwarranted meddlesomeness, was to destroy

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[1] Turkish war losses—those killed in battle or by way of reprisal, and those who perished from hunger, pestilence and exposure—are estimated at over 2,000,000. According to the report of The American Military Mission to the Near East, submitted to the Senate on April 13, 1920, . . . "600,000 Turks died of typhus alone, and not over 20 per cent. of the Turkish peasants who went to war have returned. . . ."—Ed.

once again the hopes and prayers of the ages, and to offer the wily Turk a fresh opportunity to reassert himself—for a while longer.

American Intervention Disastrous for Oppressed Races

For the first time in history, the Allied Powers were really honest in their professions of redeeming the Armenian, Kurd, Arab and Greek from the incubus of Turkish misrule. The Allies who, by the secret treaties of 1915 and 1916, had cut up Turkey into spheres of influences, were now willing and ready, at the hour of victory, to recognize the national rights of the inhabitants concerned. In his opening speech, on January 19, 1919, at the Versailles Conference, the President of France said that ". . . the rights of the oppressed, of the victims and of the martyrs . . . shall be vindicated. . . ."

The Allies, in full recognition of the general chaos that obtained in Turkey, were determined to settle the Turkish problem before they undertook the consideration of the more complicated terms of general peace.

The Turkish case, therefore, was taken up in February, 1919. At the invitation of the Conference, a Kurdish Delegation, headed by General Sherif Pasha, like the Armenian Delegation, presented the Kurdish case. The Armenian Delegation claimed considerable territories, extending from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, which were to be united with the then existing Armenian Republic (Russian Armenia), and, in view of the depleted and disorganized condition of their people and country, a request was made for provisional financial and physical aid.

Whereupon, the President of the United States, who was intensely interested in the then proposed League of Nations, and obviously believed that he interpreted the sense of sympathy felt by the American people for the Armenian people, intervened, and advised the Peace Conference that America would be glad to lend Armenia the help she needed—if and when America joined the League. At the same time he requested the Conference to *defer* action upon the Turkish case.

The sincerity and magnanimity of the President of the United States could not be questioned; the Allies could not, without inviting upon themselves the suspicion of the world,

proceed with the matter at issue; bu the *delay* which the American action imposed upon the Allies resulted, as was fully expected by informed persons, in the subsequent intrigues amongst the Allies, the resurgence of Kemal, and in the appalling tragedy that overtook Kurd and Armenian alike.[1]

Kemal Appears on Scene

No sooner had the Conference pigeonholed the Turkish case than the Turks and their agents moved into action. Americans played the leading role in the events that followed. American residents of Constantinople, and particularly most missionaries, were averse to the dismemberment of Turkey. They felt that the proposed independent Armenia and Kurdistan, and a revived Hellenism, might, and in all probability would, bring to an end their attempts at proselyting and close out what had come to be a very large business with tremendous property interests; whereas Tur-

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[1] On June 23, 1920, Mr. Lloyd George, in the House of Commons, said that ". . . the Turkish Treaty was postponed at the *request* of America. Also, Sir Austen Chamberlain, at Birmingham, on Oct. 13, 1923, said: ". . . The Peace Conference did not take up the preparation of the Treaty with Turkey until at a very late stage. That *delay* in its consequences has been profoundly unfortunate, and has affected the whole situation. The Allies were encouraged by President Wilson to believe that the United States would take an active part in the settlement of Turkey. . . ."

M. Auguste Benard (Officier d'Academie), in Aiguillon, says:

> ". . . France agreed (in 1919) to dispatch 12,000 troops to the Armenian Republic, and directed Col. Bromond to organize an Armenian army in Cilicia. Had it not been for the subsequent intrigues of some of the Great Powers, those measures would have consolidated and rendered secure the position of the Armenian Republic. But, the United States Government, which had given its assent to our sending troops to Armenia, informed us a few days later that it itself had decided to send troops to Armenia. Responsibility for Armenia's plight rests upon America and England. We will, in due time, return to this subject, and, without regard to protests and denials, make a complete expose of the circumstances which resulted in the abandonment of our faithful ally—Armenia . . ."

The delay of nearly two years which America imposed upon the Allies offered the Turks the opportunity to organize resistance, and deprived Armenia of the opportunity of accepting the proffer of help which was made to her by the Allies. This policy of procrastination was wholly avoidable, and was due solely to unconscionable negligence, incident to partisan squabbles.—Ed.

key, as it then stood, and the Russian Trans-Caucasus, under American control, would become a happy hunting ground both for possible converts and economic concessions. Gates, Bristol, and others, became the most violent propagandists for an American unitary mandate, and Dr. Gates carried a private letter from Talaat Pasha, chief organizer of Armenian massacres, to the American Peace Mission in Paris, advocating an American unitary mandate for Turkey, etc. The Turks knew full well the utter impracticability of the scheme which they apparently favored; but they were playing for time. They were well aware that the proposal, if carried into effect, would destroy the prestige and position of the Allies in the Near East, and they knew also that even the possibility of the consideration of the proposal would stir up discord amongst the Allies, and force them to a policy of "sauve qui peut." They were right.

In May, 1919, Brigadier-General Mustapha Kemal Pasha left Constantinople for Anatolia, ostensibly as Inspector of the non-existent Third Turkish Army, but in reality to organize resistance to the Allies. Simultaneously, Turkish agents started to flirt with France and Italy with some success. The arrival of Kemal in Anatolia coincided with the seizure of Smyrna by the Greeks. Great Britain sponsored this movement. The Greek action enabled Kemal to improvise a non-descript force of about 35,000 men by August, 1919. He established his headquarters at Sivas, where General Harbord, about a month later, paid Kemal his respects.

At this time Kurdish leaders, fearful of the course of events, held a meeting at Kahta, near Malatia, and organized a force, designed to arrest Kemal's adventure.

Unfortunately, however, there arrived then at Malatia Col. Bell, Chief of the British Intelligence Service at Aleppo, who, in the name of his Government, advised the Kurds against any warlike operations, and reassured them of the settled purpose of the Allies to solve the Kurdish case in accordance with their war pledges.

There can be no doubt but that the Kurds were then more than able to crush Kemal, as the Armenian Republic of Erivan could easily have occupied Turkish Armenia. But both the Kurds and Armenians committed the unpardonable folly of giving full value to the words of the Allied and Asso-

ciated Nations. Had these two races known then, as they know now, that the basis of international diplomacy is the *fait accompli,* and that international "morality" is as yet an empty platitude, they would have saved themselves all their subsequent misery.

Kemal Joins Moscow

The British support of Greece in the matter of Smyrna definitely broke up the Allied front against Turkey. Italy was intolerant of Hellenic expansion in Western Asia Minor, and France exploited the opportunity to secure for herself certain economic concessions from the Kemalists.

In the meantime, Turkish emissaries established contact with Moscow; Enver, Kutchuk Talaat, Halil Pasha, Behaeddin attended, in the late summer of 1919, the Congress of the Eastern Peoples at Baku, which was presided over by Zinoviev. Here the Turk and the Bolshevik agreed upon a plan against the "imperialistic" Powers, the first part of which was the elimination of the Armenian Republic from their path. This agreement was later embodied in another, signed in Constantinople on November 29, 1919, and, later, in a more definite and comprehensive treaty, which was signed at Erzerum on April 15, 1920.[1]

In the face of this threatening danger, the frantic and pitiful appeals of the Armenian Republic to the Allied and Associated Nations for arms and munitions for self-defense fell on deaf ears. The latter sent only Committees and Commissions of Inquiry, and addressed notes of warning to the Kemalists, while Mr. Balfour characterized Kemal in the House of Commons as a plain "bandit."

It should here be noted that the Kemalists and the Bolsheviki, who were without the pale of international law, might perhaps justify themselves in resorting to common action against those whom they recognized as their enemies. But the stupidity, sordid greed and negligence and irresponsibility of the Allied and Associated Nations, can neither be explained nor excused. They stand guilty of a wilful crime at the bar of history.

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[1] By the Treaty between Moscow and Angora, the latter represented by Ahmed Moukhtar Bey, now Turkish ambassador to the United States, a simultaneous attack upon the Armenian Republic by Turks and Bolsheviki was agreed upon. Also, Moscow agreed to cede to Turkey parts of the Armenian Republic, including Kars, Ardahan and Sari Kamish.—Ed.

Under these conditions, the Allies met at San Remo in April, 1920, and agreed upon the terms of the treaty to be made with Turkey. This Treaty was subsequently signed at Sèvres on August 10, 1920.

At this time, the Armenian Republic (Russian Armenia), which had been set up in May, 1918, was already recognized by the Allied and Associated Nations. The Sèvres Treaty provided for the allotment of certain lands in Turkish Armenia to the Armenian Republic, the boundaries of which lands were to be defined by the President of the United States.

The Treaty of Sèvres also provided for a Kurdish State. The three Articles, concerning Kurdistan, read as follows:

SECTION III

KURDISTAN

Article 62.

A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the Southern Boundary of Armenia, as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II, (2) and (3) If unanimity cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this object, a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the spot to examine and decide what ratifications, if any, should be made in the Turkish frontier where under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with that of Persia.

Article 63.

The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and execute the decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in Article 62

within three months from their communication to the said Government.

Article 64.

If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over these areas.

The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey.

If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhesion to such independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been included in the Mosul Vilayet.

While this Treaty was being signed at Sèvres by the representatives of the Principal Allies and by those of Turkey and Armenia, Kemal and Moscow were at work to thwart its execution.

Kemal Attacks Armenia

In May and June, 1920, Bolshevist uprisings took place in several districts of Armenia, which the Government suppressed. In June, Moscow sent an ultimatum to the Armenian Republic, demanding the passage of Bolshevist troops over Armenian railways to join hands with the Turks. Armenia rejected it. Refusal of a second ultimatum in July was followed by invasion in August.

Simultaneously therewith, Kemal attacked the Armenian Republic, but was repulsed. Then, in the latter part of September, 1920, a reinforced Kemalist army, under Kiazim Kara Bekir Pasha, moved upon Armenia from the southeast, while Soviet troops invaded her from the northeast. On December 2, 1920, the Armenian Government was ousted;

it returned in February, 1921, but was driven out of Armenian soil by Bolshevist bayonets in July, 1921.[1]

Kemal had now established direct contact with the Bol-

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[1] Armenia lost her independence in 1375, and was subsequently divided amongst Turkey, Russia and Persia. In 1914, the race numbered 4,500,000, of which a little over 4,000,000 lived in Turkey and Russia, since reduced to 3,069,000 (estimated).

In the World War, three hundred thousand Armenians fought in the ranks of the Allied and Associated armies or as independent units, and suffered over one hundred thousand casualties. After the defection of Russia in October, 1917, the Armenians took over the Caucasus front; fought the Turks for nearly eight months and, on May 28, 1918, set up a Republic, embracing Russian Armenia. Last week in May, in five days' battles at Sardarabad and Kara-Kliss, 30 Armenian battalions withstood 50 Turkish battalions, and, on June 4, 1918, Turkey was compelled to recognize the Armenian Republic as an independent State. This Republic was then recognized by Germany and Soviet Russia, and, subsequently, by the Allied and Associated nations, including the United States. The Treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920), to which Armenia was a party, allotted to the Armenian Republic parts of Turkish Armenia, of which the boundaries were defined (November, 1920), at the instance of the Allies, and of Turkey and Armenia, by the President of the United States. But, in September, 1920, Turkey and Soviet Russia made a joint attack upon the Armenian Republic, and seized nearly two-thirds of it. Later, in March, 1921, Moscow forced the fragment which remained into the Soviet Confederation, of which "Soviet" Armenia is an "independent" member—with option to withdraw,—if it can.

Commander H. W. V. Temperley, Adviser on boundaries to the British Delegation at the Versailles Conference, in The History of the Peace Confrence (Vol. VI., pp. 85, 86, says:

> In the autumn and early winter of 1920, the Red Army and the Turkish Nationalist Army simultaneously took the offensive. Kiazim Kara Bekir (Turkish Commander) captured Kars . . . On the other flank, the Soviet Troops, which had already conquered Azerbaidjan, and were about to conquer Georgia, invaded Armenia from the Northeast, bringing with them a Soviet Armenian Government. The Tashnagists (the Party in power) fell, and the Armenian Bolsheviks reigned in their stead, and it was they who signed the treaty with Kara Bekir . . ."

Prof. Arnold J. Toynbee, of Oxford University, in the volume, "Survey of International Affairs," makes the following observations:

> In May and June, 1920, there were Bolshevik uprisings in several districts of the Armenian Republic. Towards the end of July Moscow sent an ultimatum

sheviki, who furnished him generously with arms, munitions and gold.

By the Treaty of 1921 with France, Kemal had been relieved from further pressure in Cilicia; Italy maintained a "benevolent neutrality," and Kemal now could turn his undivided attention to the Greeks, who had remained unwisely quiescent while Armenia was being attacked.

Political divergences at home, dissensions amongst the Allies, and other factors, had destroyed the morale of the Greek army. The Greeks made one serious thrust at Kemal, and then they quit. Kemal reached Smyrna without any serious resistance. He covered 185 miles in 15 days. On September 13, 1922, Kemal ordered the destruction of Smyrna, and here was enacted one of the most revolting crimes of all history. Over 100,000 men, women and children were put to the sword or were burned to death, and over 25,000 girls were enslaved. The story of the tragedy of Smyrna is well described in a recent book, "The Blight of Asia," by George Horton, former American Consul General in Smyrna.

The breathing spell which America offered the Turks gave Kemal his chance, with the active aid of Moscow and of two other Powers, to effect the repudiation of the Treaty of Sèvres. From Smyrna, Kemal went to Lausanne to negotiate a new treaty. Here, backed by Moscow and America, he faced the Allies, no longer united, who made no secret of their anxiety to patch up any kind of a treaty.

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to Armenia demanding acceptance of a draft treaty which had been presented to the Armenian Government in June but had been rejected by them because it stipulated for the transport of Russian troops over the Armenian railways (to join hands with the Turks who were fighting the Greeks). A second refusal was followed by invasion on the 10th of August.

Before the end of September, 1920, Kiazim Kara Bekir, commanding the Turkish Eastern Army, launched a surprise attack upon the Armenian Republic. . . . On the 12th October, the Armenian forces fell back . . . and, on the 13th, Moscow sent an ultimatum to Erivan, which Erivan refused. On the 21st, Kara Bakir captured Kars, and a Moslem rising in the Alexandropol district, to the rear of the Armenian Army, forced the Armenian high command to ask for an armistice on the 7th November. . . ."

The Government of the Armenian Republic, which was ousted from Armenian soil by Turco-Bolshevist allies on July 13, 1921, now bears the title of "The Delegation of the Armenian Republic," and has its headquarters in Paris.—Ed.

Lausanne Conference, Mosul Oil, and Kurdistan

"AND they crucify Him, and part His garments among them, casting lots upon them, what each should take."—Mark 15:24.

The Lausanne Conference was an unprecedented gathering of concession seekers, honest brokers and humanists, for the allotment among themselves of the bodies and properties of flocks of timid and trusting sheep, denominated as Armenians, Greeks, and Kurds. With customary ponderous solemnity, the spokesmen of the august assembled nations played their hands according to the program, and each nation pocketed the precise loot it coveted.

Curzon was deeply distressed, while Barrère and Garoni affected mournful faces, over the wrongs suffered by the Armenians. Ismet grinned, and promised to think of some remedy, and, after consultation with Richard Washburn Child, he allowed him to advocate, for the Armenians, a "refuge" in Turkey, and then Ismet generously offered the whole of Turkey as a "refuge" for the Armenians—provided that they would behave themselves! The Kurds likewise received some "sympathetic mention," as also the Assyro-Chaldeans, and so on.

But for a correct appraisal of the Lausanne Conference,

X. Commander (third from left) of Kurdish Forces.

it is necessary to state the specific objectives which the principal participating nations sought—and obtained.

Two points, at least, should first be made clear. One is that no one nation wanted or needed to resort to force to secure its objective. Turkey herself was weak, but she was backed by Russia, glad of a chance to make trouble for England, and, also, thanks to the intervention of America, Turkey held the trump card of the Mosul oil.

The second point is that the prize loot, in which England, America, France and Turkey claimed a share, was oil—the Mosul oil—situated in a region predominantly inhabited by Kurds. This oil was the national inheritance of the Kurdish people.

What Each Nation Sought and Obtained at Lausanne

Turkey came to Lausanne with the fixed purpose of securing freedom of action by the abrogation of the capitulations and international sanction to her Pan-Turanian scheme, namely, the elimination of the Greek, Armenian and Kurd.

The price she would offer for this franchise was acquiescence in the secession of the Arabic-speaking districts of Mesopotamia, Syria and Arabia from her rule. Insofar as the oil-bearing Mosul area was concerned, which was now included in Mesopotamia, all that Turkey hoped was to blackmail a share out of the concessionaires. The Kemalists had long ago decided against the inclusion of the Mosul region in Turkey—because its vigorous Kurdish population might, or perhaps would, interfere with the execution of the plan of extermination of the less compact, although more numerous, Kurds, who were already in the grip of the Turks.

Furthermore, upon no conceivable ground could Turkey put forward a valid claim to Mosul oil.

As early as 1904, this property was in the Privy Purse of Sultan Abd-ul-Hamid, who then gave an option contract for its survey and exploitation to the German Anatolian Railroad Company, and, later, in 1908, to the English D'Arcy Exploration Company. In 1909, the Young Turk Government retransferred this same property to the Ministry of Mines, but, on June 28, 1914, a Young Turk Grand Vizier, by letter, reconfirmed Abd-ul-Hamid's option contract, in favor of the Turkish (British) Petroleum Company, now the

successor of the German Anatolian Company and D'Arcy Exploration Company.

It is true that at San Remo, on April 24, 1920, Great Britain and France, by the so-called "Petroleum Agreement," allotted 20% pro rata of the Mosul oil to the native Government of Iraq, which was the suzerain of the region of Mosul; at the same time, at San Remo, and later in the Sèvres Treaty of August 10, 1920, this oil-bearing Mosul region was recognized by the Allies as part of the proposed Kurdish State, and was, therefore, both in law and in equity, the property of the Kurds. In consequence, if the grant by Turkey to the Turkish (British) Petroleum Company in 1914 was valid, then it could not be reopened; but if it was not, then the Mosul oil-bearing region was, and is, the rightful property of the Kurds.[1]

America's Role at Lausanne

But, as early as the fourth day after the opening of the Lausanne Conference, on November 25, 1922, America intervened, and injected into the conference oil—Mosul oil—and, thereafter, oil determined the fate of the unfortunate Greeks, Kurds and Armenians.

America reopened the Mosul oil contract. She challenged its validity, and then claimed a share in it upon the so-called principle of Open Door.

When America thus injected herself into the Lausanne Conference, the Turks, who had already indicated their willingness to validate all the pre-war contracts, including the Mosul oil grant, now made a volte face, and welcomed America as a God-sent collaborator in the promotion of their schemes. In this they were not disappointed. America delivered to the Turks the Armenian case, the case of the protection of minorities, and the capitulations as well. The Turks, in consideration of this vital help, declined to validate the

[1] The disputed area of Mosul, which bears the reputed vast oil deposits, has, according to a Report to the League of Nations by its Commission of Inquiry, on July 16, 1925, a population of 799,000, of which 520,264 (the Commission lists the 26,257 Yezidz separately), is Kurd, and 36,652 Turk. Ismet Pasha, at the Lausanne Conference, contended that the majority of the population of that region were Turks; and Tevfik Rushdi, Turkish Foreign Commissar, in his argument before the Council of the League of Nations in September, 1925, qualified Ismet's assertion by the declaration that the Turks "loved" the Kurds, and that the latter insisted upon being ruled by their "loving brothers."—Ed.

Mosul oil grant, and allowed America a chance to get in on the ground floor.

America ultimately obtained a one-quarter share in Mosul oil—the precise thing she had gone to Lausanne to get. That America, having determined victory for the Allies in the war, was undeniably justified in claiming a share in Mosul oil—if oil was to be treated as spoils of war—without either bribing the Turks or without betraying her moral obligations, is a question which need not be here discussed.

The fact is that once America sided with the Turks, the Allies almost gladly conceded to the Turks their demands at the expense of their own pretended wards. The surviving Greeks and Armenians were ordered to leave Turkey. The Kurdish case was abandoned and forgotten; and the boundary between Armenia and Turkey was left undefined.

In the matter of the capitulations, as of control of Turkish finances by the foreign creditors, the Allies only made perfunctory protests and reservations, to save appearances. They yielded to Turkish pretensions in these matters, because they knew that, sooner or later, a weaker Turkey would be compelled to seek a loan, and then the foreign creditors would have a chance to impose their terms upon her.

The Allies themselves obtained, like Turkey and America, all they wanted. Great Britain secured, through her mandate over Iraq, a land route to India; a continuance of control over the Suez Canal, a vast cotton empire in the Soudan, and a share in Mosul oil. France also obtained a share in Mosul oil, and consolidated her position and prestige in the Near East through a mandate over Syria. Italy maintained her occupation of the Greek Dodecanese Islands. The concessions which these nations made to the Turks were at the expense of others—of Kurds, Greeks and Armenians. The Sèvres Treaty was "revised" only as against these latter three races, in the absence of and without the consent, of Armenians and Kurds.

Kemal's Kurdish Policy Since Lausanne

Kemal was now free to carry into effect his Pan-Turanian scheme. All the surviving Greeks and Armenians, except about 200,000, were expelled, and he then turned his atten-

tion to the remaining Kurds, in an effort to complete the plan of ridding Turkey of non-Turks.[1]

He started the campaign against the Kurds by requiring the Kurds, under penalty of death, to speak Turkish; by deporting scores of Kurdish notables; by seizing unnumbered Kurdish girls and women; and by inaugurating a general reign of terror, in all the parts of Kurdistan into which his agents could penetrate. At the spectacle of this ghastly decimation of their people, Kurdish leaders, with the infamy of Lausanne still fresh in memory, turned to the only honorable course that was open to them—revolution.

Kurdish Revolution of 1925

The Kurdish people, now harried and hounded like criminals by the Kemalists, responded gallantly and eagerly to the call to arms. Under the leadership of Sheik Said of Piran and a staff of veteran officers, an army of over 50,000 was organized under cover; munition depots were established at strategic points, and a general uprising was set for March 21, 1925, which was to drive the Turks, bag and baggage, out

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[1] No census of the Kurdish people has ever been taken, except in the district of Mosul. There are numerous pre-war estimates and claims ranging between three and five millions. How many Kurds now remain in Turkey is a matter of conjecture.

A French Government Yellow Book, published in 1892, estimated the Kurds in Turkey at 3,012,897. General Zelendji (Russian) put their number in Turkey, pre-war, at 2,800,475. A Turkish Government estimate, as of 1914, exclusive of Zor and Mosul, credits them with 2,527,840.

The Kurds themselves, claim (pre-war) in Turkey: 2,987,960; in Syria, 289,940; in Iraq, 749,380; in Persia, 1,300,000; in Armenia, 60,000, or a total of 5,387,280.

On November 17, 1924, the League of Nations appointed a Commission of Inquiry to redefine the Brussels Line in the disputed area of Mosul. This Commission was composed of Count Teleki, former Premier of Hungary; Mr. Af Wirsen, Swedish Minister in Bucharest; Col. Paulis of the Belgian Army, and was accompanied by British and Turkish representatives. The Commission spent several months in the disputed area and thereabouts, and, on July 16, 1925, made a lengthy Report, in which we find this passage:

> ". . . The Commission of Enquiry states that "out of estimated total of 3,000,000 Kurds, it is fair to say that 1,500,000 live in Turkey, 700,000 in Persia and 500,000 in the disputed territory. There are a certain number in Syria, but the number in Iraq proper is insignificant." (XIII, 87.)—Ed.

RUSSIA
TRANSCAUCASIA
CASPIAN SEA
BLACK
SEA
BATUM
DERBENT
TRABIZOND
TURKEY
KURDAVA
BAKU
ARMENIA
ABARAT MT.
Arax R.
DIARBEKIR
KURDISTAN
Euphrates River
Tigris R.
PERSIA
SYRIA
SINDJAR
MISOPOTAMIA



SHEIK SAID OF PIRAN

He led the Kurdish Revolution of 1925. His immediate command was cut off from the main force, and he fell into the hands of the Turks, and was hanged.

His last words were: *"He who dies for country, lives through eternity."*

of Kurdistan. But, luck once again was on the side of the Turks.

The Turks already had some inkling of Kurdish activities, and their spies and emissaries were at work. In the first days of March, 1925, a Kurdish patriot carelessly visits Sheik Said at his home and, on leaving, is taken quietly to the Turkish headquarters a few miles beyond—and questioned. He, of course, denies knowledge of any proposed Kurdish uprising, and insists that he had visited the Sheik to ask for a teaching position. The Turkish Commander, thereupon, addresses a courteous communication to Sheik Said, inviting him to the headquarters. The Sheik, now aware of the experience of his Kurdish visitor, and suspecting a foul plot at the hands of the Turkish Commander, summons at once his few hundred bodyguard to rise. Thus prematurely the Kurdish revolution started on March 7, 1925, instead of March 21, 1925, as planned.

Unfortunately, there were practically no wire communications between the Kurdish units, and the action of Sheik Said could reach them only through long and uncertain channels, offering the Turks the opportunity to isolate and surround the attacking forces.

The Turks sent against the Kurds the 9th Army Corps of Erzerum, the 8th Corps of Erzinjan, and the 7th Corps of Diarbekir. The Kurds inflicted decisive defeats upon the enemy, and advanced to Ourfa, Severek and Diarbekir, capital of Kurdistan, occupying the southern section of the latter city. They were successfully pressing the Turks in every direction.[1]

Then suddenly a terrible calamity overtook the Kurdish fighters. A fresh Turkish army of 25,000, transportated over the Syrian railways, in accordance with the terms of the Franklin-Bouillon agreement of 1921, appeared in the rear of the Kurds. The Kurds were thus caught between two fires. Their plan of campaign was made upon the natural assumption that Syria, Iraq and Persia would remain neutral.

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[1] The three Turkish Army Corps were composed of 9 Divisions of Infantry, or 36 regiments of 27 infantry and 9 artillery. The Turks also sent against the Kurds three Divisions of cavalry from Kars and Djezireh and six divisions of infantry, which they had concentrated in the regions of Segert, Mardin and Mediat, in September, 1924, during the dispute with Great Britain over the Mosul boundary line.—Ed.

DR. FUAD

A Kurdish patriot, participated in the Revolution of 1925, and hanged by Turks.



HASSAN HAIRI

Deputy of Dersim in Turkish Parliament, a leader of Kurdish Revolution, hanged in 1925 by Turks.

Undaunted, however, by this Turkish coup, the Kurds fought with the courage of desperation. The Turks brought fresh troops from Kars, Trebizond and Sivas. After four months' struggle, the Kurds realized the hopelessness of a regular warfare, and fell back upon a guerrilla war which is still continuing.

In the course of this unequal contest, the Turks suffered heavier losses than those during their entire campaign against the Greeks. Their casualties exceeded 50,000 and the cost of the operations amounted to over 60,000,000 Turkish pounds.

Kurdish Rebellion in Force

The Kurdish forces were then formed into units of varying sizes, and assigned to certain districts, as follows:

Egri Dagh	2,000
Dersim	5,000
Sassoon	6,000

Chapak-Achan	2,000
Vartan	2,000
Moosh-Bitlis	4,000
Manazguert	1,000
Mazi-Dagh	1,500
Silvan	1,000
	24,500

In addition to these formations, which have been put through some necessary changes in personnel and strength since 1925, there are now four other strong mobile units engaged solely in raiding operations.

Following the reorganization of the Kurdish plan of campaign, the first step was the selection of a site for headquarters and Government. Egri Dagh, midway between Persia and the Armenian Republic, was selected. By decisive actions, the Kurdish troops cleared the regions, embracing some 300 villages of Turks, and set up there the headquarters of the Kurdish Government, which has since directed the Kurdish operations, fighting many successful battles agains the Turks since 1925.

The Kemalists, during 1926, now enraged at the audacity and "impudence" of the Kurds, struck a sharp blow at Egri Dagh, the headquarters of the Kurdish National Army, and suffered a humiliating defeat. The Turkish Commander, 15 staff officers and 800 men fell into the hands of the Kurds, and over 2,000 dead and dying Turks littered the field of battle. The Kurds also captured 20 cannon, 66 machine guns, 1,200 rifles, 300 bomb throwers and other booty.

Kemal again tried his luck against Egri Dagh on December 15, 1927. An infantry regiment of the 9th Division of the Caucasus sallied forth from Igdir, to be smothered, however, under a rain of Kurdish fire. Four Kemalist officers, a score of men, 2 pieces of cannon, 15 machine guns, and considerable munitions fell into the hands of the Kurds.

On January 31, 1908, a Kurdish force seized the Motki-Bitlis road. Several enemy batallions from Moosh, Kara-Kilisse and Van soon engaged the Kurds. After three days'



PRINCE MIDHAT BEDR KHAN
Founder, first newspaper, Kurdistan, in Egypt.



DERVISH BEY
Chief of the tribe of Yezidis of Syria, a powerful leader, now an active adherent of Hoyboon.

struggle, which centered at Delikli-Tash, in the gorge of Bitlis, the Kurds carried a decisive victory. The Turks fled, abandoning on the field of battle over 400 casualties, including 15 officers, cannon, machine guns and quantities of small arms and munitions.

On February 4, 1928, a squadron of Turkish battleplanes attempted the bombardment of the Kurdish headquarters at Egri-Dagh. Two Turkish planes fell within the Kurdish lines, and the others sought safety in flight—never to return.

On March 29, 1928, a Kurdish unit engaged in battle the 29th Turkish regiment in the region of Bayazid, midway between Tapanli and Kaya Burun. After two days' bitter fighting, the Turks were hurled back as far as Zengi-Zor, within 15 kilometers of Bayazid.

On September 3, 1928, a Kurdish force, in a two days' stubborn fighting, destroyed or captured a Turkish detachment (regiment) of gendarmes, at Jeulemerk, in the Province of Bayazid. The Vali (Governor) of Bayazid was among the prisoners taken. We executed him.



HAJO BEY
Chief of the tribe of Huvilkian, a member of *Hoyboon*. He is now presented by Kemalist propagandists as a "fanatic" and a "bandit.' [1]



M. SHAHIN BEY
Chief of the tribe of Barazi, a member of *Hoyboon*, and a Deputy in the Syrian Chamber.

Almost invariably, in all these encounters, as in many others, the initiative and success rested with the Kurds; and, invariably also, the Turks were superior both in numbers and in equipment.

Kemal Deports or Murders 1,000,000 Kurds—in Retaliation

Furious over the defeats suffered at the hands of the Kurds in open field, the Kemalists, true to type and custom,

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[1] The Kemalists, in an effort to mislead world opinion as to the true character of the Kurds' struggle and to excuse the revolting atrocities which they are perpetrating upon inoffensive men, women and children, have recently set loose a flood of propaganda. "The trouble," according to them, "is only with a group of fanatics who refuse to be 'westernized,' whereas the Kurdish people 'love' the Turks." The Kurd's antipathy for the Turk is as old as Turkish rule over the Kurd. They have practically nothing in common. The Turk is a Mongoloid, speaks a Mongoloid dialect, and has ever held true to the concepts and ways of his forbears. The Kurd is an Aryan, speaks an Aryan tongue, and, before he fell under the blighting influence of the Turk, he enjoyed a fairly respectable cultural life. And the Kurd's natural sense of abhorrence of the Turk has since been reinforced by a deep sense of indignation in the face of fresh outbursts of Turkish savagery. The Kurdish

exacted a terrible toll of the unarmed, helpless Kurdish men, women and children.

During the winter of 1926 and 1927, Kemalist troops deported from their homes, by calculated brutalities upon women and children, reminiscent of the Armenian deportations of 1915, nearly 1,000,000 men, women and children.

In midwinter, with temperature below zero, through the bridle paths and mountain passes choked with snow, these miserable flocks of helpless human beings were prodded on at the point of bayonet in the direction of western Anatolia, leaving in their tracks tens of thousands of exhausted, famished and frozen unfortunates, while multitudes of young girls were forced into the officers' quarters, and others were sent to Angora for the use of the Kemalists.

Hundreds of villages were put to fire, and their inhabitants were butchered with such nauseating and revolting cruelties as only Turks can conceive and prepetrate.

For the light that it may shed upon the character of Kemal, as upon the nature of the campaign which he is now waging upon the Kurdish people, I publish elsewhere in this paper a list of the Kurdish villages which have been destroyed, together with the number of victims, and a description of the atrocities committed upon the victims.

Kurds Demand an International Inquiry

In the name of the Kurdish people, and of civilization, *The Hoyboon,* the Government of Kurdistan, invites the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy, indeed, all the civilized governments, to take the initiative to create an International Commission, which shall investigate the campaign of atrocities which Kemalist Turkey has been perpetrating in Kurdistan since 1925. The findings of the Commission could well determine the merits of the Kurd-

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people are resolved to risk their existence in the struggle to get rid of the Turk.

As to the *character* of the Kurdish rebellion, we cite the following Turkish opinion. *After* hanging 53 Kurdish leaders, who had fallen into their hands, the Turkish Presiding Judge at Diarbekir pronounced this sentence upon their corpses:

> "Some of you induced by personal egoism, others by foreign counsel and political jealousies, *but all of you motivated by the purpose to set up an independent Kurdish State, started this revolution.* Upon the scaffold you shall pay the price of ruined homes and of rivers of blood you shed."—From *Vakit,* June 20, 1925, Turkish daily of Constantinople.).—*The Author.*



ISMAIL BEY
Emir of the powerful Yezidiz of Sinjar, now an active adherent of Hoyboon.



GENERAL HUSSEIN PASHA
Chief of the tribe of Haidaran, one of two or three most influential leaders of the Kurds, and an active adherent of Hoyboon.

ish case, as those of the professions and pretensions of the so-called Kemalist republic.[1]

Kurdistan Proclaims Her Independence

In October, 1927, Kurdish leaders of diverse political faiths and affiliations, met in Convention, without Kurdistan, to elaborate a National Pact, and to take necessary steps to realize their national aims. This convention unanimously (a) created *The Hoyboon,* the supreme national organ, or the Kurdish Government, and, (b) clothed that Government with full and exclusive national and international powers.

The Hoyboon, thereupon, proclaimed, on October 28, 1927, the independence of Kurdistan, as laid down in the

[1] Under date of November 24, 1928, I am in receipt of a Report from the Kurdish Headquarters which says in part:

". . . Since last August, the Kemalist Government has been tearing off their parents Kurdish children under the age of ten, pretending that they are to be placed in special schools. The panic-stricken parents have since discovered that their little ones are being sent to Western Anatolia, and they are forbidden, under penalty of death, to make any attempt at communication with them. Stirred by this ghastly crime, designed to uproot our people, Kurdish parents are now frantically smuggling their children out of Turkey. . . ."—*The Author.*

Sèvres Treaty; designated *Kurd Ava,* at Egri Dagh, as the provisional capital of Kurdistan, and, by resolution, expressed the friendly sentiments of the Kurdish people for Persia, Armenia, Iraq, and Syria, and their determination to wage relentless war against the Turks—until they had abandoned, in perpetuity, the Kurdish soil, now under their grip.

The war between Turk and Kurd is going on—and will go on—until the objective of the Kurd has been attained.

Kurdish-Armenian Relations

The first task of *The Hoyboon,* following its creation, was an effort toward a final reconciliation, and, if possible, cooperation, with the Armenians.

I write upon Kurdish-Armenian relations with a mingled feeling of regret—and of gratitude. That, through the sinister influence of the Turk and the ignorance of the Kurd, the Armenian, in certain localities and at certain periods, has suffered, is a cause for deep regret. That we have already buried the past is cause for congratulation and gratitude.

For over 3,000 years, the Kurds and Armenians have been neighbors. During that whole period, and up to the middle of the nineteenth century, their relations have been marked by mutual respect and confidence. The Kurds have always respected and admired the honor, fortitude and great talents of the Armenians, and the Armenians have never failed to appreciate the honor and chivalry of the Kurds. Kurdish folklore, the best interpreter of the Kurd's sentiment toward his neighbors, bears out this statement, insofar as the Kurd is concerned. We find in Kurdish lore words of hate for the Turk; words of reproach for the Persian, of anger and contempt for the Arab; but not one word against the Armenian. It was since the Treaty of Paris, 1856, that the Turks, then admitted into the circle of civilized nations, began playing upon the ignorance of some Kurds and Circassians to inflame them against their Armenian neighbors.[1] No useful purpose could be served by an attempt at elaboration of the tragic consequences of this nefarious Turkish policy upon the rela-

[1] The Circassian is an Aryan, and his home is in Northern Georgia, Russia. Following the Crimean War of 1856, many of them emigrated into Turkey and embraced Islam. They are distributed throughout Turkey, and number about 150,000. They are a brave and hardy people of yet primitive habits.—Ed.



PRINCE SUREYA BEDR KHAN



HAJI MUSA BEY

Chief of the warlike tribes of Motkan, now an active adherent of Hoyboon.

tions between the Kurds and Armenians—and upon the reputation of the Kurds before the world. Kurdish leaders recognized even as early as 1900 the folly and criminality of the part that some of their people were playing at the behest of the Turk, and took steps to cast out from Kurdish councils the Turkish influence. Their patient and long efforts bore fruit—at last.

In October, 1927, *The Hoyboon,* representing the Kurdish people, and representatives of the Armenian people, recognizing the Turk as their common enemy, and the solidarity of their interests, effected a general reconciliation. On behalf of my race, I express to the gallant Armenian people deep sympathy, and reassurances of respect for their legitimate national aspiration--an Independent and United Armenia.

Kemal's Mimicry Must Collapse

Some interested parties, and perhaps also a few sincere observers, are laboring under the delusion that Kemal, by his studied imitations and affiliations, is headed toward

Sitting: Memdouh Selim Bey, Prince Jeladet Bedr Khan and Prince Kiamuran Bedr Khan, members of The Hoyboon; *Standing:* Kurdish volunteer leaders now in the field.

westernization.[1] The fact, however, is that Kemal is now playing upon the imagination and sense of vanity of the West solely to command capital and sympathy to prolong his hold upon his ricketty government, while he is building a bridge over Armenia and Kurdistan to the Turanian world. Kemal needs desperately funds and man-power.

Three points should be made clear for an intelligent appraisal of Kemal's venture.

1. Fundamentally, the Turk remains unchanged. He is as bloodthirsty and rapacious, as faithless and lying, as ever. Since 1919, the Kemalists murdered, expelled or deported over 6,000,000 Greeks, Kurds and Armenians, and robbed them of their possessions. They enslaved tens of thousands of girls and children. The minorities, who are guaranteed by the Lausanne Treaty equality, etc., are proscribed officially —in business and politics. Kemal proclaimed amnesty in 1927 for the Kurds, but those of them who trusted him have since paid the penalty of their credulity. In 1927, Kemal took a "census" of Turkey, which revealed a population of over 13,000,000. The population of Turkey, Kemal well knows, does not exceed 5,500,000, of which no more than 3,500,000 are Turks.[2]

2. Turkish currency is represented by something like $70,000,000 worth of paper, and the Turkish public debt was in 1923 a little over $791,000,000, both of them unsecured.

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[1] Adoption of reform measures and of progressive laws is no new thing in the history of Turkey. Code Napoleon, known as the Great Codes, was in theory the law of Turkey since 1839. Kemal, like his predecessors, lacks the will and machinery to administer justice.—Ed.

[2] On Oct. 28, 1927, a pseudo census "disclosed" a population of 13,649,945 in Kemalist Turkey. This daring discovery *astonished* even the usually bombastic Yonus Nady, editor of the official "Jumhouriet." *The Statesman's Year Book* (1921 edition) estimates, by districts, the pre-war (1914) population of Turkey at 20,973,900. In that tabulation, Syria is credited with 2,918,018. The 1923 French census of Syria shows a population of 2,981,863. That supports the dependability of *The Statesman's* estimate. Taking, therefore, as a basis *The Statesman's* estimate of 1914 and deducting therefrom the populations of the seceded regions of Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia, the minimum Turkish war losses, and the Armenians, Greeks and Kurds who have since been murdered or expelled, there would remain in Kemalist Turkey a population in the neighborhood of 5,000,000. Education is supposedly compulsory in Kemalist Turkey. Kemal's Commissar of Education puts (1926) the enrollment in his country's schools, all grades, at 313,900 pupils, or less than 2½% of its claimed population; whereas 28,000,000 students are enrolled (1928) in the American schools, or nearly 24% of the population. The Turks, like some missionaries, have surprisingly elastic ideas about figures and morals.—Ed.

The outgo of the Government, which is put at $95,000,000, is about 40% greater than the actual income, and nearly one-half of the revenue is used for the army. The balance of trade, which is shrinking gradually, is nearly 50% against Turkey. The primitive, inept Turkish people, now reduced to a mere 3,500,000, cannot support their Government, cannot become westernized in a generation or two, cannot increase their productive capacity by the adoption of western codes, and cannot defend so proportionately a great area, such as Kemalist Turkey.[1] The conclusion must be that the Kemalists lack not only character but actual or even potential resources for the maintenance of an independent existence. Kemal must either barter his precarious political independence for loans, or he stands ready to be engulfed in the rising tide of desperation of his own people. How long will he be able to pay and feed his army, upon which his rule rests?

3. But, if even Turkey possessed, or could possess, the essential moral and material resources to consolidate her holdings, over 6,000,000 Armenians and Kurds would never allow Turkey to enjoy in peace her ill-gotten gains. So long as Kemal is allowed by certain Powers to hold his pretensions over Armenia and Kurdistan, there can be no hope for any serious effort on his part to put his house in order—if any such thing were possible. Kemal must first

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[1] H. V. Kaltenborn, associate editor of the Brooklyn *Eagle,* in a correspondence, dated Constantinople, July 27, 1928, and published in the *Eagle,* says, in part:

> ". . . Customs duties increase the cost of everything that Turkey needs for her development. Consumption taxes, government monopolies and the high general taxes in the Near East raise the cost of living to two and one-third times what it was before the war. Incomes are only one and one-half times what they were before the war. This means reduced consumption, poor business, general hard times for everybody.
>
> "The only solution of Turkey's economic problem is foreign participation in the development of Turkish agriculture and Turkish industry. The Turks expelled their traders, artisans and industrial classes—Greeks and Armenians—and have not yet learned how to manufacture or how to buy and sell. In time, they may learn craftsmanship and business. For the present they are worse off than any Near Eastern country.
>
> "There is some progress, not much. Returning to Constantinople after a three years' interval, one notes a few new buildings, more motorcars and some outward evidence that there is a class which can afford to spend money for amusements. The budget is said to be balanced, but no foreigner trusts government statistics. For example, Turkey's official census gives the population as totaling 13,900,000. A foreign expert estimates the total at 8,000,000.
>
> "Not until the Turks become less arrogant about Kemal Pasha's military success and more critical of his economic failure will they have much chance to escape from present poverty.. . ."

get out of Armenia and Kurdistan. Westernization of Turkey is a grotesque farce—an illusion.[1]

A Last Word

Much as the Kurds would like to believe in the principles of international morality and justice, as professed so generously and so often by the Great Powers, their own experience, and particularly the terrible experience of the Armenian people, at the hands of the Allied and Associated Powers, forbids any further illusions on that head.

The Kurds are, of course, entitled to material remuneration by the Powers who have allocated amongst themselves the Kurds' national heritage. Yet, at this time, at least, they make no claims upon those Powers for any material, much less, physical, retribution or help in their struggle against the Turks.

They demand, however, that the nations concerned shall observe and respect the Kurds' territorial rights against Turkey, as laid down in the Treaty of Sèvres. They will never recognize any agreement or treaty by or with Turkey affecting these Kurdish lands.

The Kurdish people, now engaged in a thousand years struggle, which will determine their racial existence, still believe in the sense of fairness of the great American people, and, with confidence, submit their case to the conscience and judgment of the United States.

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[1] Dr. Mehmed Ali, in a November 1928 issue of *Ikdam*, Turkish daily of Constantinople, complains that even smaller and poorer countries than Turkey forge ahead, but that Turkey stands still, and continues:

> ". . . Our country holds important sources of wealth, but we do not exploit them; we don't know how. Greece has already become our greatest competitor in tobacco, rugs and similar articles in foreign markets; she invades even our own market. . . . Constantinople has been reduced to a mere shadow of Pyreus. . . . Since the day of our independence (1922?) many factories have been set up in our country—since abandoned. . . ."

That is a pretty good picture of the Turk's aptitudes and of Kemal's "progress." —Ed.

HOW KEMAL "WESTERNIZES"



A Group of Kurdish patriots, who fell into Kemal's hands, in the Revolution of 1925, hanged at El-Azara, in front of the barracks. The above photograph is taken from Vakit, Turkish daily of Constantinople, 27 April, 1925.

KEMAL'S REPUBLIC IN ACTION

A partial list of Kurdish Villages destroyed, with description of atrocities committed by Kemal, during the deportation and massacre of a million Kurds in the winter of 1926-27.

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Birhket	40	200
Heraq	50	250
Feza	30	150
Bakin[1]	150	748
Mannor	15	75
Melikan	50	249
Djoftin	25	120
Barsum	13	64
Marmaz	40	198
Limi	60	299
Tepe Keny[2]	70	349
Djilkeni	40	200
Lerdi	50	249
Dirkan	30	150
Djomalak	40	200
Fiss	60	298
Fretir	52	260
Cheklat[3]	80	398
Hori	30	150
Reza	60	292
Ayngul	15	75
Daila[4]	30	147
Marki	30	150
Chelli[5]	120	585

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[1] The inhabitants were burned to death, except Hakki, the Mayor, who was choken to death.

[2] The inhabitants were tied one to the other, and then subjected to a rain of machine gun fire. Tahir, the mayor, was bastinadoed to death.

[3] Twelve girls were raped in the presence of Captain Hifzi, who himself participated in the orgy.

[4] Three pregnant women were slashed to death, and two babes in cradle strangled by Sargent Hassan of Angora, who was subsequently promoted by Kemal.

[5] Five notables were forced to swallow quantities of kerosene and their clothes were soaked in kerosene; then they succumbed to the flames of torches manned by a frenzied Turkish mob, led by officers.

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Lerkat	15	75
Goulli	15	75
Dizdini	19	95
Aleq	15	74
Bermal	10	49
Touzle[8]	30	148
Total	1,284	6,373

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Mezer-Souhah	45	12
Ardichen	15	4
Anildan	10	8
Sotique	12	12
Kechkavar	8	50
Kerlenos	30	18
Chevisan	25	36
Mezreqor	8	12
Sifan	300	150
Chidnan	20	7
Tverin	10	13
Korini	15	12
Meradan	30	17
Kirpas	7	13
Timaq	15	13
Boukhan	15	37
Monski	10	13
Karzana	80	13
Mezre Kebir	33	22
Koulen	15	21
Djan Sor	80	25
Hot	20	12
Valir	90	28
Siyahil	15	20
Tarbatchour	200	85
Chin	32	21
Achkesor	18	2
Deri Khori	13	5
Bazan	16	2

[8] Twenty villages of this district, with over 1,00 houses, were destroyed by fire, and 4,979 of its inhabitants massacred. Twenty-one persons only, of the family of Dinani, village Melika, escaped.

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Araquil	18	3
Araquil Sagir	30	20
Ali Tchapan	28	10
Araquil Bozarada	50	18
Quermiq	16	12
Duchmalan	21	14
Tchireq	25	3
Tiyaret	19	20
Modan	50	4
Rotdja	100	75
Tchemeni	80	45
Kopart	150	12
Borneq	18	11
Yehdepir	19	22
Dilhetan	16	15
Deri Nali (i)	28	25
Alian	160	89
Elfian	50	80
Gueydamor	16	33
Mela Abdoullah	30	16
Halalan	19	17
Eski Keuy	16	11
Harabe	26	9
Litvir	20	8
Kartag [9]	5	12
Total	2,197	1,267

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Badjin	80	40
Kepalab	20	18
Barbous	30	20
Dalin	150	220
Nebl	100	195
Moukri	70	120
	450	613

[9] Seventy villages of this district were destroyed by fire, and the inhabitants burned or massacred. Those who made their way out of the flames were hurled back by Turkish troops into the furnace.

[12] The inhabitants of the above villages sought refuge in the nearby mountains before the arrival of the Turkish troops, who then laid waste all the villages. Thereafter, the Turkish Commander addressed a cordial invitation to the Kurds to assemble at Ala Kamish, promising solemnly in the name "Ghazi Pasha" to lend them necessary funds to rebuild their homes. But no sooner had these unfortunates set foot upon the "promised land" than Turkish batteries and machine guns opened fire upon them, until they were annihilated.

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Melikan	80	122
Hezarchan	60	82
Bronji	25	68
Fleq	28	40
Solahan	100	150
Harbezon	30	84
Kekmal	18	56
Azade	32	64
Kessi	17	40
Bukla	100	45
Galbi	40	64
Mazguif	8	19
Terbas	10	48
Mela Birma	25	64
Serba	50	80
Inqak	20	64
	643	1,090

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Kerhich	35	40
Kertouvin	100	5
Arbed	45	50
Nerquizlo	15	20
Tel Yakoub	10	62
Tel Magar	20	19
Chvicheq	50	72
Baksian	30	62
Gorin	35	19
Kala	100	35
	440	384

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Marin	50	50
Guirini Mina	40	70
Merbab	40	12
Gundi Chukro	45	50
Kanter	35	28
Tel Hassan	38	40
Tel Djihan	102	50
Aznavor	30	28
Badib	50	15
Harbemichq	15	19
Sidri	20	15
Harbeali	120	150
Harbqefi	35	86
Nephabab	20	12
Ebch	30	5
Baminem	40	80
Quelsora	60	19
Quenq	25	60
Koulbikan	20	28
Chouchani	50	25
Quiyoh	40	60
	905	901

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Derclamr	10	25
Kerfreb	75	160
Kartmin	10	29
Nefbadjerin	45	18
Temerzi (i)	30	19
Soran (2)	40	35
Daskan	30	67
Kakvan	25	36
Mede	20	30
Aynord	30	67
Mezizeh	120	220
Take	20	38
Kefrezi	50	78
Kemi	25	48
Habinka	18	28
	548	978

14-20 Mustapha Bey, Commander of the 41st Division, directed the operations against the 430 villages of the district of Darahim. All but 30 persons were butchered. According to eyewitnesses, unnameable atrocities were committed upon the children of both sexes and upon girls and women. Many of them, after being raped, were mutilated, and then thrown into the fire.

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Telsifan	35	71
Sturan	40	80
Abdeqan	50	100
Delavikasri	60	107
Hadjiquesian	30	90
Harabmichqui	50	120
Serqani	30	70
Harab Goze	15	50
Harab Sousne	20	60
Dibeq	25	64
Diron Aga	100	190
Mem Kan	25	50
Cheih Hidr	30	59
Baverd	25	60
Chabourk	20	65
Kanharab	20	45
Banh	30	75
Berndji	15	35
Alakamich	120	315
	740	1,706

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Deersalib	30	62
Hermiss	20	82
Tchelelik (I)	22	28
	72	172

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Aziza	65	5
Sahniz	45	22
Seydan	25	15
Sigui	40	7
Ifnoki Jor	47	12
Ifnoki Jir	33	18
Deq	50	29
Koss	25	13
Tchani	47	95
Hizaban	10	9
Fahzan	25	12
	412	237

[1] Ahmed, the mayor, and fourteen notables, after being slashed by Turkish bayonets, were trampled to death by cavalry.

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Kogni	50	28
Bachmello	40	50
Karmichlo	35	40
Korkdji	13	58
	138	176

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Dirhan (I)	10	25
Missar	12	18
Kassrdjizni	15	28
	37	71

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Kehmot	25	5
Katchir	10	9
Kof	63	163
Sayer	15	75
Brondj	25	4
Guildar	5	2
Saffan	15	27
	158	285

Name of Villages	Number of Houses Burned	Number of Victims
Ifnok	25	80
Kirpazar	30	60
Kanikan	20	40
Kanirech	30	50
Tohla	150	180
Djerk	60	28
Bora	30	48
Djiba	30	60
Tchoriqchima	10	28
Bagdje	80	40
Sirane	5	15
Kara Baldjik	60	88
Saqniss	60	92
	590	809

STEER CLEAR OF TURKEY

By Harry A. Franck

Reprinted, by permission, from The Outlook, November 2, 1927.

. . . I very recently returned from a journey through Turkey. . . .

I had planned to push on eastward and visit the eastern half of Turkey. But it simply isn't done. When I asked for permission to go to Erzerum, it was quickly and flatly refused. Having never before been proscribed in my goings and comings in any of the sixty or so countries I have visited, I asked for reasons. Foreigners were not allowed there, was all the explanation I was vouchsafed. The same short shrift was given my request to go to Kharpoot, Diarbekir, Van, Kars. The eastern end of Anatolia, the Asiatic region that is almost all that is left to Turkey, was tight closed against prying foreigners of whatever class or motive.

An anti-Kemalist and several Americans of long residence in the country at length confided the reason to me. In spite of a censorship unequaled in Western countries even in war times, the fact had leaked through that new massacres had been going on for some time in that part of the country. This time it was the Kurds who were in trouble. The Turks are natural bullies; they must have some one to pick on. The Greeks and Armenians and other Christians being virtually gone, they had fallen upon a racial minority of their own faith. Incredible as it may sound, the reason for the massacres this time was that some of the Kurds had refused to do away with the fez and adopt European headdress. Something in their own peculiar brand of religion makes this sacreligious, and they were being hanged, deported, and their property confiscated—this last the main reason always for Turkish atrocities—on the charge of rebelling against the Kemal Government. We heard of the massacres of the Greeks and the Armenians; they had friends in the outside world and propaganda bureaus from which to make their wrongs heard. The Kurds, having none of these things, die silent martyrs.

Most of the American and other Christian missionaries have left Turkey. The few mission schools that remain must give only those subjects approved by the Kemal Government. The Government not merely specifies the curriculum, but names the holidays, requires the appointment of certain Turkish teachers, names the salary that must be paid them, and forbids absolutely anything even mildly suggestive of proselyting. To so much as show a Testament to a Turkish pupil is illegal. The superintendent of schools at Tarsus ordered the American boys' school there to hold classes on Sunday, to use the Koran instead of the Bible, and to conform to several other arbitrary religious rules. A few mission hospitals are still functioning, but the interference from the Turkish authorities is intense. Most of the few missionaries who remain are merely waiting and marking time in the largely vain hope that they will get permission again to work for the good of the masses.

There is an American missionary woman who has been all alone in the southeastern part of Anatolia for years. Her mission board has tried hard and long to get permission to send another worker to relieve her, or at least to bear her company, but without success. She might be allowed to leave, but only on condition of abandoning all the mission property and most of her own. She is allowed to write letters only in Turkish, and something like one in ten even in that language reach their destination. It is hardly necessary

to add that she is within hearing distance of the Kurd massacres.

The American hospital at Marsivan was closed by order of Mustapha Kemal because the American director said within hearing of some spy that, while no one objected to democracy in Turkey, it was impossible to establish a democracy by wholesale hangings and other dictatorial acts. Fifteen professors of an American mission school were hanged because the authorities found a photograph in the school showing a football team of boys in blue and white (the Greek colors) sweaters and with the Greek as well as the Turkish flag flying above them. It had been taken years before at the time of a match between students representing the two nationalities.

Like the missionaries, commercial men are leaving Turkey. They cannot compete with the new monopolies, abetted by the grafting and the dilatory, unfair, unbusinesslike ways of the present Government. The Constantinople representative of one of our large tobacco companies has been months withdrawing his firm from the country, and the end has by no means arrived. Three times he had unpacked his office furniture, which he planned to move to Greece, for inspection, when last I saw him, and still had little hope of getting out when I left. An Englishman who held the lightering contracts with most foreign ships touching at Constantinople was forced more than a year ago to work exclusively for the harbor monopoly, and at last accounts had not received a piaster for his services.

In the old days the Sultans rewarded their favorites by farming out the taxes among them and permitting them to keep a large proportion of the collections. While taxes are far worse now than under the Sultans—being ubiquitous, arbitrary, yet bringing the people by no means benefits in proportion—the new stunt is the granting of monopolies. The present Government, disguised under the name of republic, is a closed corporation of a score or so of men close to Kemal. Most of them have done things which make it impossible safely to break with the dictator, however much they may wish to do so. These worthy Kemalists of high rank are given monopolies on many of the things of prime necessity. There are monopolies on almost everything—salt, sugar, tobacco, liquor, harbor rights, radio, even bathing; it is illegal to go swimming in Turkey except from an authorized bathhouse, after paying the corresponding fee to the monopolist. The poor *hamals*, or human pack-horses, that one still sees carrying atrocious loads in Constantinople and other parts of Turkey now toil for bare food, while the profits of their grueling labors go to the political favorite who holds the *hamal* monopoly. Under the Sultans many of them (Kurds to a large extent) laid aside what to them were fortunes and went home to spend the last years of their lives in ease.

Be not led astray by the surface of things in the "new" Turkey. The present régime is eager to be considered progressive; it does not wish to be blamed for the crimes of the former régime. But the leopard does not change his spots as easily as a Turk does his headgear. There has been much pro-Turk—or more exactly, pro-Kemal—propaganda since Turkey changed the form, and the form only, of her Government. Kemal and his entourage know enough of Western psychology to realize the appeal of the romantic to the world at large, and our papers have been flooded with reports of the completely Europeanized condition of the Turkey of today, of the striking character of her new sultan under the name of President.

But the Turk is still much what he was, and there is little evidence that Turkey has essentially changed under that ardent disciple of Venus and Bacchus, Mustapha Kemal Pasha. It is true that there are more and better schools, that more attention is being given to sanitation, that marriage and divorce laws are more on Western lines, that polygamy has been *legally* abolished, that Turkey has adopted the Swiss Civil Code and the Italian Criminal Code. But the arbitrary rule of a dictator, a wholly ruthless dictator, is still the real Government. The tourists who make up some ninety-five per cent of American travelers in Turkey come back reporting that the veil has virtually disappeared. So it has—in Constantinople, the only place tourists see; also in Angora and among the women of the official class. But the great majority of feminine faces the country over are still covered; and the "new" Turkey is in a similar state, still largely what it was under the vicious and degenerate Sultans.

Never was there such a furor of hero worship as is now being poured out upon "the Gazi" (roughly translatable as "the conqueror"), as Mustapha Kemal is known among his people. Every Government office, every schoolroom in the country, even mission schools, must have a framed picture of Kemal in the place of honor. Bronze statues of Kemal are springing up all over the country. The same amount expended on schools or roads would bring a great improvement in Turkey. When "the Gazi" came to spend his summer in one of the former Sultan's palaces on the Bosphorus, Constantinople and the towns along the way from Angora spent enough in decorations and other evidences of high regard for him to have completely built the new capital. The electric-light company of Constantinople expects fifty per cent increase in this year's business because of the few days of special illumination in his honor. Yet these statues and the like are by no means all good-will offerings. The Kemal custom of summary trials and sudden hangings in the cold gray dawn for all those of whatever class who open their mouths against him has given the surface appearance of a happy and contented Turkey under an adored ruler. But the patient traveler who will take time to win a little confidence will hear anything but contentment from the anti-Kemalists, who dare not raise their voices in public.

In this brief space only a few outstanding hints of the wrongs still being perpetrated in Turkey can be mentioned. A complete inventory would take many pages. Certainly the three reasons enumerated by those opposed to the signing of the Lausanne Treaty are as much in evidence as ever. Kemal has done nothing whatever to make reparation to the Armenian republic he gling; on the contrary, it is largely gling; on the contrary, it s largely he who has made so difficult the task of the Near East Relief in bringing many thousands of Armenian orphans through to productiveness and self-support. Unless the new left-hand understanding with Turkey contains features of which we have heard nothing, guaranties for the protection of Americans in Turkey are as lacking as ever. Personally, I should far rather trust myself to the Chinese if and when our extraterritorial rights cease to exist there than to the Turks without the protection of the capitulations. As to the "failure to provide for recognition by Turkey of the American nationality of former Turkish subjects," any Greek or Armenian born in Turkey who dares to venture back there under the supposed protection of an American passport

to regret it. The
he must have
naturalized
whatever to the
show new proof.
State Department were
selling its docu-
to any one
Will have met
Christian sub-
American
before

their faces by Turkish police, and who are henceforth unable to leave Kemal's kingdom. Possibly a certified accountant could show that the sum total shows some improvement over Sultanic days in the Turkey of Kemal. But the Turk of today and the "new" Turkey are still by no means worthy of our extending to them the right hand of friendship and forgiveness.

A Kurdish Volunteer Squad now in the Field

TURKEY'S ECONOMIC POSITION

The following quotations are taken from a book, entitled, "Turkey," published in 1920 by the U. S. Department of Commerce, written by G. Bie Ravndal, then American Consul General in Constantinople.

"Throughout Turkey the principal means of transportation are horse-drawn carriages, and wagons, oxen and water buffalo carts, pack horses, donkey trains, and camel caravans.

"The significance of the defeat of the Greeks behind Smyrna, accompanied by the exodus, not only of the Greek military and civil forces, but also of the native Greeks and Armenians and more recently of Jews, can best be grasped by referring to the factory figures given previously. These show that the Greeks and Armenians and Jews in 1915 were estimated to furnish 75 per cent. of the capital and 85 per cent. of the labor involved in Turkish industries.

"The American products which find the best market in Turkey include wheat, rice, sugar, glucose, oleo oil, petroleum products, agricultural machinery, etc.

"Imports from Turkey: tobacco, Smyrna figs, raisins, rugs, mostly reexported from Persia, mohair, wool, nuts, valonia, sausage casings, licorice root, borax, opium, raw furs, and skins.

Much has been said and written about the importance of the Turkish market, but in the face of a careful analysis this alleged value becomes somewhat modified. The total population of Turkey is thought not to exceed 7,500,000, and it is not believed that Turkish annual expenditures abroad at present exceed $90,000,000.

"The market for foreign products must necessarily be limited largely to coastal towns and to a few inland centers served by railways, and even here the proportion of the population willing and able to pay for European and American manufactured goods is restricted. . . .

"It serves no useful purpose, therefore, to entertain extravagant notions about the capacity of the Turkish market for absorption of imported goods, and it is worth while remembering that the sale of such goods must be effected on a much narrower margin of profit in Turkey than in the United States.

"The mass of the population, prompted by considerations of both economy and conservatism, clings to the primitive furnishings and implements of an earlier day.

"Under these circumstances the serious efforts at penetration on the part of European business world would appear at first glance incomprehensible.

[1] The population of Turkey, as given by the Government, includes that of the Mosul district with a population of 799,000 since allotted to Iraq. On the basis of her pre-war population, Turkey now has a population of about 5,000,000. Ed.

"These European countries, however, were also attracted to the Turkish market by considerations of investment of capital and discovery of outlets for the energy of technical personnel and labor, so that the actual sale of goods to a relatively small and backward clientele was not the sole inducement.

"Like all the other branches, marine insurance is in foreign hands and flourished until recently. At present it is eclipsed by trade stagnation; Turkish imports and exports, as well as the transit business, have shrunk to a shadow of their importance.

"The Turkish merchant is just as reliable as his occidental rival. . . . It is commendatory of the credit status of the country that there are no agencies or attorneys devoting exclusive attention to collections. . . .

> NOTE.—According to Annuaire de Commerce, 1913, a French publication, the Armenians and Greeks carried on 66% of the commerce of Turkey, and practically the whole export and import trade was conducted by them, the Jews and a small number of foreigners.—Ed.

"Mention has been made in the Turkish press of the possibility of wiping out this debt (public debt of $586,000,000) by the sale of Imperial palaces and other dynastic property. . . . Whether this is possible or not is a matter difficult of determination. In any case the debt considered on this basis is far from formidable. . . .

In the meantime the Government has suspended appropriations for interest and amortization; has greatly reduced the appropriation for the expenses of the Ottoman Public Administration, and has begun itself the encashment of the ceded revenues.

"As against this total of obligations $791,958,877, the Turkish Republic is without any gold reserve, and there is probably very little gold in the country; the credit of the State, though far from destroyed, is nevertheless compromised by uncertainty as to the attitude that the Government will adopt toward its creditors; finally, the country is almost without industries and its agricultural organization is disarranged as a result of the wars and migrations of the past decade, so that in spite of a policy of discouraging imports the balance of trade is heavily against it.

A Picture of Kemalist Turkey

Herr **Fidro,** an Austrian, who has just returned (September, 1928) from a tour of Anatolia, reports:

> **"I am acquainted with every nook and corner of Anatolia. . . . . A British Consul accompanied me. . . . . What I found there was altogether different from that which I'd heard. I was under the impression that Turkey had entered an era of progress and civilization. Such, unfortunately, is not the case. In Constantinople, Smyrna and Angora, one notes some evidences of the new movement, but the rest of Turkey remains unchanged. Most Turks go about bareheaded rather than wear a hat, and I was told that they went to bed with the fez on. Religious fanaticism retains is former force. . . . . Kemalist leaders hope to alter this ancient psychology in twenty-five years. That, of course, is quite a distant hope. The existing conditions, however, are all but hopeful. The people are in the throes of abject poverty. Business is at a standstill. What there is of industry is primitive. Business houses are being driven into bankruptcy. The Government is practically penniless. Europeans would not lend credit. And this discouraging situation is accentuated by a state of famine which first gripped the region of Iconeum, but which now rules the whole of Anatolia.[1] . . ."**

* * * * *

Herr **Klotzel,** correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt,* in his recent book, writes:

> **". . . . From the coast (Trebizond) to Erzerum (176 miles) the whole countryside presents an almost indescribable state of desolation—except for the first day's journey. (Herr Klotzel made his journey on horseback.) No sooner does one set foot in the regions which were once inhabited by the Armenians than one sees nothing but ruins.**
>
> **"These depredations have been wrought in the course of battles with the Russians," it is declared by such Turkish travellers as one meets.**
>
> **But that statement is true only in a very small degree.**
>
> **Nearly all the buildings were ruined during the massacres of Armenians. BAPERT, midway between Trebizond and Erzerum, is the only town which retains some of its former buildings—two-thirds only of it having been demolished. At Erzerum, there are but a few officials of Soviet Russia; it is now wholly an Oriental**

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[1] The term "Anatolia" is of Byzantine origin. *Anatolikon* was a Theme (Administrative district) of the Eastern Empire, and, in 959, it embraced the present province of Iconeum and part of Angora, or probably 50,000 sq. miles. The Turks, however, quite carelessly apply the term to the whole of Asia Minor.—Ed.

town, inhabited by Turks, with some Persians and Arabs. (The latter are visiting traders.) (Erzerum had a pre-war population of 70,000—now reduced to about 7,000.)

Nothing is more horrifying than the sight of a town which is emptied of all its inhabitants—human and animal alike. . . . . Armenian cemeteries, churches and monasteries appear to have been subjected to particular vandalism at the hands of the Turks.

Turkey has attained her purpose by destroying the "traditional enemy" of the Turks. But, the land where once civilization flourished is now a desert. . . . ."

* * * * *

The Visiting Correspondent of *Aksham,* Turkish daily of Constantinople, writes:

"MUSCH is at present but a heap of ruins. Some 300 mud hovels and a few shops have been slapped together. A sad picture; shopkeepers squatting and guarding, all day long, their scant wares—consisting of a few heads of onions, a few boxes of matches, cigarette paper, some raisins and rice. The streets, like the graveyard, are forbidding and dispiriting; not a sign of life. (Musch had a pre-war population of 35,000, now reduced to 2,000.)

VAN is also completely wrecked.

Formerly many vessels navigated the Lake (about 36 miles in length and the same in width)—now abandoned to the vultures. Three ramshackle buildings only remain at the harbor. . . . . The Governor, a lonely, sleepy person, offered me tea; I gave him some food. The poor fellow hadn't had anything decent to eat for days.

Then we rode, for hours, along the edge of the lake, passing through abandoned villages—in truth, a desert—and finally reached Gotum Baba. As the night set in, the villagers made light from faggots. . . . ." (VAN had a pre-war population of 65,00, now reduced to 2,500.)

Issued by The Kurdish Independence League,
655 E. Allegheny Avenue, Philadelphia, Pa.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Teheran, Persia,

No. 127. July 29, 1930.

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The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

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With reference to my despatch No. 121 of July 15, 1930, relative to the Kurdish disturbances on the Perso-Turkish frontier, I have the honor to report that order would appear to have been restored.

According to the press Persian troops have occupied the border, and are cooperating fully with the Turkish authorities on the other side in

pacifying

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NONE
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pacifying the tribesmen. These newspapers point to the shooting of Simko and the defeat of Haled Agha, an even more troublesome Kurd, as proof of the fallacy of the charges made in the Turkish press that Persia was slack in handling the problem and was largely responsible for the difficulties encountered by the Turkish authorities in dealing with the Kurds on their side of the border.

The Turkish Ambassador confirms this. He has been insisting that the Persian Government send adequate troops to patrol the border. He said that on the whole the Persian Government has done practically everything he asked, but that it has taken him many weeks to get results. The Ambassador said that for some time his Embassy had been showered with telegrams from Ankara reporting villages pillaged, caravans robbed and persons killed or wounded by the Kurds, but during the past weeks, since the Persian troops had occupied the frontier and driven the border tribesmen farther back into Persia, there had been a complete and gratifying lack of complaints from his Government.

As to bands of Kurds in the Zeilan Valley and those between Great and Little Ararat, mentioned in the despatch under reference, page 3, last paragraph, the Ambassador said that the former band, which consisted of 800 or 1,000 Kurds instead of 500 as previously reported, had been completely suppressed by Turkish troops with the assistance of Turkish peasants.

peasants. The band between the Ararats appeared to have dispersed, many of whom were found among those surrounded in the Zeilan Valley.

He said that at present his principal concern was the establishment by the Persians of a permanent and adequate frontier guard. Both Persia and Turkey had spent a great deal of money on this affair which they could ill afford to spare, and he thought that his Government would be greatly annoyed and a serious incident might result should the Persian Government allow the Kurds to get out of hand again.

Two weeks ago the Ambassador said that in order to suppress the Kurds between the two Ararats he made arrangements with the Persian Government to permit Turkish soldiers to enter "a few hundred meters" into Persian territory and station themselves under a Persian General around the southern or Persian side of Little Ararat. This was necessary since the Perso-Turkish frontier passes between the two mountains, taking in a portion of the northern base of Little Ararat. Twice before the Turks had endeavored to surround turbulent Kurds in the same position and each time they had escaped by way of Little Ararat into Persian territory due to the failure of the Persian troops to stop them. The Turkish Commander did not intend to let this happen again and he counted on Turkish troops on the Persian side of Little Ararat to prevent the Kurds escaping.

Note
891.0146

The Ambassador now informs the Legation that since this band of Kurds had largely dispersed it

had

had not been necessary for Turkish troops to avail themselves of the permission to enter Persian territory.

I have dealt with this latter phase at some length since it is difficult to explain briefly, and since it involved the granting by Persia of permission for Turkish troops to enter Persian territory, albeit under nominal Persian command, it was thought to be of some interest.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Charles C. Hart.

Copy to American Embassy, Istanbul.

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, August 9, 1930.

No. 1108

BUREAU OF STATE DEPT OF
INDEX
AUG 27 30

FOR DISTRIBUTION

INDEX NUMBER
767.91/45

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 28 1930
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir: 767.91/42

I have the honor to report that the situation along Turkey's Persian and Irak frontiers, as described in my despatch No. 1101 of July 26, 1930, has apparently undergone little change during the past fortnight. Turkish forces are reported as still investing that portion of the Mt. Ararat region lying in Turkish territory, while the Persians, according to Teheran despatches, have at last shown some signs of activity by hemming in the bandits of Ağri Dağ from the Persian side. Although the first snows are said to have begun to drive the bandits down from their strongholds, there is considerable doubt in military circles whether the Turkish troops will be

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AUG 30 1930

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able to operate during the severe winter months which begin in September. The Government forces, moreover, consist largely of men from the Aidin and Smyrna districts who are unused to such rigorous climatic conditions. The country around Mt. Ararat is said to be bleak and absolutely barren affording little opportunity for shelter of any description. The Government, however, continues to issue statements supporting a campaign to exterminate completely the bandits and has already started to provide the troops with warmer equipment.

The incursion of the Kurds on the Irak border in the direction of Hakkiari apparently involved operations on a much smaller scale. This region is now said to be cleared of the bandits who were led by Sheik Harzan.

Hardly had this been effected, when a fresh disturbance was reported, this time on Turkey's Syrian frontier where the famous Kurdish chieftan Hatcho with some sixty followers occupied a Turkish border village near Urfa and proclaimed open warfare in the name of the "Independence of Kurdistan".

Insignificant as these disturbances on Turkey's Syrian and Irak frontiers appear when compared with the full-sized uprising in the North, they furnish added proof of the concentrated action believed to be displayed by the various Kurdish tribes and anti-Turkish elements organized outside Turkey. They also show that these disturbances are primarily Kurdish with a definite racial consciousness continually asserting itself and proving a dangerous bond between the Kurds in Turkey and the Kurds outside her boundaries. The Kurdish race is estimated by Fevzi Pasha,

Chief

Chief of Staff of the Turkish army, to be divided as follows: 400,000 in Turkey, one million in Persia and another million in Irak. The present disturbances, therefore, appear to involve Turkey's international relations rather than a purely internal problem. As such they emphasize the danger spots which exist at all times along three of her four frontiers and which constantly threaten to affect her relations with Persia, Iraq and Syria.

In this respect the present troubles differ considerably from the Rebellion of 1925. The latter was a purely local uprising, very intensive, but spread over one corner of Turkey only, that region south of Lake Van. While internally it may have held more potential complications, the scene of action was concentrated, whereas the present disturbances are scattered over a widespread area along Turkey's frontiers. I am reliably informed from an eye-witness who travelled recently through Bayazit that the present insurgents are better prepared and armed than those in 1925. The fighting strength employed on both sides in the present uprising is reliably estimated to be about equal to that in 1925, namely 40,000 Turkish troops against 15,000 Kurds.

The press which is still featuring the Government's campaign has carefully refrained from making such a comparison as above, continuing to place all the onus on foreign organizations outside Turkey. Ismet Pasha in a speech before the Ankara Law School on July 30 admitted the existence of foreign organizations attempting to bring in anti-nationalist propaganda. While he did not go so far as to mention Persia by name, the Prime Minister left no

doubt

doubt as to what country he referred to when he stated that Turkey would, if so compelled, take action to control and guard her frontiers, particularly when her neighbor failed to do so.

Persia's reply to the Turkish note was received a few days ago. While no official text has been printed, the note is reported to deny any responsibility for recent events on the border and to refuse to allow Turkish forces to operate in Persian Territory. At the same time, the note is said to agree with the principle of mutual cooperation for the suppression of banditry proposed by Turkey and leaves open the question of how this cooperation should be applied. It is understood that the Turks are sending further proposals to the Persian Government.

With regard to Turkey's ambition to rectify the frontier, I desire to point out that such a rectification, even though strategically advantageous to Turkey, will not in itself be any guarantee against uprisings along a frontier bristling with Kurdish tribes on both sides.

To sum up, it can be said that so far these disturbances in themselves have not had any widespread effect throughout the country, being more sporadic than symptomatic when considered in connection with the present internal situation of Turkey as a whole.

It is rather the financial expenditure involved that will have a distinct bearing on the growing list of economic and financial difficulties which have confronted Ismet Pasha and his cabinet since last fall and which have

caused

caused a certain amount of unrest in Turkey.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

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KW

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(Copy sent American Legation Teheran).

Copy sent E. I. C., Paris.

PM RECD

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Teheran, Persia,
August 25, 1930.

No. 143

DEPT. OF STATE
SEP 17 30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 4 1930
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 17 1930
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

INDEX BUREAU
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767.91/46

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767.91
note
767.9115

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Copy Transmitted by The Commercial Office (A-C/O)
Istanbul
9/23/30
CB

Sir:

767.91/44

I have the honor to report that since writing my despatch No. 127 of July 29, 1930, concerning the Kurdish disturbances on the Perso-Turkish frontier, the trouble seems to have flared up again in a somewhat more aggravated form, and I recount below the recent events bearing on this question.

A curious series of assertions and denials have appeared in the press. On August 12 the SÉTAREH'YE-DJÈHANE stated that Mendouh Chevket Bey,

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Bey, the Turkish Ambassador, had in the name of his Government thanked the Persian Government for having aided the Turkish authorities in restoring order on the frontier by Persia's energetic attitude vis-a-vis the Kurdish insurgents. However, two days later the same paper published the Turkish Ambassador's statement that he had not done so. On August 15 the newspapers announced that the Turkish Ambassador had been recalled, and on August 17 a report from Turkey and other foreign countries that Turkish troops had entered Persian territory, was denied in an official statement from the Foreign Office published in the press. Furthermore, a Reuter's telegram from Istanbul said that the Turkish Government had sent a note to the Persian Government, calling for closer colaboration with the Turkish forces in the Kurdish disorders and implying a sharp criticism of Persia. On August 17 this was denied in the Persian press. On August 15, in a telegram from Ankara, Reuter's reported that Turkish troops were intrenched on the southern and eastern slopes of Little Mount Ararat well inside Persian territory, and on August 20 the same news service reported from Istanbul that a Persian note had been received declaring that under no circumstances would the Persian Government consent to military cooperation with Turkey against the Kurdish rebels in Persian territory. The Teheran press also published a statement to the effect that, contrary to rumors, the Turkish Government had not proposed an exchange of territory with the Persian Government.

All

All of this is somewhat confusing. The Turkish Ambassador did not attend the receptions at the German Legation and the Afghan Embassy on August 11 and 29, respectively, the National days of those two countries. In relation to his absence at these two receptions he told the Legation that since he had resigned, his resignation had been accepted and his successor named, he did not care to attend formal functions as he no longer felt he was Ambassador.

Memdouh Chevket then said that his own policy was not always that of his Government, and when the orders received required that he deviate too radically from what he regarded the proper procedure he resigned. He added that over two years ago, when on leave in Ankara, a note to the Persian Government was prepared which he did not approve. He resigned and his resignation was accepted. A few days later the Turkish Foreign Minister adjusted the matter to suit Memdouh Chevket and sent him back to Teheran.

While the Ambassador did not say so directly and was naturally reticent, it seemed very clear that the meaning which he intended to convey was that a similar situation had arisen; that his Government had sent him instructions with which he did not wish to comply and he had again resigned. The next logical inference would seem to be that the instructions had to do with the frontier troubles, and probably called for more vigorous representations or threats than the Ambassador was willing

to

to make. Press reports of a Turkish note sent and the denial of its reception by the Persian Government would seem to support this hypothesis. Furthermore the Turkish Military Attaché admitted the Ambassador's views on handling the frontier problem differed from those of Ankara.

Memdouh Chevket said that he had asked for permission to leave Persia at once on account of his health, having an enlarged heart, but his Government urged him to stay until his successor, Khosrov Bey, arrives, provided his health permits. The Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs assured him of his full confidence, but it is clear that he feels piqued.

He very naturally does not wish to meet his successor in Teheran and plans to meet him in Kasr-i-Shirin or Pahlevi, depending on the route he takes to Persia.

Obviously something has taken place between the Ambassador and his Government.

As to the frontier difficulties the British Consul in Tabriz reports that, according to the Military Commander in that town, the Persians lost 100 men and 4 officers in an action against the Jalali Kurds near Maku. The press and the War Ministry admit a loss of 20 men and 1 officer.

The most discussed question is whether the Turks have actually crossed the frontier. The Turkish Ambassador and Turkish Military Attaché say they have not. On the other hand there are

persistent

persistent unofficial reports that they have, and Colonel Dodd, British Military Attaché, said that he has it on excellent authority that on or about August 20 some Turkish troops penetrated 10 kilometers into Persia in pursuit of Kurdish rebels. He believes that this was done in error, since the frontier is not clearly defined, and that the matter has been smoothed over satisfactorily. The Egyptian Minister is of the opinion that there are Turkish troops on the Persian side of the line, but with Persia's consent. The Department will recall that the Turkish Ambassador informed the Legation that he had made arrangements with the Persian Government to permit that maneuver.

In any event a force of Kurds is said to have gathered between the two Mounts Ararat and are reported to consist of 1,500 rifles. It now appears that they have not dispersed as the Turkish Ambassador said, which statement was reported in the despatch under reference. An attempt is being made to surround these Kurds by combined Turkish and Persian forces and they are giving serious trouble.

The Turkish Military Attaché said that there are about 15,000 Turkish troops in northeastern Turkey engaged with the Kurds, but that the Persians only have one batallion of 600 troops on the southern and eastern slopes of Little Mount Ararat and perhaps another 600 troops along the frontier south of that mountain. This,he said, would be wholly inadequate against a force of 1,500 Kurds. Furthermore, there

are

are estimated to be all told about 250,000 Kurds in northwestern Persia, so it is easy to imagine these troops might be confronted by a very serious situation should the sympathies of these Persian Kurds become aroused. A Persian officer informed the Legation that he estimated that there were about 600,000 to 700,000 Kurds in Persia, 500,000 in Iraq, and 3,000,000 in Turkey.

When the Turkish Military Attaché was asked what Turkey desired Persia to do he replied that his Government wanted the frontier moved to the south and east of Little Mount Ararat so that hereafter Turkey could surround both mountains and deal with Kurdish rebels without entering Persian territory. The other provision which Turkey wanted was a permanent guard on the Persian side of the frontier. He said that would require some 7,000 troops.

In this connection Colonel Dodd estimates the total strength of the Persian army at 39,000 troops. He added that the Shah places his army at 60,000.

As regards the operations in Turkey, Colonel Dodd said that the losses have run into several thousands. The British liaison officer with the Syrian army at Aleppo reported that during a brief recent visit of Saleh Pasha, the Turkish Commander in the East, that officer referred to the losses as 4,000 casulaties and 6,000 missing, presumably deserters. These figures would seem to be too large if there are only 15,000 Turkish troops in this area as mentioned above.

However,

However, the fighting has been exceptionally severe, and it is reported that many Kurdish villages in northeastern Turkey have been completely wiped out, including every woman and child, as a punishment for assisting the rebels. According to these reports the area west of Mount Ararat has been so thoroughly devastated that no forage can be obtained there and the army has to depend on long and difficult transport to supply the troops.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, September 8, 1930.

No. 1124

INDEX BUREAU DEPT. OF STATE

SEP 23 1930

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SEP 2 1930
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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In U. S. A.

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX BUREAU
767.91/47

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

767.91
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891.46

The much heralded Turkish campaign of suppression against the Kurds now occupying Agri Dag (Mount Ararat) appears to have begun on September 7. Up to date the only important military event has been the desperate though unsuccessful attempt of the Kurds on August 11 to break through the Turkish lines at Ighdir. The period of inactivity in the interim was undoubtedly due in large measure to Persia's refusal to allow the Turkish forces to encircle completely the region of Mount Ararat, part of which lies in Persian territory. After waiting in vain for such permission, the Turkish general staff has apparently decided to carry on the suppression as

NONE 10-1-30

RECEIVED SEP 23 1930

as best it can from the Turkish side. Unfortunately the beleaguered Kurds, having a line of communications open into Persia, have been able to hold out so far and if necessary may be able to escape by the back door unless the Persian frontier force proves more effective than heretofore. This has been the history of more than one of Turkey's border troubles.

The precise status of the diplomatic negotiations between the two governments for the purpose of arriving at a plan of cooperation in suppressing the Kurds and banditry remains obscure, although Persia's replies to the various Turkish proposals have always contained a refusal to envisage the operation of Turkish forces in Persian territory. This fact has been confirmed to me by the Persian Chargé d'Affaires, who states that there are now some 5,000 Persian troops cooperating in suppressing the Kurds. The Chargé adds that the Turks have not actually advanced into Persian territory. This seems most probable as Turkey at present desires to remain at peace with her neighbor. Persia, in turn, would certainly regard with suspicion any Turkish forces on her soil, particularly in the province of Azerbaijan, Turkish aspirations for which are well-known and where an appreciable percentage of the population is Turkish speaking.

Husrev Bey, the new Turkish Ambassador to Teheran, has already left for his post. After consulting with the Gazi at Yalova, where an important cabinet meeting

was

was held, it seems most probable that the Ambassador carries with him instructions which should go a long way toward settling Turkey's Kurdish problem in so far as it affects Persia. The latest solution offered by the Turks is to cede to Persia a fertile zone along the southern boundary in exchange for a certain portion of the Mount Ararat area lying in Persian territory.

The fact remains, however, that the Kurdish problem is still in the melting pot as shown not only by events in Turkey but also in Syria and Irak. In Syria the French have had to take measures against the Kurds and other reactionaries, a large number of whom have come across the border from Turkey. Among the bandits participating in Hatcho's raid towards Mardin the press reports numerous Armenians, who it appears are throwing their lot in with the Kurds. In Irak the acting Prime Minister has had to placate the Kurds in southern Kurdistan who were agitating in behalf of their interests which they claim were disregarded in the recent British-Irak treaty. Press reports intensify this agitation as tantamount to open rebellion. The principal Kurdish organization, the Hubyan society, has issued a declaration at its general assembly which has recently appeared in the Cairo press and which is reprinted in the local

1/ STAMBOUL. A translation of this article is herewith enclosed as throwing considerable light on the Kurdish nationalist movement.

As for Turkey, it is interesting to note that since

the

the inauguration of Fethi Bey's new party the press has found no room for the Kurdish question, which has dropped out of the picture entirely until revived again by the terse announcement today concerning the resumption of military operations. The public is apparently too absorbed with the new party and cannot follow more than one situation at a time. Or is it possible that the Government has seen an opportunity to cover up its Kurdish difficulties in the hubbub over home politics? Even Fethi Bey appears to consider these difficulties forbidden grounds on which to attack the administration. Or is he waiting until debate opens in the Grand National Assembly in November?

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

Enclosure:

1. Translation from the STAMBOUL of August 26, 1930.

Copy sent to American Legation Teheran.

Copy sent E. I. C., Paris.

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KW

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ENCLOSURE No. 1.

TRANSLATION:

From the STAMBOUL, August 26, 1930.

A MANIFESTO OF THE HUBYAN SOCIETY.

The EL-AHRA, a Cairo newspaper, publishes a declaration made by the General Assembly of the Hubyan Society.

We are reproducing this document drawn up in the name of the Kurds, which throws light on a considerable number of questions which until the present have remained in the dark.

After stating that the declaration has been issued with a view to rectifying erroneous news which for some time already have been spread by the papers on the Kurdish question, the promotors of the document continue as follows:

"After the general Kurdish insurrection in 1925, the numerous Kurdish chiefs were scattered in various directions. Whether or not they had taken part in the revolt, all chiefs were considered by the local governments as political refugees, whether in Irak, Persia or Syria.

"As regards the remainder of the Kurdish population, it remained in Turkish territory although withdrawing into the regions of Mount Ararat where the Kurdish tribe Zaglali established itself.

"Later on, an agreement was reached between the political Kurdish agitators in Turkey and those of their compatriots who were pursuing a like goal in Irak, Persia and Syria. This agreement made possible the convening of a Pan-Kurdish General Congress at which all the Kurdish chiefs have taken part. In was during the sittings of this Congress that the Hubyan Society was founded, Hubyan meaning Independence.

"The goal of the foundation of the Hubyan Society therefore was to achieve Kurdistan's independence by all possible means.

"It

"It was with a view to carrying out this program that the Hubyan founded branch offices in all regions inhabited by Kurds, even in the United States of America. Thus the Hubyan Society has been able to establish a rather extensive system of branch offices.

"One of these branch offices was established in the Ararat region. All the Kurdish chiefs residing in this country had taken part in the Pan-Kurdish Congress. In the Ararat region Kurds who had been dispersed following the failure of the 1925 revolt, had now established themselves. This region was therefore considered as being the most important one and became the center of the political activities of the Kurdish element.

"Domestic and foreign measures were decreed and the high command of the revolutionary army was entrusted to Ihsan Nouri Pasha who had been directing the revolutionary movement at Beytuche-bap.

"Ihsan Nouri Pasha then proceeded to the Ararat region in accordance with instructions from the Hubyan Society.

"He carried out his mission and succeeded in creating in Turkish territory a Kurdish organization placed under the orders of the Hubyan Society.

"Owing to the fact that the Turks were ignorant of the political intrigues carried on by the Kurds, they did not from the start give to the Ararat region the importance it deserved.

"But when the Turks realized that the real aim of the Kurds was insurrection, and that the forces under the command of Ihsan Nouri Pasha had reached their allotted posts, they began to despatch troops toward the Ararat region. The Vali of Bayazid expressed the desire of having an interview with Ihsan Nouri Pasha.

"This interview took place and the Vali of Bayazid proposed very advantageous conditions with a view to concluding peace.

"In accordance with these conditions, money and lands were to be distributed to the revolutionaries. But Ihsan Nouri Pasha refused to accept the said conditions. He had already begun to organize

organize the civil as well as the military administration of the Ararat region.

"The goal of the Kurds and their commander was to establish in this region the general headquarters of the revolution which they were preparing.

"The Turkish Government which was closely watching the development of events decided to stifle the movement by despatching an armed expedition to these parts.

"The Turks accuse the Kurds as being reactionaries and tools in the hands of foreigners.

"There is, however, not a single foreigner who lends a helping hand to the Kurds. The most blatant proof of this lies in the hostile attitude assumed by foreigners toward the Kurdish movement. The Powers of all the countries contiguous to Turkey create every kind of difficulty to the Kurds who live in those countries or who seek refuge there.

"A year and a half ago, the Persian Government arrested and put in prison at Tabriz some forty Kurdish chiefs accused to belong to the Hubyan Society.

"On the other hand the Kurdish chiefs established within the Turco-Irakian boundary line have been compelled by the Irakian Government to abandon their residence there and to leave behind all their property.

"In Syria they are subject to like treatment. Kurds living in the vicinity of the Turco-Syrian frontier have been sent south. Kurds are strictly forbidden to penetrate into a zone considered as being the frontier line, some 40 kilometers wide.

"It is not true that Colonel Lawrence and the people figuring in the list of the 150 undesirables have helped the Kurds.

"The entire revolutionary organization is wholly the work of the Kurds and no foreigner has taken a part therein."

IN

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Teheran, Persia,
September 9, 1930.

No. 155.

OCT 1 30

File

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 2 1930
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

Confidential

767.91/48

FOR DISTRIB... No.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

767.91
note
701.6791

Sir:

I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 145 of August 26, 1930, concerning the Perso-Turkish frontier disturbances and in which it was suggested that Memdouh Chevket Bey, the Turkish Ambassador, may have resigned rather than carry out the instructions of his Government in this relation.

On August 30, the day before he left Teheran, the Turkish Ambassador informed the Legation definitely that this was the reason for his

resignation

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He said that the Turkish Foreign Office had instructed him to make representations in the matter of the frontier disturbances which he felt were too severe and he had resigned. He also said that, though Tewfik Rushti Bey, the Turkish Foreign Minister, was annoyed with him, he had received intimations that neither Kemal Pasha nor Ismet Pasha had lost confidence in him.

The Ambassador added that he felt vindicated in the stand he had taken since his Government had altered its views which now conformed with his in the matter of the frontier difficulties. He did not, however, inform the Legation of the nature of the representations which he was originally instructed to make, nor the policy which he had advised his Government to follow.

Respectfully yours,

Chas C. Hart

Charles C. Hart.

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PM RECD

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Istanbul, September 24, 1930.

No. 1130

INDEX BUREAU DEPT. OF STATE

OCT - 8 30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 8 1930
FILE
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

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To the Field
In U. S. A.

767.91/49

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that the military campaign of suppression against the Kurds of Ağri Dağ, referred to in my despatch No. 1124 of September 8, 1930, as having begun on September 7, appears to have been successfully finished on September 12. An official communique from General Salih Pasha, commanding the Turkish forces, describes the intensive operations lasting five days during which the desperate resistance of the Kurds forced the fighting to the very topmost peaks of Mt. Ararat. The Persian Chargé here informs me that on no occasion did the Turks cross into Persian territory, but that the Persian frontier force cooperated with

767.91/47

OCT 11 1930

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with the Turks by means of liaison officers. The result was that the Kurds soon found their line of retreat cut off from all sides. The Chargé describes their last stand as made by an exceedingly well-armed and organized band of 2000 men. The resistance offered by such a force gives some idea of the Turkish losses which must have been considerable.

Although the Chargé has not yet received news of what became of the remaining Kurds in the Ağri Dağ region, there seems to be little doubt that this time the Persians, largely through fear of Turkish aggression, proved of considerable assistance in thoroughly cleaning up this last Kurdish stronghold.

Such a timely end to the Kurdish troubles - for this season at least - has furnished much-needed political capital to Ismet Pasha's Government. At the opening of the Assembly's special session on September 22, the Prime Minister gave a detailed and characteristically frank exposé of the whole affair. The Kurdish troubles he attributed to a desire on the part of their leaders to strike a final blow for independence before Turkey's railway program was completed and while their stronghold, Mt. Ararat, defied attack. He did not minimize the seriousness of the rebellion. He admitted the infiltration of armed bands on all Turkey's frontiers. He lauded the exploits and efficiency of the Turkish Army and pointed out the loyalty and acts of heroism by the populations of Erdjich, Van, Aldjevaz

and

and Ahlat. Finally he defended the Government's policy of suppressing reactionary feudal elements and establishing equal rights and laws under the Republic. In referring to Turkey's relations with her neighbors, the Prime Minister struck a far milder tone than in his speech of July 30. He said in part:

> "The great states composing our neighbors by living up in a most friendly way to those treaties assuring the security of our frontiers have refused to give the least encouragement to the rebels after their suppression and flight. These states have even warned them that they will not allow their uprising.
>
> "They have also chased the rebels and expelled them in many places. These facts, while showing the consideration Turkey enjoys in international relations, is by the same token proof that our country in regard to its neighbors is following a policy based on a sincere and trustworthy security, on friendships and neighborly feeling, and that it will not allow subversive elements to embarrass those countries adjacent to it."

While negotiations with Persia over military cooperation against the Kurds seem finished, the Persian Chargé informs me that the demarkation of the frontier is still a thorny question. The Turks are preparing a favorable setting to ask for rectification, he asserts. The Persians, on the other hand, merely want delimitation according to the boundary settled in 1913. Meanwhile the question will be left to the Boundary Commission which has been interrupted in its labors. Failing an agreement by that body the question will be referred to arbitration, according to the frontier convention signed between the two governments on

April

767.91/5
767.91/52

April 9, 1929.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew.

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Copy sent E. I. C., Paris.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 891.00/1507 FOR #67

FROM Teheran (Villard) DATED Sept.15, 1930

TO NAME 1—1127 GPO

INDEX BUREAU
767.91/50

REGARDING: Kurdish troubles--Azerbaijan.

Wi

In the short space of time I remained in Tabriz, there appeared to be little information regarding the Kurdish troubles which is not already known in Teheran. Some apprehension, however, as to the extension of these troubles was noticeable in the temporary removal to Tabriz of American Lutheran missionaries stationed at Soujbulak, not far from the seat of operations. In regard to the death of Simko, notorious Kurd leader, at the hands of government forces, the reaction among most people was to make them rather ashamed and apologetic at the method by which he met his end. Even though his depredations were feared, he maintained something of an heroic quality in the average person's mind, and the nature of his death aroused no popular applause even in the districts where he was best

AM RECD
BUREAU
DEPT. OF STATE

No. 166.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Teheran, Persia,
September 20, 1930.

DIVISION OF EASTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.
OCT 8 1930
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OCT 16 30

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
JAN 7 1931
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

Confidential

INDEX BUREAU
767.91/51
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To the World
In U. S. A ✓

JAN 8 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OCT 1930
DIVISION OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

767.91

Sir:

Continuing my previous despatches on the Perso-Turkish frontier disturbances, I have the honor to repeat below the remarks made to the Legation by Lieutenant Colonel Arfa, a Persian officer at present in command of the Shah's Pahlevi, Cavalry Regiment, giving a Persian view of this situation.

Colonel

Confidential File
FILED
JAN 10 1931

Colonel Arfa was born in Tiflis of a Persian father and a Russian-English mother, and spent his youth in Tabriz. While attending a Turkish military school in 1912 he ran away to fight in the Turkish army as a corporal during the first Balkan war. He has since attended the Ecole de Guerre in France, and was for a short time Military Attaché in London. His wife is English and his father is Prince Arfa, who was a prominent diplomat and statesman under the Kadjars and lives in Monaco.

Despite his foreign education and long residence abroad and his unusual linguistic abilities he is rabidly nationalistic and strongly anti-foreign in his views.

As regards the present relations between the two countries Colonel Arfa said that Persia desired the Turkish road to Trebizond opened for motor traffic and made safe for travel and that Turkey should not cast covetous eyes on Persian Azerbaijan.

867.154

Colonel Arfa believes that the Trebizond road, which he has traveled and which is now only suitable for beasts of burden, could easily be made passable for automobiles. This is the natural outlet to the sea for products from Persian Azerbaijan and the logical escape from present Russian economic control by reason of Russia being the only northern outlet of Persia's trade. Colonel Arfa feels that Turkey, in order not to offend the Soviet Government, has carefully refrained from improving this historic and natural route.

As to Turkey's aspirations for Persian Azerbaijan, Colonel Arfa said that though he knows Turkey and the Turks as few Persians do, having spent much time there, he wholly distrusts their assertions of friendship for Persia. Referring to often repeated assurances of Memdouh Chevket Bey, the former Turkish Ambassador, that Turkey desires a strong Persia, Colonel Arfa said that though the Ambassador may have been sincere he did not believe that Kemal Pasha, Ismet Pasha or any other Turks in power had such convictions.

Note
891.014

According to Arfa the Turks are essentially and preponderantly a warlike people. The rulers of Turkey today know that Europe is closed to her. The Mediterranean islands are controlled by Italy and England, and there is no chance of expansion to the south owing to the French in Syria and the British in Iraq, so that Turkey can only grow at the expense of its eastern neighbors. Colonel Arfa believes that Persia would be the first to suffer since the rich Turkish speaking Persian Azerbaijan would make a logical addition to Turkey. But Azerbaijan is separated by a corridor inhabited by Kurds who are always ready to fight the Turks.

This brought Colonel Arfa to the present situation. He said that aside from the desire to pacify the Kurds for domestic reasons, the Turks wished Persian cooperation in destroying the power of these tribes which have for centuries been the frontier guard of Persia. In fact the Persian policy was to

allow

allow these tribesmen great liberty of action on the Persian frontier since in the first place it would be an almost impossible task to suppress them, and in the second place the Persian Government believes they would resist a Turkish invasion of Persia more effectively than Persian troops, not because they care anything for the Persians, which they do not, but because they always fight any invaders of their territory. Hence Persia did not desire to diminish the Kurdish strength on the frontier.

Colonel Arfa believes, therefore, that behind Turkey's insistence that Persia help her suppress the Kurds and that Persia even give up an important stragetical position on Lesser Ararat in favor of the Turks, who say they want it in order to control Turkish Kurds, is the desire on the part of Turkey to prepare the road for taking Azerbaijan from both Persia and Russia. He added that he believed that should Turkey take Persian Azerbaijan it would become quite Turkish in five years.

Though on the map, the Persian possession of the southern and eastern sides of Lesser Mount Ararat do not appear to be of great importance, Colonel Arfa says this position entirely controls the Maku Valley, which in turn is the natural route between Turkey and Baku.

As to the Caucasus, Colonel Arfa is of the opinion that Georgia and even Armenia would rather be Turkish than Russian. On this point the Minister

of

of the Court, with whom also some phases of this matter were discussed, disagrees. Furthermore, Teymourtache said that Russian Azerbaijan could readily be assimilated by Turkey and that Persian Azerbaijan would not. Colonel Arfa expressed the view that Russian Azerbaijan, being considerably Bolshevised, would be more difficult to absorb.

861.014

As to the Turkish soldiers, Colonel Arfa said they were excellent, but that the Shah, like many Persians, underestimated their fighting ability. He said that he was certain that any armed advance by the Turks would be met by the most vigorous defense possible in Persia, since the Shah was determined to not give up a single inch of Persian territory.

Asked what position he thought Russia was taking in this affair, Colonel Arfa said that her policy was at present to keep Turkey and Persia on bad terms with each other. He did not, however, think that the Soviets feared that a weak Turkey would spread east into the Caucasus.

Though Colonel Arfa gave the foregoing as his personal views, which he expressed with some asperity and obvious sincerity, he also admitted that he was convinced that they were also the views of the Persian General Staff and the Persian Foreign Office.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart

Charles C. Hart.

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" " Istanbul.

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LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Teheran, Persia,

No. 170. September 23, 1930.





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

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

767.91/51

Referring to my despatch No. 166 of September 20, 1930, and previous despatches concerning the Perso-Turkish frontier disturbances, I have the honor to report that on September 11 the Minister of the Court informed the Legation that he had that day received a telegram from Saleh Pasha, the Turkish Commander, informing him that the Turkish troops were closing in on the Kurds on Mount Ararat and that they would be entirely wiped out in two or three days.

Asked

FILED
OCT 20 1930

Asked if he thought this would take place Teymourtache said that he knew the terrain was extremely difficult for those making an assault, but, that in view of the large numbers of Turkish troops engaged and the determination on the part of their commander to destroy the Kurds, he felt sure that Saleh Pasha would carry out the promise contained in his telegram. He added that the Persian troops were entrenched on the southern and eastern slopes of Lesser Mount Ararat in Persian territory to prevent the Kurds escaping into Persia.

The Minister of the Court also said that the Turkish troops were driving the Kurds from between the two Ararats toward Great Mount Ararat which is entirely in Turkish territory.

He added with a smile that while this might settle the Kurdish difficulties in the Ararat district it would by no means settle the Kurdish question for Turkey.

The telegrams in the press from Ankara report that Kurds on Mount Ararat have been completely shattered and that the operations were terminated without violating the Persian frontier. The Legation has not as yet been able to obtain a confirmation of these reports.

The British Military Attaché said that a few weeks ago when a body of Turkish troops suffered a defeat at the hands of a band of Kurds and lost two villages, they were driven across the river Aras into Soviet territory. The Russian troops

received

received the Turkish soldiers with great consideration and escorted them to a point on the Turco-Soviet border where they could recross with safety.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.91

SEE 891.4016-Pan Kurdish Movement/1 FOR #246

FROM Persia (Hart) DATED Dec.23,1930.
NAME

TO

1—1127 GPO

INDEX BUREAU
767.91/53

53

REGARDING: Discussion of the Kurdish question in the Persian press from the standpoint of its effect on Persia's relations with Turkey. References to recent frontier troubles.

km

Tehran, Persia,

No. 246. December 23, 1920.

Confidential

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Persian nationalists with little else for an issue at this time, I have the honor to report, are seeking to fan themselves into fury over reported Pan-Turkish movement. The burden of the attack appears to be falling on the British who have to take the blame for almost every evil which threatens the country, either real or imaginary.

The press is beginning to work itself up over the subject, generally attributing the movement to

British

British intrigue. Several times the question has come up in recent conversations with Persians who suspect the British of having determined on a scheme to set up a new Kurdish state to be created principally from the Kurdish sections of Turkey and Persia and such of Kurdish Iraq as can be aggregated by amicable arrangement with the Government at Baghdad.

Among the disclosures of Soviet intrigue made in Paris by Agabekoff, former attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Teheran, is one which throws light on the more recent inception of the Pan-Kurdish movement. This places the source of the propaganda in Moscow. The movement was hardly under way, Agabekoff points out, until the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stepped in and called a halt. He indicates that the campaign continued but less in the open.

"We were much interested in the Kurdish problem," Agabekoff says. "In the Foreign Department of the Moscow (Central) G. P. U. they had come to the conclusion that as the Kurdish tribes were divided and spread over four countries; i. e. Turkey, Iraq, Persia and U. S. S. R., and located on routes leading from Iraq to the Caucasus, their attitude would be of great importance in any future wars, e. g. in any eventual future clash between England and Soviet Russia. Furthermore the Kurds are excellent fighters.

"So that before us", Agabekoff continues, "there was the question of organizing the Kurds to work against Iraq, where the British air forces were concentrated.

"To aid the G. P. U. in this matter the Soviet Government in 1927 intended to organize an 'Independent Kurdistan'

"'Kurdistan' on Soviet territory, hoping in this way to win to their side the sympathies of the Kurds. But the Foreign Affairs Commissariat opposed this programme, being afraid that his act would force Russia to break off relations with Turkey and Persia. So it was necessary to adopt another method and organize the Kurds secretly.

"For this purpose it was important to study the condition of the Kurdish tribes, be introduced to their chiefs, cover Kurdistan with a G. P. U. 'net' and later force the Kurds, in some way, to make a secret treaty with us in case of war.

"The centre of all this work was to be Sauj Bulagh. Minassian was in the meantime charged with the work of studying and reporting on the political and commercial life of Azerbaijan (Persian), the means and roads of communication, and the Financial (economic) penetration of the British into Azerbaijan, i. e. how much money the British spent there.

"We had been informed that there was an intention to construct a railway from Trebizond to Tabriz; while on the other hand the British were already constructing a road - the Kowandus Road - from Iraq to Lake Urumia. The Soviet organizations had begun to worry about this, as Persian Azerbaijan would become economically self dependent, and independent of Russia, through finding other routes of communication for exporting its products. But this was not all, for by losing our economic control we should also lose our political control."

The SHAFAGH-I-SORKH of Teheran, whose editor is more lucid than most other Persian publicists, takes up the

Kurdish

Kurdish question editorially in the issue of the paper of December 22, 1930. He discusses the question from the standpoint of its effect on Persia's relations with Turkey.

Commenting, under the caption, "The Perso-Turkish Relations", he deplores the constant raising of the Kurdish question and expresses pain that the latest disturbing reference to the subject appeared in a French newspaper, LE TEMPS of Paris.

I find some of the Persian newspapers interesting as to their editorial matter but hardly worth reading from the standpoint of news integrity. It will be recalled that when the troubles were occurring on the Turkish frontier several months ago the Persian Government, as did the press, stoutly denied that Turkish troops had invaded Persia.

I think it can be conclusively shown that Turkish troops made a raid across the frontier, and, furthermore that Soviet troops also pursued a band of Kurds to somewhere in the vicinity of Tabriz. This latter fact was never published but came out recently in connection with the Agabekoff disclosures. While digging into these revelations it was revealed that toward the close of the Kurdish conflict Teymourtashe, Minister of the Court, made a violent protest to Logunovsky, Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, which resulted in a permanent breach between the two men and forced the Persian Government to transfer all foreign relations to the control of Foroughi who was then made Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The SHAFAGH-I-SORKH editorializes as follows:

During

During the last Kurdish uprising in Turkey the Persian Government adopted a clear and straightforward policy towards Turkey. Persia lent her sincere cooperation in settling the trouble and the attitude of the Persian Government was appreciated by Turkey. In our opinion it is by mutual cooperation that both countries will be able to solve some of their domestic difficulties. Persia has never deviated from this policy, and Turkey is also endeavoring to follow the same line of conduct.

Nevertheless, it is noted that the foreign press ever and anon carries sporadic insinuations which are inconsistent with the aforementioned policy, but which are not worthy of the least consideration, like other illusions which surround the European press in regard to oriental countries.

Latterly LE TEMPS has published a report from its Ankara correspondent which is indeed a source of great regret and surprise. He has reported to his paper that the Kurds in Iraq are making preparations for an assault against Turkey through the Persian territory and that the Turkish Government has decided to send its forces to the Persian territory in pursuit of the invaders if such an attack should be made.

A similar report has been reproduced in AL IRAQ of Baghdad from a German paper alleging that the Perso-Turkish relations are once more strained, and that the Turkish Government has given its frontier troops the necessary instructions to be well-prepared.

The situation is not very mysterious to us, for we are acquainted with policies which are opposed to friendly relations between Turkey and Persia, and which endeavor to create suspicion and distrust between the Turkish and Persian Governments whenever the latter come closer together with a spirit of friendship and cordiality.

We are not unaware of the special aspects of the Kurdish affair in Iraq, and we believe that neither the Turks are ignorant of the Kurdish policy. It is, therefore, presumed that the fallacy of these charges, especially in the face of the lucid attitude of the Persian Government in the Agridagh question, is unquestionable. The Persian Foreign Office will doubtless take action to deny these rumors through its Diplomatic Representatives abroad.

What is really distressing is the appearance of these rumors in LE TEMPS which is either ignorant of the facts or a tool of the evil designs of those

who

who find it in their own interest to embroil Turkey with Persia. Also the correspondent may have obtained such news under the influence of his environment in Ankara, which, if true, will still make the situation more painful. For in that case it will evolve that such flimsy thoughts are entertained in the atmosphere of Ankara; whereas, we have been assuming that the majestic attitude of the Persian Government in the Agridagh* affair has left no room for suspicion or unfavorable speculation in Ankara. Thus it makes it more timely for the Turkish authorities also to publish the same denial which the Persian authorities will send out. For if Persia and Turkey should not demonstrate through active cooperation that such unfounded charges and allegations have no influence on the Perso-Turkish relations, the adversaries of Perso-Turkish friendship will be encouraged to exert more activity in fabricating more fraudulent reports.

The MAHLUL MATIN, a Persian newspaper published in Calcutta, India, goes deeper into the question than the Teheran newspaper, admonishing the Persian and Turkish Governments to get together without delay and find a solution for the Kurdish question which will afford insurance against the use of the tribes by British or other Governments to make serious trouble in Central Asia. This paper under the heading, "The Future Kurdistan", says:

> Over 15 years ago the late Lord Curzon drew the plan for an independent Kurdistan. His plan encountered many difficulties and it finally entailed in the secession from the Turkish Kurdistan of the provinces of Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Mosul and Erbil and their annexation to Iraq. It was clear that this small section of Kurdistan would become independent for the moment, pending its future enlargement to cover all other Kurdish provinces.
>
> The official acknowledgment of the Kurdish language in Kurdistan of Iraq, the latter opposition of the Kurds against the new Anglo-Iraq Treaty which resulted in nearly 50 casualties in

*NOTE. The Agridagh question involves an exchange of territory on the Perso-Turkish frontiers which the Turks hold would put an end to Kurdish trouble in the future. It also involves the Turkish invasion of the Persian territory last summer which was officially denied.

in Sulaimaniya, the developments in Baghdad, the movement of Sheikh Mahmoud and his dreams for a throne in Kurdistan and a hundred other things which have not yet happened, are all the sequels of the orginal pan-Kurdish plan. Iraq will experience the same fate which Morocco has suffered during the last half century. As a result of the new Treaty and her nominal independence, Iraq is doomed to envisage two catastrophes, namely, (1) the secession of the four above-mentioned Kurdish provinces under the pretext of the protection of the (Kurdish) minority, and (2) the secession of Basra on the plea of protecting the Shia majority.

The independence of the Kurdish provinces in Iraq is not without its dangers for Persia and Turkey. On the contrary it will be a prelude for the autonomy of all other Kurdish provinces. Our Kurdish brethren should not be misled by the sweet word 'independence'. They should not think that is is in their interest. Once this plan is put into effect the Kurds will be the first people to suffer. Doubtless the politician who drew the plan was not thinking of the Kurdish interests. He was evidently figuring on what splendid warriors the Kurds would make in fighting their (British) strong enemy, i. e., Russia, and thus intimidating their (British) other neighbors, Persia and Turkey. Even if the Kurds should be armed in the name of independence and engaged in warfare for over a half-century, the same result would be achieved as in Ireland where the Government finds itself under a foreign yoke more than ever before. Kurdistan will have the same destiny. It will be divided between Russia and Great Britain, thus becoming eventually a land for bloodshed in the center of Asia.

Inasmuch as the independent Kurdistan will, without having the least benefit for the Kurds, impugn the honors of Persia and Turkey, it behooves the Persian and Turkish Governments to cooperate in remedying the situation before it becomes too critical. They should sit down and formulate a scheme for neutralizing the old plan. If the Turkish statesmen should follow the example of the Ottoman diplomats in working against Persia, there is no doubt that the pan-Kurdish plan will go into effect, in which case young Turkey will suffer nine times more than Persia in so far as her prestige and independence are concerned.

Constant stirring of this question, I would say, is likely to bring to the top some smouldering embers which

can

can easily burst into flame with a little more fanning. Just how live the question is now is difficult to say because the economic crisis has crowded all questions of foreign relations into the background. I had hoped that some information might be obtained through the Turkish Embassy but the Ambassador has not indicated his intention to make an early return, while the man in charge has not impressed his colleagues as an official in possession of any valuable knowledge.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

Copy to E. I. C., Paris.

CCH/F.

A true copy of the signed original.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 767.911 5/24 FOR #260

FROM Persia (Hart) DATED Dec.31, 1930
TO NAME

1—1127

INDEX BUREAU
767.91/54

54

REGARDING:

Negotiations for the settlement of the boundary dispute between Persia and Turkey.

Wi

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.91 / 55

SEE 767.9115/25 FOR #295

FROM Persia (Hart) DATED Jan.14, 1931

NAME

1—1127 ...

REGARDING: the return of the Turkish Ambassador to Persia to take up negotiations with the Persian Government for the settlement of the Mount Ararat question which involves a revision of the Turco-Persian frontier.

dew

Teheran, Persia,

No. 295. January 14, 1931.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that Husrev Bey, Turkish Ambassador, is expected to return to Teheran about January 20, 1931.

Immediately on his return the purpose is, I am informed, to take up negotiations with the Persian Government for the settlement of the Mount Ararat question which involves a revision

of

of the Turco-Persian frontier.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

Copy to E. I. C., Paris.

CCH/T.

A true copy of the signed original.

DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 867.00/2054 FOR #333

FROM Persia (Hart) DATED Jan. 28, 1931
TO NAME

1—1172

767.91/56

REGARDING:

Possibility of Kurdish disturbances on the Turkish-Persian frontier and refusal of the Persian authorities to turn over to Turkey Nuri Pasha, Kurdish leader.

Teheran, Persia,

No. 535. January 28, 1931.

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that first direct news of the latest Kurdish disturbances in Turkey was brought to Teheran today by a reliable Persian returning from the frontier. The present rising, he said, does not especially concern Persia because it is in the interior, in a small triangle near Bush, west of Lake Van, and far removed from the frontier, a fact not made clear by any newspaper despatches I have seen.

The most interesting feature of his report was

the

the statement that Turkish troops actually have huts on Little Ararat, on the Persian side of the frontier, despite denials of the Persian Government that the Turks have at any time crossed over. He assumed that these preparations carried on by Turks on the Persian side have been organized with the knowledge and consent of the Persian Government.

This informant expressed no doubt that there will be a fresh outbreak on the frontier just as soon as warmer weather comes. The Kurds, he declared, have no reason to be discouraged because they have fared far better than reports have made it appear. He asserted that in his judgment the Kurds have not lost 500 men while the Turks have lost a very much larger number, besides having been forced to expend not less than 5,000,000 lire on the conflict.

It is observed that newspaper dispatches from Turkey always put Nuri Pasha, leader of the Persian Kurds, into recent front line fighting. He has become almost as much a mobile figure as the mysterious "Colonel Lawrence." Colonel Dodd, British Military Attache, informed me today that Nuri Pasha has been living under Government protection since last September at the little village of Saveh, thirty miles south of Teheran. He is living quietly and is not under arrest, Colonel Dodd said.

When the Turkish Government demanded that Nuri Pasha and some of his chief followers be turned over to Turkish military authorities, the Persian Government

refused

refused to give them up on the grounds that they are only political offenders, and if punishable at all, should be disposed of by Persian legal processes. About this attitude of the Persian Government, Colonel Dodd said, the Turkish Government is in a furious mood which, he intimated, he thought justifiable.

Within the last few days Kurdish Turks have risen on the Iraq frontier near Sulaimaniya, led by Sheikh Mahmoud who aspires to be sovereign of Kurdistan. British troops are aiding the Iraq Government in the suppression of this uprising and the Persians are giving aid in the vicinity of Meriwan.

First notice of the latest Kurdish trouble was taken yesterday (January 27) by IRAN, Teheran newspaper, which confirmed the presence of Nuri Pasha in Persia:

"The (London) TIMES of December 30, quoting its Cairo correspondent had a lengthy article on the revolt in Kurdistan and the breach of word by the leader of the rebels," commented IRAN. "The (London) DAILY TELEGRAPH also publishes a Teheran report concerning the insurrection of the Turkish Kurds. Both reports are based on the flight of Ihsan Nuri Pasha.

"While we are not going to go into the details, we desire to announce for the mere information of the above-mentioned papers that Ihsan Nuri has not escaped; that he is still in Persia and under

surveillance

surveillance and custody. Hence all illusions resulting from his reported flight are untrue."

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

CCH/JMM

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

SEE 767.9115/27 FOR #372

FROM Persia (Hart) DATED Feb.11, 1931
TO NAME 1—1172 GPO

767.91/57

57

REGARDING:

Informs that Husrev Bey, Turkish Ambassador, has not begun negotiations for the settlement of the boundary question and comments on possible Kurdish uprisings on the frontier in the spring.

Wi

Teheran, Persia,

No. 972. February 11, 1931.

Confidential

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to report that although Husrev Bey, Turkish Ambassador, has been in Teheran for three weeks, conferences with the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs relative to the settlement of the Perso-Turkish frontier question have not begun.

Foroughi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, informed me at a dinner last night that he had expected Husrev Bey to open the question immediately on his return

three

three weeks ago, but that the Turkish Ambassador had gone no further than to say he was not yet ready to begin discussions. Foroughi said the frontier question was first taken up here by Chevket Bey, former Turkish Ambassador, last August. Discussions were then cut short by the departure of Chevket Bey for Ankara.

Foroughi repeated then the information which I communicated to the Department some weeks ago, that Husrev Bey came here in September and departed two or three weeks later without mentioning the subject. Later he took up the question with the Persian Government by note to Foroughi from Ankara ~~or~~ Constantinople.

It seemed to me that I detected in Foroughi's voice a note of disappointment. The numerous published interviews with Husrev Bey in the Turkish press had undoubtedly led the Persian Government to believe that Husrev was returning here prepared to settle the question and even to offer very considerable concessions on the part of the Turkish Government finally to determine the question.

My opinion is that Husrev Bey is playing with fire. Only a few weeks hence the snows will melt away on the slopes of Little Mount Ararat and the Kurds will swarm like bees from their hibernal haunts, hungry for food and trouble making. If seemingly authentic reports that the Ararat Kurds did not fare so badly in the conflict with Turks and Persians last summer are true, there is no reason why

why the raids should not be renewed.

The Turkish Government, I would say, is not at fault in the present crisis. The blame seems to rest on Husrev Bey whose superiority complex, acquired at that most extreme eastern outpost of western civilization, Sofia, is leading him into the mistake of exhibiting too boldly his feeling of contempt for his fellow orientals, the Persians.

In no country in the world do I believe it safe for a diplomatic official to put on parade his distaste for the people of the Government to which he is accredited. But, perhaps, Husrev Bey is in that state of mind where he does not care and prefers to be frank. Mayhap he feels proud that his open dislikes were openly arrived at.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

Copy to American Embassy, Istanbul.

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DOCUMENT FILE

NOTE

767.91/58

SEE 767.9115/28 FOR #386

FROM Persia (Hart) DATED Feb.19, 1931
TO NAME

1—1127 o.r.o

REGARDING:

Report on some of the matters affecting the Turco-Persian boundary dispute. Question of the territory to be ceded by each country in the settlement of the matter. Trebizond road. Influence of Russia's attitude.

WI

Teheran, Persia,

No. 306. February 19, 1921.

Confidential

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Referring to my previous despatches concerning the Turco-Persian boundary dispute, I have the honor to report that, as far as I am aware, no further developments appear to have taken place. However, I present in the following paragraphs some of the influences bearing on this vexed question as they suggest themselves, though of necessity it involves a certain amount of repetition and stating of the obvious for the purposes of clarity.

The

The chief difficulty in dealing with this subject is the paucity of definite information obtainable, which lack has been much accentuated by the departure of the former Turkish Ambassador, Memdouh Chevket Bey, who so kindly offered many illuminating remarks during his stay in Teheran.

Nevertheless, as reported in my despatches, a few points seem to be quite clear.

That Turkey is keenly desirous of obtaining the Persian or southern and eastern slopes of Little Mount Ararat, ostensibly in order to eliminate the entire district as a Kurdish stronghold, has been too much stressed in Turkish public and private statements to require emphasis here. On the other hand it is not clear how strongly Persia feels that the loss of this small area would affect Persia's strategic position in the Nakhitchevan valley, in particular, and northern and western Persia in general.

The views of Colonel Arfa on this point (see my despatch No. 186 of September 20, 1930) were very concrete and the Department will recall that he believed that both the Persian General Staff and the Foreign Office shared his deep suspicion that Turkey looks at this strategic position with a future conquest of Persian Azerbaijan in mind. But Colonel Arfa is first a soldier, and I am not at all sure that the Persian Foreign Office is not seriously contemplating a trade. This is especially true since it is well within the bounds of possibility that Turkey will force Persia to give in on this point if she does not do so otherwise. The reported

encouragement

encampment or garrison of Turkish troops on the Persian slopes of Little Mount Ararat (see despatch No. 353 of January 28, 1931), strongly lends credence to this hypothesis. Furthermore, Foroughi has admitted that Persia "had accepted in principle" the proposal to give up Persia's Ararat district. This admission of the Foreign Minister is the more convincing and significant when judged in the light of the reported occupation of that district by Turkish troops referred to above.

There have been frequent public and private references to the proposal that Turkey should compensate Persia for her Ararat district by giving a large and fertile area of Turkish territory farther south. The bargaining over the amount of this compensation is, no doubt, an important factor in these negotiations, as in such matters all countries, especially Oriental ones where appearances are given such weight, may be expected to demand a tangible quid pro quo. However, I believe that the real kernel of the bargaining lies not in the size and location of the Turkish territory to be given to Persia but in the question of the Trebizond road.

Persia is naturally extremely anxious that a good road be built on the Turkish portion of this historic route from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea. It is the natural economic outlet of northern Persia. I have even heard it suggested that a railway also is being considered.

To be sure there is under construction the Rowandus road,

road, which is to run from Tabriz, south of Lake Urumia, and across the Iraq frontier to the railhead at Nishibin, and I understand that all but about fifteen or twenty miles on the Persian side are completed. This last bit runs through very difficult country and there is a much longer stretch on the Iraq side on which the work is proceeding very slowly owing to the straitened financial position of Iraq, as well as the physical obstacles in the way of its completion. When finished this Rowandus route will, however, never be as economical an outlet for northern Persia as would be a good Trebizond road, since Trebizond, a seaport, is not much farther than, if as far as, Nishibin from which a long rail haul is necessary to reach the sea.

This brings me back to Persia's self evident anxiety for the opening of the Trebizond road, especially since, as the Department is aware, Russia at present is for all practical purposes the only outlet for north Persian produce and therefore can fix its own price. Persia's discomfort in this situation is too obvious to call for comment.

Should Turkey build the Trebizond road a great part of this compulsory and unremunerative trade with Russia would go to the Turkish port, doubtless to the profit of Turkey. Thus, if the construction of the Trebizond road would not entail too great an expense, it would appear that both Turkey and Persia could only benefit financially by such a venture.

Conversely,

Conversely, in the event of such a road being constructed, Russia would lose much of its lucrative control of northwestern Persia and, therefore, will no doubt endeavor to prevent the building of that road.

I might mention here the view which has sometimes been offered that the U. S. S. R. desires Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan to be strong and mutually peaceful, and if they cannot be kept friendly to Russia she none the less needs them as protection from the south. What foundation if any there may be in this hypothetical policy, I doubt that it has perceptibly influenced the Soviet toward a more friendly attitude in regard to the Trebizond road project, and I feel that my previous surmise, namely: that Russia is whole-heartedly opposed to such a project, is correct.

When it comes to the relationship between Turkey and Russia as regards this question, I am almost wholly at sea in the absence of any concrete or even suggested information to go upon. At the British Legation one hears that Ankara has cooled considerably in its attitude toward the Soviets during the last year. Memdouh Cheviket Bey suggested as much last summer, but added that Turkey could not afford to offend Russia.

Such vague and intangible allusions are not of much help in estimating the triangle of conflicting interests discussed in the previous pages. By this triangle, which to be sure is based largely on assumptions, I mean that Persia desiring freedom from

economic

economic dependence on Russia appears willing to trade her strategic position in the Ararat district for the Trebizond road; and Turkey, keenly anxious for the control of the entire Ararat district is perhaps willing to build the road but is afraid of thus irritating Russia.

As I said above, the weakest link in this chain of reasoning lies in the absence of any definite information on Turco-Russian relations and, therefore, the unknown quantity of how far Turkey may flaunt Russia with impunity.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

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AM RECD

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Teheran, Persia,
March 16, 1931.

No. 444.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 15 1931
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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE

APR 15 31

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APR 21 1931

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
APR 16 1931
DIVISION OF
NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

767.91/59

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

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With reference to my previous despatches concerning the Turco-Persian frontier, I have the honor to report that according to a current but as yet unconfirmed rumor, Turkish troops are said to have penetrated 24 kilometers into Persian territory near Mount Ararat a few days ago ostensibly in pursuit of Kurdish bandits from the Turkish side of the line.

The British Consul at Tabriz, who communicated to this Legation this reported penetration, added that he had been told that the Persian troops stationed in and about Tabriz had been rushed to the Maku area southeast of Ararat.

APR 25 1931

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These reports were given some color by the rumor in Teheran that all available trucks in town had been commandeered to carry troops from the capital. Colonel Dodd, the British Military Attaché, had inquiries made and learned that such orders had actually been given but were later partially countermanded. It is also said that a number of truck loads of ammunition have been sent to the north.

On March 17, I had occasion to call on both Foroughi, the Foreign Minister, and later on Husrev Bey, the Turkish Ambassador, when the frontier was mentioned.

As to the reported penetration of Persia, Foroughi did not admit that Turkish troops had entered Persian territory but said that some Kurdish bandits had crossed the Persian frontier a few days before. But to Foroughi this must be an unpleasant subject at best and I doubt that he would even be willing to admit, as reported in previous despatches, that there are Turkish troops encamped on the Persian slopes of Little Mount Ararat.

Feeling that he would naturally desire to be reticent on this score, I confined my talk to the progress of his conversations with the Turkish Ambassador on the boundary question. He said they had had many discussions on the subject but had made no progress. Somewhat to my surprise Foroughi said that the trouble was that Husrev Bey "has no power to settle anything", adding that being fresh from Turkey himself, he was thoroughly familiar with the political situation there. In Turkey, Foroughi declared all powers are vested in

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the military which controls foreign relations as well as all other administration. Foroughi's remark concerning Husrev Bey is interesting since the Foreign Minister is, as far as I know, entirely sincere and I do not believe that he would attempt to mislead a disinterested observer like myself.

In my previous despatches I have indicated that I do not regard Husrev Bey as comparable to his predecessor. He seems always to be endeavoring to give the impression of importance and does not quite succeed. But as Husrev Bey is reported to be a close friend of Kemal Pasha, a report which is confirmed by the British Legation, I am a little undecided what to think of Foroughi's remark.

When I called on him later, Husrev Bey also said that there had been a great many talks on the frontier question but that the Persian Government, though accepting in principle, the cession of the Persian Ararat territory, had shown little real inclination to get the matter settled. He said that Turkey only wanted an area of five by eight kilometers on the Persian slope of Little Mount Ararat in order to control certain connecting mountain paths used by the Kurds and was willing to give in exchange Turkish territory in the south ten times as large. He had duscussed every phase of the question with the Ministers of the Court and Foreign Affairs, supplementing his explanations with the use of maps, but with little apparent success.

In his conversation with me, Husrev Bey endeavored to point out, as he had to the Persian Government, that

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it was in the interest of both Turkey and Persia to suppress the Kurds and that Ararat was of no basic strategic importance to Persia in a frontier hundreds of miles long. But I remain unconvinced and daresay that as mentioned in my previous despatches, the Persian Government also takes an entirely different view from that suggested by the Turkish Ambassador. The latter appeared also to make a particular point of urging upon me the legal propriety of his Government's action in maintaining military outposts in the Little Ararat region. He pointed out that there had been lengthy discussions between his Government and Foroughi while the latter was Persian Ambassador at Ankara, that these discussions had resulted in the signature of a protocol regarding boundary questions and that when signing such protocol it was recognized that an agreement had not been reached with regard to three disputed areas. The forty square kilometers in the Little Ararat was, he said, one of these disputed areas and Turkey naturally claimed its right to operate as far as the eastern boundary thereof; it had already done so last summer, at the time of the 1930 Kurdish troubles, and it still maintained small military outposts in the area to control certain key paths used by the Kurds when travelling on the eastern slopes of Little Ararat.

The "protocol" to which Husrev Bey referred is, no doubt, the so-called Turco-Persian Frontier Agreement of April 9, 1929, referred to in current despatches from this Legation and from the Embassy at Istanbul. (Please see particularly Mr. Grew's despatches Nos. 721 and 758 of April 24 and June 3, 1929, and Mr. Williamson's despatch No. 893 of July 26 of the same year). As reported in Mr.

Grew's

Grew's second despatch; Article 1 of the Agreement described the frontier; Article 2 sets up a Mixed Commission to demarcate it; and Article 3 prescribes how the three "disputed zones", mentioned in Article 1, shall be allocated. The description in Article 1 indicates that the first of these disputed zones, or areas, is in what is generally spoken of as the Little Ararat region, the other two being to the southeast in the Mt. Sourava and Kutur regions.

Referring to the Tabriz-Trebizond road, Husrev Bey agreed that Persia was very anxious to have this opened but said that the Persians did not seem to comprehend that it involved a great expenditure for an improverished Turkey, especially were a modern port to be built at Trebizond. He referred nevertheless to a possible future Trebizond through which most of the trade of northern Persia might pass and expressed the opinion that his Government would not object to granting extensive "free port" privileges there.

867.154
891.154

867.003
Free Zone
(Trebizond)

While the Turkish Ambassador and Foroughi did not directly confirm my views, I am still inclined to the opinion contained in my despatch No.386 of February 19, 1931, that the opening of the Trebizond road looms larger in Persia's interest than any territory which she may receive in exchange for the Persian slopes of Little Mount Ararat.

767.9115/28

The British Military Attaché said that according to the Turkish counselor, Djevad Bey, an offer of settlement made by Persia actually had been accepted by Turkey and that when the Persian Government brought up entirely new

points

points the patience of his Government was exhausted. I endeavored to obtain a confirmation of this from the Ambassador but he only went as far as to say that Persia had accepted in principle the relinquishment of Persian Ararat, a fact of which I have been aware for some time.

If, however, Djevad Bey's remark may be taken at its full face value, I should not be surprised to see increasing penetration of Persia by Turkish troops in the Ararat district until Persia gives in on this question.

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

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DEPT. OF STATE DIV. COM. & REC.

LEGATION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Teheran, Persia,
March 23, 1931.

No. 462.

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APR 17 1931
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767.91/60

The Honorable

The Secretary of State,

Washington.

Sir:

Supplementing my despatch No. 459 of March 17,1931, concerning the recent penitration into Persian territory of Turkish troops, I have the honor to report that on March 19, 1931, in a speech in the Medjliss, Mirza Khalil Khan Fahimi, a deputy from Gouchan, Khorassan, questioned the Foreign Minister in the matter of "foreign encroachments", obviously referring to the Turkish encampment on the Persian slopes of Little Mount Ararat, the recent incursion of Turkish troops mentioned above and perhaps to the entry of Soviet troops into Persian territory last summer. The deputy's remarks follow:

"Persia

APR 21 1931

"Persia has a peaceful foreign policy. She does not encroach upon the rights of others, nor does she allow others to encroach upon her rights. The Government should, therefore, have an open policy in the realm of foreign relations. The people of Persia have the right to know which country has respected the rights of their country and which country has violated these rights. It is needless to say that nowadays no country can encroach upon the rights of another country. The time when one nation assailed another nation with tribal guerilla parties is passed. Otherwise we could do the same thing as well. Unfortunately the Persian Government has heretofore believed in a secretive policy in the domain of its foreign relations. In my opinion this policy of dissimulation is detrimental, for reports are magnified and fallaciously reproduced in the foreign press.

"The Medjliss has remained reticent because of its ignorance of the facts. This reticence is also detrimental. It may be interpreted as a proof of Persian heedlessness, lack of interest and sense. Since last year we have been hearing that certain Governments pretending to be friendly to Persia have openly encroached on the rights of our country. Such encroachments cannot be attributed to anything else save to wilfulness and carelessness in respect to international obligations.

"The people of Persia have the right to know their foes and friends. The Medjliss has the right to ask the Government to abandon its extravagant policy of diplomatic decorum which has now reached its extreme. It should make a row and proclaim its grievances in order that the

civilized

civilized world may learn how Persia is being treated. Persia is a member of the League of Nations. She should report these violations to the League."

Foroughi, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied to the deputy as follows:

"The Government has neither been ostentatious nor secretive. It is true that during the past year the rights of our country have been violated. I do not intend to conceal this fact from the gentleman. On the other hand, the Government has not remained an idle spectator vis-á-vis these events. It has immediately lodged protests against aggressions and has taken prompt action to remedy the situation.

"The circumstances have not been such as to render the Government hopeless in continuing to endeavor to obtain results through direct representations. Thus it has been unnecessary to resort to the League of Nations or to appeal to the Medjliss and to public opinion. This is all I can say today in reply to the honorable deputy. The details I will leave for the future."

Respectfully yours,

Charles C. Hart.

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